On Linguistic Warfare

Whereas the most basic purpose of language is to facilitate communication between people, its development is necessarily a social affair. That being said, the role of individuals in this process cannot be denied. Only individuals think, act, speak, and write; there can be no erection of social constructs without the sum of individual efforts. It is true that a collective endeavor is necessary in order for a particular word to come into use and be understood to have a particular set of meanings with regard to connotation, denotation, and exosemantics. But before this can happen, some individual must take the first step. Someone must have an idea that one cannot express in one’s extant vocabulary and thus feel the need to either borrow a word from another language or invent one out of thin air. Because ideas which cannot be put into words are very difficult to utilize, this creative process is necessary for the advancement of knowledge and technology.

Jargon 101

The next step toward a word gaining widespread acceptance and usage is use within a smaller group. At this stage, a word may be described as jargon. Merriam-Webster defines jargon as “the technical terminology or characteristic idiom of a special activity or group” or as “obscure and often pretentious language marked by circumlocutions and long words.” Those outside of the group in question often view the former as the latter, with varying degrees of accuracy. The majority of jargon consists of terminology within a specific industry created to allow for greater precision and efficiency among participants in that industry. As Étienne Bonnot de Condillac writes,

“Each science requires a special language, because each science has ideas which are unique to it. It seems that we should begin by forming this language; but we begin by speaking and writing and the language remains to be created.”[1]

However, any social group can have jargon; the defining characteristic is special vocabulary and/or definitions, not use by any particular type of group or toward any particular purpose.

There exists a wide range of applications for jargon within various social dynamics. Jargon can be used as a means of excluding outsiders by speaking in terms that they do not understand, in which case it is also known as argot. The particular pronunciation of a word can also denote in-group versus out-group; this is called a shibboleth. Conversely, a lingua franca is especially used to communicate with outsiders; examples include the various creole languages and pidgins that have formed when people who speak mutually unintelligible languages wish to trade. The general trend over the long-term is for the secrecy of argots and shibboleths to be dissolved, for technical jargon in a specific field to become part of the wider lexicon of a language, and for linguae francae to develop into full languages, but in each case some of these will be lost in the mists of time.

Politics and Weaponization

Because there are disagreements between groups of people and these are debated using language, such disputes necessarily manifest in the linguistic realm. The desire by each side to emerge victorious from these debates causes the above processes to become weaponized. This weaponization takes several forms. First, instead of inventing terms to advance knowledge by giving expression to new ideas, terms are invented for the purpose of attacking one’s political opponents. In some cases this creates a direct insult, but the majority of the examples of this are indirect, such as the term assault weapon. This was invented by gun control advocates in the 1980s and was alien to the practice of gun ownership. The goal of these terms was to attack gun owners indirectly by attacking something that they hold dear. With the 1994 assault weapons ban, the term had to be defined in the law as it had no clear prior definition. In any event, the goal of this strategy is not to debate but to ridicule, not to resolve disputes but to broaden them.

A related strategy for less creative political activists is to corrupt the meaning of existing terms. This is done to associate a present political opponent with a hated enemy from the past. A prominent example of this is the word fascist. Fascism refers to a particular type of political order consisting of nationalism, authoritarianism, protectionism, socialism, and cultural conservatism. But the work of radical leftists has debased the term into a general insult to be hurled at anyone who is perceived by them to be insufficiently leftist. The word racist has undergone a similar transformation; having once referred to hatred of people based on their external appearance, it has been corrupted to mean anything that is not sufficiently anti-white. Corrupting an existing word in this manner is less effective than inventing a new word because there are always large groups of people who resist the change in definition, but this only serves to amplify conflict by enabling rivalrous groups to talk past each other.

Of course, the wordsmiths responsible for such efforts are aware that the best defense can be a good offense. This has led to a strategy of curtailing efforts by the opposition to express their ideas, for that which cannot be expressed need not be rebutted. Those in power may resort to “hate speech” laws to criminalize speech that they oppose (another example of the invention of a term for the purpose of attacking one’s political opponents). These are made intentionally vague and are meant to be used to prosecute only a few high-profile cases. The intention is to create a chilling effect that deters those out of power from using linguistic processes to their full potential, as they will always be wondering whether they are engaging in crimethink. After all, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and self-censorship greatly reduces enforcement costs.

Because such direct censorship is generally resisted in the West, less direct means of interfering with the opposition’s ability to communicate are often employed instead. Because jargon is commonly used by religious cults to hide their true nature from outsiders and the public has a generally unfavorable opinion of cults, a political operative can conflate this with the efforts of an opposition group to expand a language so that they may express novel ideas. A simpler method is to accuse the opposition of making up their ideology as they go due to their invention of terms, which is surprisingly effective given that all words have been made up by someone sometime.

Unfortunately, the spread of democracy has exacerbated these problems. Because everyone in a democratic system has a slice of political power, everyone becomes a political target. The deliberate engineering of permanent conflict in society that is democratic government ensures that weaponization of language is omnipresent. Thus, all linguistic innovation is hindered to the detriment of rationality and real progress, as efforts which could have gone toward higher endeavors are misdirected into internal disputes.

Solutions and Pitfalls

The above examples have a distinctly leftist flavor to them, and this is not an accident. All of the above tactics are disproportionately used by leftists, and political democracy is an inherently leftist institution. Therefore, most of the solutions will have a rightist character to them, and the potential pitfalls will tend to resemble tragic flaws in which rightists try to adapt leftist methods without removing the aspects which make them distinctly leftist. Let us now counter the above tactics.

The first two, the invention and use of insults as well as the demonization of activities and objects present the pitfall of sinking to the level of the enemy. When confronted with someone who argues in bad faith, resorts to ad hominems, and denigrates one’s cherished hobbies and prized possessions, the desire to be nasty to that person is an understandable impulse. But it is the wrong course of action. The correct strategy is actually best summarized by an enemy of libertarians and reactionaries. To quote Michelle Obama, “When they go low, we go high.” It is best to remain calm and state for the record that what the opponent is saying is not a proper argument or that when an argument is lost, slander becomes the tool of the loser. If one must go further, then it is best to follow the advice of Sam Brown, “Never offend people with style when you can offend them with substance.” That is to say, whatever observations one makes should be clearly demonstrable and insightful.

Those who corrupt definitions are a more subversive lot, unlikely to be directly encountered. In most cases, one will be dealing with ignorant, misinformed college students who are convinced of their own competence and know no better. This challenge requires one to be well-informed about the truth, the lies that students are commonly taught, and why their professors are wrong. Most can be reasoned with if the correct approach is used, but forceful suppression is necessary in the most extreme cases. It is necessary to exercise discretion and only debate those who are willing to be convinced of other ideas.

Accusations of cultism or of making up one’s ideology in an ad hoc fashion can be extremely damaging if not rebutted properly. Although leftists frequently engage in these behaviors as well as psychological projection, this counter-accusation by itself is a tu quoque fallacy that does not rebut the accusation. A proper response should present a reasoned case for why one’s political movement is not comparable to a religious cult, or how one’s ideology is internally consistent.

Unlike the strategies discussed so far, the most fruitful approach for dealing with “hate speech” laws is likely to be a simple reversal. Instead of banning “hate speech,” the laws should be changed to ban “communist propaganda.” Such a ban should be as vague and fear-provoking as the laws which muzzle rightists, particularly outside of the United States. Of course, any non-critical discussion of the concept of “hate speech” would count as “communist propaganda.” The end goals of such a measure are both to suppress radical leftists and to show moderate leftists that any power they wish the state to have can and will be used against them when they are not in power. The potential pitfall is to lose sight of these goals and become right-wing counterparts of social justice warriors.

Finally, it will not do to hack away at the branches of evil without striking the root. Although such behaviors can occur on a small scale within non-democratic societies, democracy amplifies linguistic warfare to a fever pitch by making all disputes of sufficient importance into political disputes. As Carl Schmitt writes,

“The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship. The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense.”[2]

The historical method of abolishing democracy has been the imposition of an unelected government, whether a military junta, hereditary monarchy, or some combination thereof. Libertarians propose another methodology; that of a stateless propertarian society in which all property is privately owned and all goods and services are provided by competing firms in a free market. These systems deny the general public—those who do not have an ownership stake in the society—a political voice. The restriction of political power to those who have an ownership stake means that it makes no sense for most people living in these social orders to insult, bully, and attack one another over political disputes, as the winner of such a dispute has no direct influence over the direction of the society. When only the king or dictator can vote, or only the private property owner can make decisions over the property in question, only they and whatever underlings they may have are worth engaging with linguistic warfare. Even these attacks will be blunted by the fact that freedom to engage in such attacks is not a universal human right, but a privilege belonging to those who control territory. If one owns a space, one may say whatever one wishes within that space. Those who own no property and cannot convince anyone who does to let them speak are thus silenced, and society is better off for not having to hear their ignorant pablum.

Conclusion

There are two overarching tactics for opponents of the progressive establishment in the current environment of linguistic warfare: play to win or knock over the gameboard. Playing to draw or trying to lose gracefully, as establishment conservatives and libertarians have done for decades, has in large part allowed conditions to degenerate to their present status. Though playing to win is certainly necessary, it will not be sufficient because although it can defeat enemies, the current system is firmly entrenched and designed to produce ever greater numbers of foot soldiers for the establishment. Only demolition of the Cathedral will suffice to return society to a state of peaceful discourse. The resulting end of linguistic warfare would bring about a renewed focus on the advancement of knowledge and technology, paving the way for a proper restoration of Western civilization.

References:

  1. de Condillac, Étienne Bonnot (1776). Le Commerce et le gouvernement considérés relativement l’un à l’autre. p. 93.
  2. Schmitt, Carl (1996). The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition. The University of Chicago Press. p. 61.

Book Review: Reactionary Liberty

Reactionary Liberty is a book about libertarian philosophy by Robert Taylor that approaches this and related subjects from a reactionary perspective. The book is divided into fifteen chapters, with a short introduction preceding.

Taylor begins with a four-page introduction in which he explains his motivations for writing the book. Mostly, this involves the decisive leftward shift in American libertarianism since the Ron Paul presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012, including a notorious open letter to Paul read at the 2015 International Students for Liberty conference and Gary Johnson’s disastrous presentation in 2016. He briefly explains what is wrong with left-libertarianism and gives an outline of the structure of the book.

In the first chapter, Taylor begins with the non-aggression principle (NAP), self-ownership, and private property rights. Although Taylor notes the important distinction between just property and currently-held property, he fails to properly account for the role of conquest in determining property rights over the long term. Taylor goes on to explain the social and economic difficulties that arise without secure property rights. The failures of central planning are discussed, as are the differences between negative and positive rights. He lays out the history of natural law in Western philosophy, beginning with early Christian thinkers, continuing through Enlightenment philosophers, and culminating in Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. Taylor contrasts this with the state, which routinely violates natural law and rights. He details the many crimes of nation-states, war and debt slavery being chief among them. Taylor concludes by proposing an alternative to Marxist class theory which vilifies the state rather than the capitalist, and elevates the producer rather than the parasite.

The second chapter deals with the Austrian School perspective on the subject. Taylor takes the reader through praxeology, the action axiom, marginal utility, and the role of prices in efficiently allocating resources. Next, he explains why government and central bank interference with prices is so destructive. The section on money deals with the history of money according to the regression theorem, beginning with barter and commodity money, then progressing to precious metals and receipts for those metals. Taylor shows the reader that modern fiat currencies are a corruption of these receipts into instruments of inflation and debt slavery that facilitate unduly risky financial behavior, state largesse, and wars. In the Austrian view, these behaviors fuel the business cycle of booms and busts by distorting interest rates, which leads investors astray.

Spontaneous order and free markets are the subjects of the third chapter. Taylor begins with the economic calculation problem, the knowledge problem, and public choice theory, showing that central planning cannot succeed because it cannot calculate prices without the market and is further hampered by cynical concerns. He then covers the concept of spontaneous order, making the important and oft-overlooked observation that “there is no such thing as an unregulated market; the issue is, rather, who is doing the regulating.” These regulations take the form of trust, reputation, and freedom to dissociate, unless the state interferes by imposing its coercive regulations. Taylor frames the difference between state and market in terms of who gets profits and who suffers losses. The state privatizes profits and socializes losses, while the market does the opposite. Next, Taylor proposes the term marketization to describe the proper procedures for converting state monopolies into free-market entities, as privatization has acquired the meaning of turning over state monopolies to politically-connected oligarchs, as happened in Russia when the Soviet Union collapsed. He concludes the chapter by providing an outline of how businesses may function in a purely libertarian market while noting that the particulars can only be observed in the future, not precisely predicted in the present.

The fourth chapter offers a much-needed treatment of Cultural Marxism, a concept often (and incorrectly) dismissed by leftists as a conspiracy theory. Taylor traces its roots to the failure of political and economic Marxism in Europe after World War I, at which time Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukacs resolved to apply Marxism to culture and use it to destroy traditional Western culture, which they faulted for the failure of communism to take root in most of the West. Taylor traces the ‘long march through the institutions’ from its beginnings in the 1930s all the way to its modern manifestations of identity politics and campus craziness. He calls on libertarians to refute Marxism’s cultural application, just as they defeated its economic application. The next section begins to do this by making the case against egalitarianism, showing it to be both impossible and self-defeating in practice. The second half of the chapter traverses more dubious ground in the form of r/K selection theory. This is an interesting analogy for attempting to understand political dynamics, but it places too much emphasis on nature instead of nurture and encourages dichotomous thinking in complex problems. That being said, it correctly suggests that some authoritarian leftists are beyond reason. The chapter ends with an explanation of the necessity of traditional social and sexual norms, as well as how and why Cultural Marxists have attacked them.

Decentralization is the focus of the fifth chapter. Taylor gives the reader a history lesson in the creation of Western traditions and common law through decentralized institutions after the fall of the Roman Empire. He blames centralization elsewhere in the world for preventing those peoples from enjoying the liberty and prosperity of Europeans. Turning to America, these two descriptions show the difference between what the United States was supposed to be and what it has become. As a remedy, Taylor proposes breaking up the US into at least 100 smaller territories. He concludes the chapter by praising those who have taken a strong stand for decentralization in the face of oppressive state power.

The sixth chapter attacks state power as a concept. Taylor explains how people are ruled indirectly through propaganda and mythology rather than directly by force, as the masses are sufficiently numerous and armed to defeat such an effort. He discusses the role of government schooling in indoctrinating the masses to accept such an arrangement, as well as the insufficient efforts to resist the imposition of compulsory indoctrination in the 19th century. The concept of situational Leninism comes next, followed by an overview of famous psychological experiments that demonstrate the willingness of people to obey authority toward reprehensible ends. After this, the role of language control and thought policing in maintaining authoritarian leftist control is examined. Taylor finishes the chapter with Ludwig von Mises’ concept of statolatry, in which statism becomes a sort of secular religion.

The attack continues in the next chapter, as Taylor turns to the flawed ideas of minarchism. He returns to the American example to show how limited government does not stay limited. He explains that the Constitution was not actually written to limit government, contrary to popular belief. It gave the federal government more power than it had under the Articles of Confederation, which Taylor praises in relative terms. He shows how Americans of the time were deceived, taking the reader through the tax rebellions of the 1780s-90s and the Alien and Sedition Acts. In the next section, he contrasts traditional monarchies with modern democracies, finding the former to be far less limited and more destructive due to inherent incentive structures. The chapter concludes with a strong explanation of why democracy grows the state and harms the cause of liberty.

In the eighth chapter, Taylor addresses police statism and what Samuel Francis termed ‘anarcho-tyranny’, a situation in which real crime goes unpunished while those who try to defend themselves are attacked by the state. He begins by noting the difference between a peace officer and an agent of the state. His description of several US Supreme Court cases is accurate, but misses the larger point that a coercive monopoly has no enforceable obligations because no one can enforce obligations against them, regardless of any court rulings. Taylor reviews Cultural Marxism through the lens of anarcho-tyranny, then explains some of the more obnoxious leftist behaviors in terms of Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals. The successes of the alt-right are explained in terms of their willingness to use the left’s tactics against them, unlike conventional conservatives. Next, he covers the origin of modern policing in the UK and the US, then proposes a private alternative to state police forces. The last section contemplates violent resistance against the state, though not with nearly the length and depth that the topic deserves.

While the eighth chapter considers the enforcers, Chapter 9 is concerned with what they enforce. Taylor begins by illustrating just how much poorer everyone is today as a result of lost economic growth due to regulations. Next, he refutes the progressive narrative about the antebellum South and the industrial captains of the 19th century, showing the negative aspects of both to be the result of government intervention rather than its absence. He then profiles James J. Hill, a largely forgotten hero of free-market capitalism in the late 19th century. Hill’s good deeds are contrasted with those who used the state to get undue favors and suppress competition. Taylor also corrects the record on John D. Rockefeller. The following section covers the history of expanding regulations after the Civil War, through the Progressive Era, and on to the present. He accuses those who point to regulations as the cause of improvements in safety and reductions in pollution of committing the broken window fallacy and ignoring the fact that some regulations have made people less healthy. The chapter concludes with many examples of faulty regulations that do more harm than good.

The transition from voluntary mutual aid to coercive welfare statism is the subject of the tenth chapter. Taylor introduces the subject with the age-old statist question, “Without government, who would take care of the poor?” Of course, one must begin by pointing out that government does no such thing, as Taylor does. He spends the first part of the chapter educating the reader about mutual aid societies, which were common before the Progressive Era but were destroyed by government intervention into the healthcare and insurance industries. Taylor shows how the state has reduced the supply of medical care, thus increasing its cost and decreasing its availability. Unfortunately, Taylor’s approach ignores the Social Darwinist perspective that natural selection should be allowed to remove the least successful humans from the gene pool. The second half of the chapter debunks at length the myth of Scandinavian socialism.

The eleventh chapter deals with civil disobedience. Here, Taylor stumbles in the way that most libertarians do, in that he fails to understand raw power, celebrates small victories that will not occur on a large scale, and confuses the downfall of a particular regime with ending the state itself. He does this even while reciting the history of preparedness for the use of force among civil rights leaders and noting what the state has done to leaders of nonviolent resistance efforts. Taylor also manages to celebrate the effects of Western degeneracy among Middle Eastern youth. His encouragement of government agents to refuse unjust orders, leak information detailing abuses to the public, and otherwise engage in whistleblowing is more on point, though he notes the powerful incentive structure against doing so. The second half of the chapter details a plethora of private alternatives to services which have long been monopolized and/or heavily regulated by the state.

The growth of cryptocurrency and other peer-to-peer technologies is the focus of Chapter 12. Taylor provides a decent layperson’s overview of Bitcoin, then moves on to practical applications of cryptocurrency, such as funding dissidents suppressed by legacy financial networks, evading capital controls, and engaging in commercial activities forbidden by the state. Next, he covers the P2P revolution, which has greatly expanded liberty and privacy online and in the physical world. The remainder of the chapter runs through various examples of how P2P and blockchain technologies have solved problems and exposed corruption.

In the thirteenth chapter, Taylor addresses the open-borders dogma held by many libertarians. He demonstrates that open borders and forced integration are a form of the aforementioned anarcho-tyranny, with closed state borders being sub-optimal but less evil. The role of forced diversity in creating internal conflicts that lead to less liberty is considered, as is the biological phenomenon of kin selection in creating cohesive groups. Taylor makes the case that open borders are contrary to private property rights because in order to have open borders, the state must override the wishes of property owners who do not want migrants to enter. He then examines the history of US immigration policy from 1790 to the present, noting the shift in demographics admitted after 1965. The contention that the real problem is the welfare state rather than demographic shifts is rebutted both on the practical grounds of American politics and with the counterexample of European nations surviving socialism but falling into turmoil due to migrants.

The fourteenth chapter furthers the themes from Chapter 11 by discussing secession, nullification, and political migration. Taylor notes the myriad benefits of secession, but only briefly mentions the history of larger states violently suppressing such movements. Next, he covers the history of both legislative and jury nullification in opposing unjust laws. Taylor’s exploration of political migration is rather America-centric, but it can be adapted to other situations. His praise for the Free State Project comes off as overzealous, given the thoroughly leftist nature of that organization. He finishes the chapter with a concept called the Benedict Option, in which those who wish to preserve a tradition and begin a restoration retreat from the public and urban life of a degenerate culture.

The final chapter of the book is an argument against democratic government. This reads much like Hoppe’s Democracy: The God That Failed, quoting and borrowing from it extensively as Taylor explains the perverse incentive structures inherent in democracy and makes the case that monarchy has a superior incentive structure. But unlike Hoppe, Taylor contemplates physical removal as a means of achieving a libertarian social order in addition to a means of maintenance. As Taylor writes on page 283, “Economics teaches us that there is no such thing as a free lunch. But in order to achieve and maintain a libertarian social order, there will be free helicopter rides.” His defense of Augusto Pinochet’s actions in Chile and Lee Kuan Yew’s rule in Singapore as better than the alternatives is common in right-libertarian circles, but his defense of Francisco Franco goes a bit too far. Taylor ends with an exhortation to and description of a libertarian revolution, but this is, as before, too brief.

Overall, the book is good, but not great. For a book called Reactionary Liberty, it could have used more reaction in the form of lengthy explanations of traditional norms and power dynamics. Taylor seemed to lack an editor and proofreader, as some typos survived in very unfortunate places that render a few sentences absurd. A few chapters can become tedious when Taylor features a laundry list of examples. That being said, it is a strong presentation of right-libertarianism that is impeccably sourced.

Rating: 4/5

Bill Wirtz’s Helicopter Skydive

On December 25, 2017, Freedom Today Journal published an article by Bill Wirtz in which he denounces Hans-Hermann Hoppe and his supporters, claiming that they have made improper and incompatible allies, done great damage to the libertarian movement, and should leave. In this rebuttal, I will show on a point-by-point basis that he is wrong on all counts.

False History

Wirtz begins by mentioning a recent case of a member of Students for Liberty being kicked out for his support of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, though he does not cite a source. He then delves into an erroneous history of right- and left-libertarianism. The truth is that the term was originally used by classical anarchists such as Pierre Proudhon, whose beliefs were quite different from contemporary American libertarians. The word was appropriated from them by American classical liberals in the early 20th century[1] because progressives had altered the meaning of the word liberal, although it continues to have a far-left connotation outside of American politics. He is correct to say that “left-libertarianism is merely another socialist viewpoint on the collective ownership of resources, that is inherently anti-capitalist.” But considering “leftists who described themselves as libertarians, as being very confused about what the philosophy means” only makes sense in an American context.

According to Wirtz, the American debate between right- and left-libertarianism is as follows: “the right believes in a strict application of property rights and the left has sucked up to ‘cultural Marxism’.” This is inaccurate; it is instead a description of the debate between thin- and thick-libertarianism. The thick libertarians believe that there is more to libertarianism than self-ownership, non-aggression, and private property—that these imply something more about the values that one should hold. Thin libertarians will have none of this, although most understand that libertarianism is not and was never intended to be a complete worldview and must have questions beyond what constitutes appropriate use of force answered by a complimentary philosophy, such as reactionary thought. Wirtz begins a pattern of applying scare quotes liberally with the term “cultural Marxism,” which he never bothers to define.

Wirtz then complains about Hoppe’s supporters, “who constantly nag the liberty movement about the importance of culture and the feeling of national identity,” being sure to place scare quotes around the word libertarian, as though they are somehow not libertarians. Let us note Wirtz’s focus on the liberty movement, a collective identification which will undermine the rest of his case. Denying the importance of culture and identity is a sign of political autism, as the philosophy of liberty was developed in a specific cultural context and those who do not form a group identity are at a disadvantage against those who do.

False Understanding

Wirtz refers to Hoppeans as “pretend right-libertarians,” but as we will see, Hoppe is more libertarian than Wirtz. His claim that Hoppeans invented this dichotomy is false; the thick-libertarians did this as a tactic of leftist entryism to disrupt and co-opt the liberty movement. Wirtz claims to understand Hoppe’s arguments, but he only does so in a superficial, politically correct manner. Wirtz writes,

“Private property tenants should be allowed to remove trespassers from their property, which particularly includes people who hold wildly anti-freedom believes [sic].”

But as Hoppe explains,

“With respect to some pieces of land, the property title may be unrestricted; that is, the owner is permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted. As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property (voluntary zoning), which might include residential versus commercial use, no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example.”[2] (emphasis added)

In truth, libertarianism says that private property owners should be allowed to exclude people on any basis whatsoever, and the extent to which they are unable to do so is the extent to which the state or some other force is infringing upon their liberty. Wirtz notes the prevalence of memes about physical removal among the alt-right, but this is partly because alt-rightists tend to misunderstand the concept. He then claims that Hoppe “could have denounced white nationalists and national socialists as a group of collectivists who use his positions for their dangerous rhetoric” and has not done so. The facts are that Hoppe has denounced national socialists on multiple occasions, and that certain forms of white nationalism can be compatible with libertarianism. As long as a particular group of white nationalists acquire property in a legitimate manner, use their property rights to exclude non-whites, and refrain from aggression against non-whites, libertarians should speak out in favor of their property rights and freedom of association. In fact, because there is a short and slippery slope from interference with politically incorrect uses of private property to all manner of interference with private property rights, those who use their property rights in a controversial and/or reprehensible manner (as long as no force is initiated in the process) should be the first people that libertarians defend. This should be done regardless of one’s feelings about racial discrimination or white nationalism, for if their rights are infringed, ours are weakened as well.

Autistic Gatekeeping

Wirtz laments that Hoppe “seems all too keen to welcome the alt-right as his supporters, gives interviews to far-right papers and only occasionally calls the welfare-state ideals of people like Richard Spencer unfortunate.” Every part of this sentiment is fallacious. First, there is no reason why libertarians should not perform outreach to the alt-right. There is significant overlap and compatibility between the two, the alt-right are more willing than anyone else to do battle with authoritarian leftists, and many alt-rightists are former libertarians who left the liberty movement due to the latter’s perennial ineptitude. Should such outreach be successful, the result would be racists who no longer initiate the use of force in their advancement of racism or advocate for politicians to do so on their behalf. This should be regarded as a positive development by any sane person. The presence of such people in the liberty movement would also help to counter the worrying development of entryism by social justice warriors and other leftists into libertarian circles by triggering them into leaving, though as we will soon see, Wirtz may be fully aware of this and perceive it as a negative.

Second, Wirtz implies that it is wrong to even have a conversation with or use a platform provided by people with certain political views. The truth is that speaking with someone does not mean that one agrees with that person. Wirtz shows his establishment colors here, as this gatekeeper fallacy is the same tactic used by the legacy media against alternative content creators. The absence of dialogue with people who have different ideas also prevents both the improvement of libertarian philosophy and any outreach or conversion efforts toward those people. This makes little sense in light of the obsession that mainstream libertarians have with bringing as many people as possible into the liberty movement, regardless of quality.

Third, Wirtz seems to expect Hoppe to continually denounce the welfare statism of parts of the alt-right. While a libertarian should oppose the alt-right on this point, the implication here is that clearly stating one’s position is insufficient; rather, one must continually virtue signal in order to maintain one’s social status. This is a leftist, social justice warrior standard that should have no place in a healthy libertarian organization.

Wirtz continues,

“One thing should be very clear: grouping people in categories in order to attribute certain behavioural characteristics to them, is inherently collectivist.

Ron Paul, now often claimed by these right-libertarians, has been equally clear on the topic:

‘Racism is simply an ugly form of collectivism, the mindset that views humans strictly as members of groups rather than individuals. Racists believe that all individuals who share superficial physical characteristics are alike: as collectivists, racists think only in terms of groups.’”

This is a straw man; the purpose of grouping people into categories is not to attribute certain behavioral characteristics to them, but to notice useful patterns that may serve as a heuristic for taking decisions in situations which disallow a consideration of each person on an individual basis. A refusal to do this results in a politically autistic hyper-individualism that is incapable of perceiving demographic trends and other group dynamics. This kind of thinking leaves libertarians vulnerable against opponents who do perceive such dynamics and weaponize them against us. Interestingly, this hyper-individualism tends to come full circle into a globalist hyper-collectivism. This occurs because a rejection of group differences combined with the blank-slate egalitarianism of classical liberalism causes one to see humans as interchangeable cogs in a grand machine called the global economy. The end result is a belief that all of humanity is one large collective with universally preferred values, which is inconsistent with all empirical results.

Paul’s description of racism is also misguided, as few racists think only in terms of groups or believe that all individuals who share superficial physical characteristics are alike. Many simply believe that there are significant differences between population groups and that because superficial physical characteristics are produced from the same genetic codes that influence a person’s intelligence, athleticism, behavior, and other important attributes, there is good reason to believe that there is some correlation between superficial physical characteristics and more meaningful traits.

The Worst

Wirtz accuses Hoppe of “aligning with the worst parts of the political sphere,” by which he means the far-right. But what does it mean to be the worst part of the political sphere? By libertarian standards, this means initiating the use of force to cause the most deaths of people and destruction of property, regardless of rhetoric. Since Wirtz claims to be a libertarian and says earlier in his article that “there is every importance in the world between what we say and what we end up doing,” we may assume his agreement with this methodology. In such an accounting, it becomes clear that communists and other Marxists are the worst part of the political sphere, not fascists or racists. Though neo-Nazis are by no means a benevolent force, they can be a useful ally of convenience against communists, to be disposed of once the communist threat is eliminated. Contrary to Wirtz, this is not an “’end justifies the means’ sort of approach,” but a calculated political strategy. An unwillingness to deal with the context at hand by making alliances with unsavory characters in order to defeat even worse political forces is yet another sign of political autism.

Conclusion

Wirtz ends his article where it began, with a confused and ignorant view of left and right. He writes,

“Adopting the paranoia that everyone who disagrees with you must be leftist, a cultural marxist[sic] or what have not, is utterly ludicrous.”

This is a straw man, as no right-libertarian or alt-righter does this. There are significant internal disagreements in both camps, and there are discussions of these disagreements in which people do not sink into such ad hominem fallacies. That said, it would not be paranoid for a person who is completely right-wing to adopt such a view, as disagreement with such a person would necessarily require leftism of some variety.

Wirtz continues,

“Libertarianism was about not being fooled by the left/right spectrum which only supports the narrative of big government. Either you believe in the ideas of liberty or not. And yes, this means means that there is a big tent from objectivists[sic] to classical liberals, but it surely doesn’t include the proponents of racial politics.”

Libertarianism is a philosophical position on what constitutes the proper use of force. It says that initiating the use of force is never acceptable, and using force to defend against an initiator of force (commonly called an aggressor) is always acceptable. It has nothing else to say about the left/right spectrum apart from the aforementioned. While it is true at face value that one either believes in the ideas of liberty or not, Wirtz seems pathologically incapable of considering not only the potential role of racial politics in preventing demographic shifts which will be hostile to liberty, but any indirect strategy whatsoever. Furthermore, he ignores the possibility of any sort of reactionary thought being under the big tent, when a synthesis of libertarianism and reaction makes more sense than any other such synthesis.

Wirtz concludes,

“Dear Hoppeans: you left the liberty-movement and expected us to follow you, yet nobody outside of a few losers with toy helicopters did. As you are the champions of freedom of association, here’s a little association freedom for you: get out.”

Hoppeans did not leave the liberty movement; it left us. As predicted by Robert Conquest, any organization which is not hostile to the left will eventually be taken over by the left. This is exactly what has happened to most mainstream libertarian organizations. The end result is no better than it was when Murray Rothbard tried to work with the left in the late 1960s and learned that they were insane. However, as misguided as Wirtz and his ilk are, perhaps there is a bootlegger’s cause to agree with his final suggestion. It may be easier to form a new libertarian movement that is complemented by reactionary thought in order to prevent entryism, denounce libertinism, and seek a stable libertarian social order than to attempt to fix the mess that has been made of the current liberty movement. Though it would be unfortunate to cede control of anything to people like Wirtz, perhaps the best right-libertarian minds could accomplish more without the burdens that left-libertarians bring.

References:

  1. Burns, Jennifer (2009). Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 309.
  2. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (2001). Democracy: The God That Failed. Transaction Publishers. p. 139.

The Not-So-Current Year: 2017 In Review

Though the specific demarcation of the passage from one year into another is a rather arbitrary social construct, it does provide a useful annual period for self-examination and remembrance. Now that 2017 has entered the history books, let us take a look back at a year’s worth of essays and review the not-so-current year.

We begin, of course, with last year’s article of the same kind. Some articles in this list are sequels to articles in that list. Aside from that, we may move on.

I began 2017 by addressing a recurring story throughout the 2016 election campaign; that of Russia hacking the DNC and phishing Hillary Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta’s email system. I argued that Russia would have been justified in doing not only this, but in actually altering the election to cause Donald Trump to win. I would later use this piece as an example in a guide on how to argue more sharply in order to throw opponents out of their comfort zones. The story lingered on, so I published a sequel detailing the benefits of a Trump-Russia conspiracy. The left’s activities after the election became ridiculous, so I decided to give them some free advice.

My first list of 25 statist propaganda phrases and some concise rebuttals was a major hit, so I started planning a sequel. I had no intention of taking almost two years to compile 25 more statist propaganda phrases to refute, but better late than never, I suppose.

Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States, which of course meant that Gary Johnson did not. I explored in detail what was wrong with Johnson’s campaign that made him not only lose, but fail to earn 5 percent of the vote against two of the least popular major-party candidates ever to seek the Presidency. Once Trump was in office, the responses to his trade policies among mainstream analysts led me to explain why many of them are politically autistic.

Book reviews have long been a part of my intellectual output, but I decided to start doing more of them in late 2016. This trend continued throughout 2017, as I read and reviewed The Invention of Russia, The Age of Jihad, In Our Own Image, Come And Take It, Against Empathy, Level Up Your Life, Islamic Exceptionalism, The Science of Selling, Closing The Courthouse Door, Open To Debate, Calculating the Cosmos, The Art of Invisibility, Libertarian Reaction, and The Euro.

Antifa grew from a nuisance that rarely affected anyone other than neo-Nazis into a serious threat to anyone who is politically right of center and/or libertarian who wishes to speak in a public venue. A comprehensive strategy to defeat them was necessary, and I was happy to provide one. Kyle Chapman grew weary of Antifa’s antics and led the effort to take up arms against them, becoming known as Based Stickman. I praised him in song. After the events of February, April, and May Day, I revised the strategy.

The Walking Dead comic series and the television show based on it contain many themes which are of interest to the student of libertarian philosophy. I explored the many ways in which Negan’s group resembles a state apparatus. The first part covers the sixth season of the show, and the second part covers the first half of the seventh season. At least three more parts will come next year.

‘No Particular Order-ism’, or the belief that libertarians should take whatever reduction in the size and scope of government they can get, has become common among the more radical members of the Libertarian Party. I explained why this approach is misguided.

White nationalist and alt-right leader Richard Spencer was present in the bar of the Marriott hotel that hosted the International Students For Liberty conference. This did not go over well with Jeffrey Tucker, who loudly denounced Spencer, after which security removed everyone from the bar. I wrote about the incident and the philosophical underpinnings of it.

Sometimes, the lens of examination is best turned inward to correct one’s own missteps. Such was the case for an article I wrote in 2014 about the nature of fake libertarianism, so I published a revision.

Theories concerning the creation, acquisition, trade, inheritance, and defense of private property form much of libertarian philosophy. The role of conquest in the determination of property rights had gone largely unexplored, so I decided to remedy the situation.

Terrorism struck in London on the anniversary of the Brussels attacks. I wrote a list of observations on the event.

I argued against more amendments to the United States Constitution, namely the Second and the Eleventh.

A chemical weapon attack occurred in Syria, which led to US intervention via a cruise missile strike. I wrote a list of observations on the event.

Keynesians and others who support fiat currency and central banking frequently claim that there is not enough gold in the world to back the quantity of currency in existence, and thus returning to gold would set off a deflationary spiral while destroying several industries that depend on gold. I debunked that claim.

On the anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, I applied ethical theories to the event to gain a deeper perspective of what happened and the aftermath of the event.

The primary aim of politically active libertarians is to limit and reduce the size and scope of government, as well as to eliminate as much state power as possible. I made the case that in order to do this, it may be necessary to temporarily do the opposite.

On May 8, Fritz Pendleton published an article at Social Matter in which he argued that liberty is best preserved by authority rather than anarchy. He then proceeded to launch a misguided attack against libertarianism, all while misunderstanding authority, anarchy, liberty, and the nature of a libertarian social order. I rebutted Pendleton’s case on a point-by-point basis.

Fashion trends can be a useful barometer of the health of a society. I explained how the trend of clothing that is designed to mimic the appearance of wear and work for those who think themselves above the sorts of activities that would produce these effects naturally indicates that a revolution may come soon.

Memorial Day provides an opportunity to promote statist propaganda concerning the nature of service and the provision of defense. I decided to do the opposite.

The immediate danger standard says that using force against someone who is not presenting a physical threat at the exact moment that force is used constitutes aggression, and it has become far too commonly advocated in libertarian circles. I explained why it is wrong and why it has gained prevalence.

On June 14, James Hodgkinson opened fire on several Republican members of Congress and their staffers while they were practicing for the annual Congressional Baseball Game for Charity. I wrote a list of observations on the event.

The Supreme Court ruled against the stays on Trump’s travel ban, but he missed a greater opportunity by letting them decide rather than ignoring the courts. I explained how and why.

Political rhetoric has grown increasingly heated, with violence erupting as a result. I showed how democracy is the root of this problem and how abolishing democracy is the solution.

The meme of throwing one’s political rivals out of helicopters has become popular among certain right-wing and libertarian groups in recent years. Unfortunately, people from all over the political spectrum tend to misunderstand the historical context of the meme, and thus interpret it incorrectly. I wrote an overview of this context and explained why helicopter rides may not be the best option.

I welcomed Insula Qui, the first additional writer for Zeroth Position, in July. He provided two articles to keep the site going while I was preparing for, participating in, and recovering from the Corax conference in Malta. A piece describing the problems that led to the call for net neutrality and recommending against more state inteference in the Internet came first, followed by a critique of common libertarian strategies to date. Speaking of the Corax conference, a revised version of my talk may be found here, as they own the rights to the original. A topic that came up in the talk that needed further comment is that in the discussion of proper behavior beyond the basics of libertarian theory, right-libertarians in general and libertarian reactionaries in particular will use the term ‘degeneracy,’ but they do not always properly define the term. I attempted to do so.

In the August 2 episode of the Tom Woods Show, he asserted that libertarians and fascists are completely contradictory political perspectives and could never be combined, and that when one embraces fascism, one must have relinquished one’s libertarianism, as there is no other solution that would make sense. Qui countered these assertions and delved deeper into the relationship between libertarianism and fascism than I had previously, which is not as inimical as one might think.

An alt-right rally in Charlottesville, Va. on August 11-12 turned violent, with three deaths and about 20 injuries. I wrote a list of observations on the events. In response, the large technology companies of Silicon Valley, which have become increasingly hostile to right-wing and libertarian content creators over the past decade, ramped up their censorship efforts. I proposed a novel and radical plan to deal with this problem so as to avoid public utility regulation.

I welcomed Benjamin Welton, our second additional writer, in September. I had meant to write an article about using the historical concept of outlawry to deal with violent illegal aliens myself, but time constraints led me to outsource the project. He then explored several historical examples of private military defense, finding that something novel must be created in order to defeat the state and maintain a libertarian social order.

In the wake of two major hurricanes, the usual complaints about price gouging were made yet again. I explained why price gouging is actually beneficial.

Qui wrote a piece about the limits of the applicability of libertarian philosophy, explaining that humans can fall into the categories of personhood or savagery, and that it is important to deal with each accordingly.

Catalonia held a referendum to secede from Spain and become an independent nation on October 1. This was met with force, and much hostility ensued. I wrote a list of observations on the events.

Qui examined the role of the modern concept of citizenship in advancing a particularly insidious form of totalitarianism.

On October 5, the New York Times published an opinion column by Michael Shermer in which he argued that the rule of law is a bulwark against tyranny, but guns are not. I thoroughly rebutted his arguments.

Welton explored the history of judicial corporal punishment, then made a case for restoring its use as a replacement for imprisoning lesser criminals.

The debt ceiling became a political issue again. As it incites financial panic for no good reason and hides important truths from common view, I advocated for its elimination on formalist grounds.

Capitalism and consumerism are distinct phenomena, with the latter caused by high time preference, which in turn is caused by the flaws inherent in modernity. Qui explained this at length.

I welcomed Nathan Dempsey, our third additional writer, in November. He runs a project called Liberty Minecraft, and wrote an introduction to the project.

The relationship between libertarianism and racial politics has become a controversial issue in recent years. Views on the issue run the gamut from complete opposition to imperative alliance, with nearly every conceivable position between being advocated by someone noteworthy. Many libertarians either provide the wrong answer or are afraid to address the question, so I decided to address libertarianism and support for ethnic nationalism.

Black Friday is revered by most libertarians as a celebration of free-market capitalism. I updated my explanation of why this reverence is misplaced. I weighed in on holiday shopping again due to some misguided criticism of computer programs designed to scalp popular gifts. Finally, I detailed the problems with Santa Claus.

Qui offered a message of hope in dark times by demonstrating how the socialists and anti-capitalists of today are not usually as fanatical as those that the early libertarians opposed, then offered advice on how to argue against them. He quickly followed this with an explanation of his concept of autostatism, which closely echoed one of the other presentations from the Corax conference. He then dealt with traditional views on degenerate behavior, and how a compassionate, non-enabling approach is necessary.

Due to surging exchange rates, the opening of Bitcoin futures, and the likelihood of Bitcoin exchange-traded funds in the near future, there is renewed mainstream interest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. There are benefits of cryptocurrencies which will be cheered by political outsiders to the chagrin of the establishment, and I listed eight of them.

Qui finished out the year by explaining why individualism and nationalism are not as incompatible as many people believe.

All in all, it was an interesting year full of occasions to make sharp libertarian and reactionary arguments. May 2018 bring more and better. Happy New Year!

On Individualism and Nationalism

One of the most common sentiments expressed by both individualists and nationalists is that these two perspectives are incompatible. It is supposedly impossible to both prioritize the well-being of the singular individual and the well-being of the nation. No matter if the charge is being an anti-social, politically autistic individualist or a collectivist nationalist, there is a tremendous amount of hostility between the adherents of these ideas. If one wants theoretical reasons for why individualism and nationalism are supposedly incompatible, one must analyze the objections from both sides and consider what it means to be an individualist and a nationalist, respectively.

The Individualists

The doctrine of individualism rests on a fundamental assumption that in both theoretical and practical matters, an appropriate guideline is the primacy of the individual. Collectives are not immoral or illogical, but all collectives are ultimately reducible to the actions of individuals. Since societies are determined by individuals and not vice versa, it must also be the case that individuals are responsible for the health of societies. By this standard, there can never be any attempt to increase the health of a society by suppressing the individual. Individualism also implies that each individual ought to be judged by one’s own actions. This means that an entire society should not be glorified for the actions of a heroic individual within that society, and an individual should not be held accountable for deeds done by others in the society who claim to act on behalf of all.

This supposedly creates a fundamental incompatibility between individualism and nationalism, as nationalism judges individuals by their collective affiliations. Nationalism discriminates according to national origin, even though a person does not choose one’s heritage. Individuals become tied to a collective and are discriminated either for or against by collective preference, regardless of their individual goals and deeds. This is contrary to individualism because it subordinates individuals to the national collective. Individuals have their opportunities reduced or expanded, and their persons degraded or elevated due to being considered part of a nation. Furthermore, some forms of nationalism aim to practically reduce the role of individual choices and increase the role of national choices. Even worse, a significant amount of nationalist philosophies are thoroughly anti-individualist, so nationalism as a political force can be contrary to individualism as a political force.

The Nationalists

At its core, nationalism is a focus on the advancement of the nation, either in relation to other nations, the history of the nation, or some goal set by the ruling class. Nationalism can manifest as imperialist expansionism, progressive isolationism, or anything between. This contrasts with internationalism, which does not aim to advance nations on their own but rather a collaboration of nations. Internationalism holds that the advancement of individual nations is irrelevant when contrasted with the advancement of supranational aims. These may be ending global poverty, establishing a worldwide economy, or simply putting in place a pan-European superstate. Nationalism and internationalism are not ideologies, but rather manifestations of special interests by different groups. Many ideological positions inherently incorporate internationalism or nationalism, but neither position becomes defined by the ideologies with which they are associated.

Due to the diversity of nationalist ideology, it is difficult to define the opposition that nationalism as a whole has to individualism. One can easily critique individualism from fascist, national communist, or communitarian perspectives, but there is no singular nationalist critique of individualism. There is not even a cohesive nationalist critique of anything (is imperialism nationalist or internationalist?). If individualism advances the nation more than any other form of social organization, then any good nationalist ought to favor individualism. For this reason, a nationalist cannot properly judge individualism to be completely incompatible with nationalism. The most coherent argument against individualism from a nationalist standpoint is that the focus on individual desires and aims will always create a society in which the organization of the nation can never advance. The sort of non-conformity and disorder that individualism can bring will never form a national identity that can be on par with more collectivist societies. But this is not a cogent or complete critique for the reasons elaborated on below.

A Synthesis

To prove that an integration of nationalism and individualism is possible, one must prove that individualism advances the nation and that nationalism is not necessarily based on individual submission. This can effectively defeat the criticisms of nationalism advanced by individualists and the criticisms of individualism advanced by nationalists. Although this cannot explain why individualists should support nationalism, it can demonstrate that individualists could support nationalism.

First, one must demonstrate how internationalism is held up by a fundamentally collectivist attitude, and how true internationalism can never be replicated under individualist conditions. The ideology of internationalism is derived from the egalitarian notion that all individuals, no matter their culture, genetics, history, or language, are equally valuable and united by their common humanity. But this is the worst form of collectivism, a collectivism that spans the entirety of the globe. The extent of this collectivism is so vast that many even confuse it with individualism. This collectivism completely ignores subjective valuations and assumes that the value of all persons is some objective matter.

Many classical liberals and libertarians fail to understand that internationalism is collectivist. Universalism, humanitarianism, and globalization are so deeply ingrained into the liberal tradition that they cannot bring themselves to question these values. In this view, all people are the same, are subject to judgment under the same higher law, and ought to cooperate for the maximum benefit of each individual. Additionally, with less institutional discrimination based on national collectives, it could only be true that internationalism is advanced when there is more individualism. But if people acknowledge that there is no common humanity, what attachments would anyone have to people with whom they have no recognizable contact? At best, internationalism can only be a pragmatic policy for individualists and not an ideological position.

If the collectivism of all peoples is the worst form of collectivism, would it not also be true that the collectivism of a single genetic and historical group is similarly undesirable? This is the second question in need of an answer: why is nationalism not the same sort of collectivism that internationalism is? The answer to this is fairly simple. The definition of a nation has two important conditions which must hold true. First, positive externalities must accumulate easily. Since people within a nation share physical, economic, and cultural connections, the people within that nation all benefit when single people benefit. When there are more rich people in China, very few people benefit in Oregon. The profits from trade and commerce from China only make up a small part of the goods to which the people in Oregon have access. However, if there is more economic advancement in Oregon and if more wealth accumulates to individuals in Oregon, then many Oregonians can expect to benefit. Likewise, advancements of the culture in Tibet do not necessarily mean that those living in Hong Kong benefit from a better culture. All of these groups have more and stronger internal connections compared to their external connections with other groups. Each individual is incentivized to look after their own group or groups rather than concern themselves with the welfare of out-groups. This is especially true whenever there is a democratic state, as all groups will aim to gain access to the powers of the state for their own benefit.

Internationalism requires collectivism based on a fictitious idea of humanity. This is not to dismiss the notion of biological incentives shared across all human groups or a natural law that should apply to all. Rather, this is a recognition that in the real world, there are natural incentives for cooperation between nations but none for global unity. One could also say that the smallest possible group is the individual and as such, independence is best for the advancement of an individual. But interpersonal and economic relations are vital to sustain a society, and these are most effective within a small community no larger than a historical city-state. Decentralized nationalism is tremendously beneficial to individuals, and it is perfectly individualist to support voluntary nationalism of this kind. Furthermore, this creates a spontaneous national order in which voluntary individual actions advance the nation as they advance the goals of the individuals. This means that there is no need to force people to be nationalists.

The second important aspect of a nation ties together with the first. Within each nation, the transaction costs are reduced as language barriers, geographical barriers, cultural incompatibility, and a lack of trust are all lesser problems. When all else is equal, it is always preferable to work inside one’s own nation. Thus, free trade should be understood in the context of cooperation between nations and not as something that supersedes nations. The incentive structure in a free market system favors local exchanges and high-trust networks. Therefore, it must be true that individualism advances nationalism and that individuals do not need to submit to their nation and give up their own self-interest to be nationalists.

The Case for Individualist Nationalism

It has been demonstrated that individualism will lead to nationalist ends, and that nationalism does not require individuals to be secondary. However, this does not mean that nationalism is necessarily good. It may still true that individuals without national connections are better off than individuals who are within a connected nation. There are some ways to demonstrate how individuals can benefit from not having an institutionalized nation. However, if one is to claim that individuals are better off without national bonds, one must ignore the entire purpose for which anyone would become an individualist in the first place. Individualism supports making one’s own choices and having those choices respected. Most people will make choices that strengthen their relationships to other people in their nation. This is because the majority of people value their own nation and want to be a part of it. The vast majority of the human population has a preference for their in-group and has connections to their heritage and history. Thus, if one is to be an individualist, one must account for the fact that to most people, this means nationalism within the individualistic framework.

Although some individualists support nationalism, it does not follow that this is necessarily correct. There is no reason why an individualist ought to support nationalism in the modern sense unless one is choosing it as a lesser evil than internationalism. Furthermore, it is contradictory for individualists to support anything other than what they themselves as free individuals wish to support. Individualism, however flawed it may be, allows for each individual to choose one’s own priorities. Nationalism may be antagonistic to some and favorable to others, but the beauty of the individualist mindset is the possibility of personal choice. There is no need for a monolithic individualism; the notion that individualists all ought to think the same way and adhere to some strict principle is self-contradictory. All individualists need to respect the power of persuasion and debate while accepting that some people will make mistakes, such as a rejection of even localist forms of nationalism.

Should Libertarians Support Ethnic Nationalism?

The relationship between libertarianism and the alt-right has become a controversial issue in recent years. Views on the issue run the gamut from complete opposition to imperative alliance, with nearly every conceivable position between being advocated by someone noteworthy. Let us thoroughly explore the issue to see what support, if any, libertarians should provide to ethnic nationalist movements.

Ethnic Nationalism and Ethno-statism

Many people who support ethnic nationalism are also ethno-statists. That is, they seek to form nation-states that are ethnically homogeneous or nearly so, and they want these states to advance the interests of the majority population in an explicitly racial sense. While many ethnic nationalists advocate voluntary separation, it is unlikely that enough people would do this on a large enough scale to form the desired ethnic separation on the scale of contemporary nation-states. It would thus be necessary to initiate the use of force in order to achieve this goal, and this is nearly certain to occur regardless of whether leaders of ethno-state movements wish it to occur.

Libertarianism is a philosophical position on what constitutes the acceptable use of force. It says that initiating the use of force is never moral, but responding to an initiation of force with defensive force is always moral. This puts libertarians directly at odds with those who would use state power to force people into different associations from those which they would choose. In fact, libertarian philosophy justifies the use of any amount of force to defend against ethno-statists who attempt to forcibly separate people.

At first glance, this may appear to be an open-and-shut case, but there is far more nuance to consider. Unfortunately, most libertarian commentators stop here, failing to consider anarchic forms of ethnic nationalism as well as the role that ethno-statists may play in moving toward a free society, however unwittingly. Let us examine these and other considerations.

Anarcho-ethno-nationalism

The starting point for libertarian ethics is self-ownership; that each person has a right of exclusive control over one’s physical body and full responsibility for actions committed with said control. Note that in order to argue against self-ownership, one must exercise exclusive control of one’s physical body for the purpose of communication. This results in a performative contradiction because the content of the argument is at odds with the act of making the argument. By the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction, self-ownership must be true because it must be either true or false, and any argument that self-ownership is false leads to a contradiction.

Each person has a right to exclusive control of one’s physical body, so it is wrong for one person to initiate interference with another person’s exclusive control of their physical body without their consent. This is how the non-aggression principle is derived from self-ownership. Each person has full responsibility for the actions that one commits with one’s physical body, so one may gain property rights in external objects by laboring upon unowned natural resources, and one owes restitution for any acts of aggression that one commits against other people or their property. The reason for this is that one is responsible for the improvements that one has made upon the natural resources, and it is impossible to own the improvements without owning the resources themselves. To initiate interference with another person’s property without their consent also violates the non-aggression principle because it denies them the just fruits of their labors.

It is possible to form and maintain an ethnic community using these principles. Someone may acquire land and form a community upon it, granting admission only to those who meet criteria chosen by the property owner. Alternatively, a group of like-minded people may purchase adjacent properties to achieve the same result. As long as no acts of aggression are committed, people who form a covenant community may choose whatever rules for admission and continued membership that they wish. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe explains,

“With respect to some pieces of land, the property title may be unrestricted; that is, the owner is permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted. As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property (voluntary zoning), which might include residential versus commercial use, no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example.”[1]

As Hoppe notes, these criteria may have a racial component, as a free society has no state to tell property owners that they may not discriminate on certain grounds that policymakers deem objectionable.

It would not do to leave unaddressed the apparent contradiction in anarcho-nationalism. This is a semantic problem; the word ‘nation’ has become convoluted in its meaning. In this case, nation is to be understood in the sense of the Old English word ‘thede.’ A thede is a group of people who share a heritage, whether this be cultural, genetic, linguistic, religious, or some combination thereof. They define an identity for themselves and consider themselves to be a group of which everyone else is not part. (The term ‘elthedish’ refers to those outside the thede.) A person may be part of multiple thedes or none at all, though the latter makes survival and reproduction much more difficult. Non-genetic thedes can and do exist, but as purely social constructs without a clear biological root, they are less stable and require effort to maintain. With this in mind, it becomes clear that anarcho-nationalism need not refer to the contradictory idea of a stateless state, but to the idea of a group of people with a shared identity and common heritage who reject statism in favor of voluntary forms of social order.

A Liberal Case for Illiberalism

Of course, at this point we may expect outrage from all of the usual suspects that one would lift a finger in defense of racists. The classical liberals among these people would do well to consider their own attitudes toward freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and other such freedoms that they hold to be universal human rights. When they defend these ideas, they frequently find themselves standing up for people who make controversial and/or reprehensible statements. This occurs because censors pursue such people almost exclusively. After all, they have no motivation to target people who make ordinary conversation that has no potential to cause meaningful change. Classical liberals defend their ideological opponents from censorship because they believe that there is a short and slippery slope between infringement of the rights of some and infringement of the rights of most. Thus, they follow the quote commonly misattributed to Voltaire but actually written by Evelyn Beatrice Hall, “I wholly disapprove of what you say and will defend to the death your right to say it.“[2]

What they fail to realize is that the same is even more true of private property rights. In the libertarian view, freedom of communication is not a universal right. As Hoppe explains,

“In a covenant concluded among proprietor and community tenants for the purpose of protecting their private property, no such thing as a right to free (unlimited) speech exists, not even to unlimited speech on one’s own tenant-property. One may say innumerable things and promote almost any idea under the sun, but naturally no one is permitted to advocate ideas contrary to the very purpose of the covenant of preserving and protecting private property, such as democracy and communism. …Likewise, in a covenant founded for the purpose of protecting family and kin, there can be no tolerance toward those habitually promoting lifestyles incompatible with this goal.”[3]

More generally, one has no right to communicate ideas on private property that someone else owns if doing so goes against the wishes of the property owner. Because private property is a more fundamental right than freedom of communication, restrictions on property rights are even more injurious to liberty than assaults upon freedom of speech or freedom of the press. As before, those who use their property in a mundane manner that is unlikely to cause meaningful change are unlikely to encounter interference. Those who are confronted about their non-aggressive use of private property rights will be those who use their property rights in a controversial and/or reprehensible manner, such as excluding people on the basis of race. Because there is a short and slippery slope from interference with politically incorrect uses of private property to all manner of interference with private property rights, those who use their property rights in a controversial and/or reprehensible manner (as long as no force is initiated in the process) should be the first people that libertarians (or classical liberals) defend.

Ethnic Separatism

As explained previously, libertarianism stands against an ethno-statist takeover of an existing state apparatus followed by ethnic cleansing, endorsing the use of force to defend against and stop such events from taking place. But ethno-statism need not manifest in this form. Another possibility is the concentration of people of the same ethnicity in a particular area, who then decide to secede that region from a larger state. Although ethno-statism cannot be supported by libertarians in an absolute sense because it is still a form of statism, there are several beneficial effects which may result from a race-based secessionist effort. This may allow libertarians to offer limited support for such a movement as a lesser evil than the current state of affairs with a possibility for greater potential for libertarian efforts in future.

First, let us consider the political orientation of the typical racial separatist. Overt and elevated in-group preference combined with statism results in an affinity for socialism, which tends to manifest as fascism or national socialism among white nationalists and as communism among racial nationalists of other races. If such people become concentrated in a certain area, it follows that the political climate in said area will become more socialist while the political climate elsewhere will become less socialist.

Second, it follows that ethno-statists are useful for breaking up large, powerful states into smaller, less threatening parts. If, for example, white nationalists were successful in seceding Oregon from the United States, and black nationalists were to do the same with Mississippi, then the United States government would be weaker than it is currently, and the two ethno-states would be weaker still. While there would still be much to be desired from a libertarian perspective, it would be an improvement over current levels of state power.

Third, the departure of the most bigoted and hateful individuals of all races into ethnically homogeneous territories would produce a significant reduction in racial tensions. After all, a multiracial society is more likely to succeed if those who deem it impossible remove themselves from that society, and an ethnically homogeneous society is the only way to satisfy such people. That such a scenario would distinguish the true separatists from race-baiting charlatans so as to expose the latter is a decided plus.

Next, let us consider the possible fallout from such a development. Secessionist movements, irrespective of their impetus, tend to inspire a nationalist response in other parts of a state. While this is fraught with its own dangers because nationalism is hostile to decentralization of power below the national level, nationalism is certainly a lesser evil than globalism, and may serve as a temporary makeshift on the path to a better political arrangement than that presaged by the United Nations and the European Union. If secessionists succeed in their efforts, it will inspire other secessionists to try their hand, some of whom may be far more libertarian than the ethno-statists who began the trend.

Just as altering the concentrations of racists and socialists are two-way streets, so is altering the concentration of libertarians. If people who reject libertarianism in favor of ethno-statism wish to concentrate somewhere and separate from the rest of a current state, this is beneficial for the cause of liberty in the remaining area because it raises the percentage of libertarians there. This could be a deciding factor in achieving the critical mass of libertarians necessary to form a libertarian social order.

Crossover Effects

It is necessary to explore the consequences for the libertarian movement from explicitly standing up for the rights of ethnic nationalists. Because any collaborative interaction between groups is likely to result in some degree of personnel exchange, we may expect that some ethnic nationalists would become libertarians and vice versa. If ethnic nationalists would embrace libertarianism, that means that they would accept self-ownership, the non-aggression principle, and private property rights. As a result, they would have to stop initiating the use of force in their advancement of racism and advocating for politicians to do so on their behalf. This should be regarded as a positive development by any sane person. The presence of such people would also help to counter the worrying development of entryism by social justice warriors and other leftists into libertarian circles by triggering them into leaving.

We may also expect that some libertarians will become ethnic nationalists. They are more likely to become the sort of anarcho-thedists discussed earlier than to ally with national socialists, though the latter is not unheard of. This may be a positive development, in that there is a tendency toward politically autistic hyper-individualism in the contemporary libertarian movement. This is an individualism so extreme that it fails to comprehend group identities or interests, and may even deny their existence and relevance. Mingling with ethnic nationalists may awaken libertarians to the realities of demographic issues and alert them to the fact that they will consistently lose to those who organize around a group identity unless they do so themselves.

The Nature of the West

The final matter to consider is the role of ethnicity in libertarianism itself. Anyone who has been to a libertarian gathering knows that the attendees at any such event will skew overwhelmingly white, and anyone who has studied libertarian philosophy will know that most of its authors are white and/or Jewish. Ethnic nationalists have an explanation for this that fits with the available logic and evidence. Like any other species, humans adapt to their environment. Although humans are uniquely capable of adapting the environment to themselves, differences between individuals frequently outweigh differences between groups, and there has been significant mixing of human populations, these do not completely negate the former effect. Humans in different parts of the world have also developed different cultural norms, governing philosophies, and religious traditions as adaptations to their particular environments. This explains why universally preferable values are not universally preferred and why there is a correlation between ethnicity and the acceptance of libertarian ethical norms. Those who view the West only as a portable set of ideas should consider the above explanation for why the portability of those ideas has been relatively poor and why the continued practice of them outside of the West is linked to a legacy of Western colonialism in such places.

At this point, a few caveats are necessary. None of this is to say that individuals of color cannot become libertarians, or that the failure of non-Western cultures to produce a tradition of libertarian philosophy thus far proves that they cannot. Nor should libertarians who are not of European or Jewish descent be anything less than welcome in libertarian groups. But in the aggregate, demographic disparities are natural and should be expected. The disproportionate number of white or white-passing people at libertarian gatherings is neither a problem to be solved nor an achievement to be celebrated; it is simply a result explained by evolution and history. Thus, there is cause for cautious optimism that some white nationalists may come to reject statism and socialism in favor of creating a libertarian social order in their ethnic communities.

Conclusion

Depending on circumstances, libertarians can support some forms of ethnic nationalism, as long as they only involve voluntary ethnic separation and seek to use private property rights to create their ethnic enclaves. However, libertarians should forcibly suppress those who insist on aggressive violence in pursuit of racial agendas. Regardless of whether they agree with such action, libertarians should defend the rights of anarcho-ethno-nationalists to do this, as it is both a litmus test for true belief in private property and the first target that enemies of libertarianism will attack in a larger quest to diminish or destroy private property rights. This is an actual slippery slope that must be vigorously guarded.

No libertarian can support statism or involuntary socialism in an absolute sense, but the kind of self-quarantine of such ideologies that ethno-statists propose may prove useful for libertarians who do not live in an ethno-state. If ethnic nationalism leads people to break apart larger states into smaller ones, this would be a positive step toward liberty. A more general sense of nationalism may develop in response to ethnic secessionist movements, and while this will present an obstacle to further localization in the long-term, it may be a useful temporary ally against statist globalism.

The West, and the liberty that has thus far uniquely developed from its traditions, is neither exclusively genetic nor exclusively ideological; it is partly both. Libertarian philosophy was mostly constructed by members of particular thedes, and other members of those thedes are statistically more likely to accept this philosophy. Ethnic nationalists can inform and remind libertarians of this so that efficiency may be increased by focusing more on the aforementioned thedes in our conversion efforts.

References:

  1. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (2001). Democracy: The God That Failed. Transaction Publishers. p. 139.
  2. S. G. Tallentyre (Actual author: Evelyn Beatrice Hall) (1906). The Friends of Voltaire. Published by John Murray, Albemarle Street, London. p. 198-9.
  3. Hoppe, p.218.

Book Review: Libertarian Reaction

Libertarian Reaction is a collection of fifteen essays by Insula Qui. The book explores various issues from a libertarian reactionary perspective. The book is divided into three sections; one focusing on reaction, one focusing on liberty, and a long final essay.

The first part begins with an essay on the limits of libertarian ethics. In Savages, Qui deals with several types of humans who cannot be properly be considered people, and must instead be dealt with as lesser beings. The point that there is a difference between colonialism (the imposition of law and morality on people who have no rational conception of it) and colonization (a parallel development of law and morality while not imposing upon others) is important and oft-overlooked. The essay finishes with a denunciation of both Islam and communism as incompatible with libertarianism if each is to be practiced rigorously. The arguments are correct but elementary, which the author has since remedied elsewhere.

In Borders And Liberty, Qui weighs in on the debate over border policy, concluding that while state immigration restrictions are not libertarian and the only justifiable borders are private property boundaries, closed borders are a lesser evil than the forced integration imposed by modern states. He recommends restoration of the right to discriminate, sponsorship of and vicarious liability for immigrants by those who wish to bring them in, and elimination of welfare programs as methods of improving the current situation. References to support the assertions regarding demographics would improve the case made here.

Prerequisites for Liberty deals with the problem of humans who are not savages as described in the first essay but are nonetheless inclined to aggressive violence. Again, references to support demographic arguments would be helpful. Qui notes several obvious but underappreciated truths here, most notably that a libertarian social order cannot exist below a certain intelligence level, as this would preclude people from understanding the necessary rules of such an order. He correctly states that some people may convert to libertarianism by seeing it in practice instead of reaching it through reason. In fact, this is by far the more likely method of conversion in the near future. The role of hedonistic practices in damaging a social order are discussed, as is the folly of accepting non-libertarians into libertarian circles simply to grow numbers.

The next essay is Voluntary Ethnic Separation, and it explains the difference between what libertarianism requires one to accept and the common caricature of all such ideas as hateful racism. Qui shows great insight in tackling common leftist arguments here. He also makes the important point that collectivism can arise as a benign heuristic to help with decisions because people lack the capacity to deal with individuals beyond a certain point. However, the same demographic claims resurface without proper support. Finally, the point that ethnostatism could be a step toward breaking up large nation-states into more local forms of governance is overlooked by most libertarians, but not Qui.

The Antistatist Case for Monarchial Government is a longer essay that Qui included despite having changed his views on the matter, as he views it as being theoretically important. He makes a distinction between government (a manager of land and provider of essential services) and state (an entity that exercises a monopoly on initiatory force) which is lost on many people. He also explains that while a libertarian society would be imperfect, a state has even worse inefficiencies. Later, Qui hints at a potential problem with wilderness areas falling victim to a tragedy of the commons, but this could easily be solved by homesteading such areas. There are two significant errors here: a lack of accounting for the arguments made by Stefan Molyneux and others in favor of private dispute resolution organizations with regard to how law courts could function without a state, and a contradiction concerning redistribution and efficiency. The final part of the essay reads much like Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s case that monarchy is superior to democracy, and is reminiscent of the real-world example of Leichtenstein.

Qui tackles an uncomfortable issue that perhaps interests too many people in libertarian circles with The Libertarian Solution to the Age of Consent. He quickly rebuts the left-libertarians who wish to let children make decisions regarding sexual conduct, describing parenting of young children as a sort of regency until the child gains the ability to use reason. But Qui errs in saying that damages done by improper parenting are no different from any other sort of crime, as one can never truly be made whole from the lifelong detriments caused by improper parenting.

Dysgenics and Market Nobility discusses the corruption of the phrase “all men are created equal” from a statement of equality before the law into a belief in human biological uniformity. In doing so, he distinguishes between the natural elite of a free society and the power elite of a statist society, which are often conflated by leftists. Qui then explains how the two tend to work together in statist societies to keep the same families at the top for centuries rather than let the rags-to-riches-to-rags cycle properly play out. The essay then turns toward dysgenics, which refers to programs that have the opposite of a eugenic effect. The roles of feminism, sexual liberation, and welfare statism are examined in this light.

The first part concludes with Civilization and Natural Law, which makes unconventional but strong arguments in favor of censoring and physically removing people on the basis of their political opinions. Qui’s case is more utilitarian and reserved than it needs to be, but he still reaches the correct result that freedom of speech is a privilege that comes with owning property, not a fundamental right. He then finds that the solution to intractable differences between people and groups is mutual discrimination and exclusion, as forced integration necessarily results in racial tensions.

The second section begins with The Freedom of Government, which revisits themes from several of the previous essays. Qui makes a powerful case that people who claim to believe in democracy but deny people the self-determination to choose their form of governance are charlatans. He also observes that a large enough number of small monarchies is effectively equivalent to a libertarian social order. The only problem with this essay is brevity, as more explanation of each point would greatly improve the presentation.

The Curse of Citizenship explores how the modern state makes its subjects into cogs of its machine through citizenship as a legal concept. Qui shows that democracy, contrary to leftist propaganda, only makes this worse by providing an otherwise absent appearance of legitimacy. He correctly recognizes the futility of localism as an ultimate strategy, as it fails to account for the supremacy of higher levels of government. But his contention that “corruption within the state is nothing other than the people who are creating the illusion themselves being aware of the illusion” is misguided; one can have this knowledge without weaponizing it into corruption, and one can be corrupt without such an awareness.

In The Role of Co-Operation in Competition, Qui refutes several myths about capitalism. First, he proves that capitalism is not as anti-social as its critics claim. Second, he corrects the misconception of competition as being necessarily aggressive in nature. Third, he explains how competition can actually be a form of cooperation, in that individuals or groups can agree to compete in order to find out which methods are superior. Qui segues into several examples of cooperation that are not strictly competitive, such as food companies co-marketing with drink companies and agreements between private road companies. To complete the argument, he examines how the contrapositive is also true; namely, that removing competition also removes an incentive to cooperate. He finishes with a brief discussion of cartels and makes the insightful observation that a labor union is not commonly recognized as a cartel, despite functioning much like one.

It is only in Reverse Claims to Property that Qui truly goes off the libertarian reservation in his thinking, though he admits at the beginning that he may be doing so. Here, he tries (and fails) to invent an inverse of property rights to resolve questions of state-occupied property and wilderness areas. Qui again neglects other libertarian theories on how to deal with pollution. This un-ownership would, as he suggests, legitimize rights violations in some cases.

In Who Watches the Watchmen, Qui explores the libertarian answer to this age-old question, namely that the watchmen (in the form of private defense agencies) all watch each other. Here he enters an off-topic though informative discussion on the impossibility of eliminating the state by democratic means. He then returns to the topic to find that re-establishment of a state is the worst case scenario in a stateless society, but all economic and military incentives work against it. That it is the worst case means that all other outcomes must be better, setting this particular objection on its ear.

National Defence Without Coercion is the last essay in the second part, and it deals with the subject at length. Qui begins by noting the common fallacy committed by statists: using a state to defend people against other states does not change the fact that people are subjugated by a state; it only changes which state is in control. He covers the basics of how a private defense agency should function, but is a bit too enamored with nationalism. His comparisons between a private defense agency and an insurance company make one wonder where such arguments were in earlier essays. The latter part includes some novel thought on how the facilities of a private defense agency might be employed in other ways during peacetime. The conclusion discusses the difference between pre-modern gentlemen’s war and modern total war, with libertarianism likely to end modern warfare and return us to the less destructive pre-modern type of warfare. This essay and the previous essay could have been combined.

The final part consists of one much longer essay titled Examining Cultural Destruction. Qui examines the causes and symptoms of cultural decay, then proposes solutions. The role of the state and central banking in reducing time preferences is explained, then Qui shows how capitalism makes this worse not by being bad in and of itself, but by amplifying whatever inputs it receives. Egalitarianism is blamed in the Rothbardian sense of a revolt against nature, as is the loss of autonomy and identity that statism causes. Symptoms of these causes are identified as the demonization of productive work, the collapse of stable interpersonal and family relationships, the loss of spiritualism and hierarchy, the ascent of shallow materialism, the prevalence of escapism, and the expansion of empiricism into inherently rational disciplines. To solve these problems, Qui recommends absolute private property rights, abolition of central banking and as much of the state as possible, and a restoration of traditional values.

The first word that comes to mind when describing the entire collection is ‘incomplete.’ Qui lacked an editor for the book, and it shows. The grammatical constructions and punctuation are frequently in need of revision, and each of the essays would benefit from a much deeper bibliography. But the thoughts expressed therein are sufficiently intriguing to merit reading despite these flaws.

Rating: 4/5

Lecture: Libertarianism and Reaction

On July 28-30, 2017, the second annual Corax Conference took place in Sliema, Malta. To my great surprise, I was invited and sponsored as a speaker. I decided to seize upon the opportunity to spread part of my message to a live audience, as well as leave the United States for the first time. While there, I gave an early version of the lecture linked below. That version, and all other materials from the conference, may be purchased here: https://cor.ax/coraxconf-remote

This is a lecture about libertarianism and its relationship to reactionary thought of several types.

How To Rein In Censorious Technology Giants

Over the past decade, the large technology companies of Silicon Valley have transitioned from a mindset of attempting to make government censorship impossible to a mindset of attempting to make government censorship unnecessary. Those with views which are in opposition to the progressive narrative have increasingly found their posts removed and accounts suspended on the social media platforms created by these companies. Though this is not a new problem, it has escalated since the firing of James Damore from Google and the unrest in Charlottesville. Those who are not part of the progressive movement, such as conservatives, libertarians, reactionaries, and the alt-right are increasingly finding themselves shut out of open discourse online, having to either signal compliance with the left or risk being de-platformed on the most popular social media sites. Though the alt-right has borne the brunt of this so far, it is unlikely to stop there, as the contemporary left does not value discourse in the same way as their classical liberal predecessors. There are several proposed responses to this situation, but none of them are likely to effectively deal with the problem. Let us examine these to discover their shortcomings, then craft a novel response that is more likely to succeed.

The Mainstream Libertarian Response

In the mainstream libertarian view, the large size of Google, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, GoDaddy, Paypal, and others are astonishing success stories of free-market capitalism. They tend to view these technology companies as private businesses whose owners should be able to freely choose with whom they will associate or not associate. Indeed, many libertarians view ostracism as a nearly universal positive, working to reward preferred behavior while punishing dispreferred behavior. If these companies behave improperly, mainstream libertarians believe that the market will punish them by elevating an alternative to prominence.

Though ostracism on the basis of behavior is nothing new, the crowdsourcing power of the Internet has transformed it into a political weapon that can be used to ruin people unjustly. Moreover, it is capable of dividing an entire society along ideological lines. When reasoned discourse is shut down and unpopular viewpoints are suppressed by howling irrational cyber-mobs, those who are de-platformed are likely to have their internal victim narratives confirmed, radicalizing them further. This may serve as a precursor to a novel type of civil war, one which arises when the heated rhetoric that is naturally produced as a byproduct of democracy escalates into political violence and there is no peaceful outlet to reduce tensions before they consume the entire society.

In a free market, censorious behavior from the largest companies would be of little concern. As John Gilmore, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said, “The Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.” But it is also true that those in positions of power view checks, balances, and competition as damage and seek to route around them. Technology giants accomplish this partly by lobbying governments to regulate their industries in a manner that they can capture, as any other large companies would. But they have another weapon which can be even more potent: they can use their platforms to keep their upstart competitors out of search results and application stores. This can keep their competitors from gaining the brand recognition necessary to build the user base to become successful social media platforms. This was less of a problem in the early days of social media when turnover of the most popular sites was higher, but the near-monopolies of the largest companies are no longer as vulnerable.

The Conservative/Alt-Right Responses

In the view increasingly expressed by conservatives and alt-rightists, the Internet is an essential aspect of life in the 21st century, and the technology companies that deny people access to the most popular social media platforms, domain hosting services, and payment processors are curtailing both the civil liberties and economic opportunities of those people. The largest technology companies are effective monopolies, in that these firms are the only sellers of products and services that have no close substitutes. In response, they call for the state to regulate these companies as public utilities, much as they do to providers of electricity, water, and natural gas. This line of thinking also leads to support among these people for net neutrality regulations. Some argue that government regulation is even more necessary in this case, as the network effects and first-mover advantages of the largest technology firms mean that a competitor cannot provide the same quality of service even if there are no significant barriers to entry into the business of creating social media platforms, search engines, and payment processors.

However, treating social media as a public utility is likely to cause more problems than it solves. When governments began regulating other industries, innovation in those industries slowed. The companies which were nearly monopolistic either remained so or became real monopolies, as competition became even more difficult. Freezing current troublesome companies in place as major players rather than allowing upstarts to displace them is an undesirable outcome. This is exacerbated by the fact that public utility regulations are just as vulnerable to regulatory capture as any other regulations. It is also strange to equate losing social media presence with losing access to goods and services like clean water or garbage disposal, as one can live a healthy life without access to social media. Furthermore, the cost of regulation is likely to be high, and the regulated businesses will pass this cost onto their customers.

A Radical Proposal

To summarize the above responses, the mainstream libertarian would do too little while the conservative or alt-rightist would do too much. What is needed is an approach that can stop the censorious technology giants from abusing the power they have accumulated without causing the innovation-stifling and monopoly-calcifying effects of government regulation. This approach should use state power in a manner which does not expand said power beyond its current size and scope, but will solve the problem with minimum malign interference in the economy. Fortunately, there is a simple and powerful solution which may be explained in a straightforward manner.

To begin, let us note that all of these technology giants are incorporated companies. A corporation is a legal fiction created by the state to shield business owners from full financial liability and ease the enforcement of laws upon those businesses. It is impossible to create a corporation without involving the state, as attempting to do so without registering the corporation with a government will have no effect. The closest one could come would be to negotiate recognition of a business entity with limited liability with each customer of that business, but this would not be identical to a state-recognized corporation in terms of its interaction with the state. Two results directly follow from this. First, registering a corporation amounts to participation in a government program. Second, state-recognized corporations are not truly private businesses, but public-private partnerships in which the state provides limited liability through its monopoly on courts and the private business fulfills its purpose, whatever it may be.

In order to participate in a government program, a person or other entity is supposed to be in compliance with government laws. In the United States, the highest law with which a state-recognized corporation should be in compliance for this purpose is the Constitution. The Constitution contains a number of provisions which are supposed to limit the conduct of government, including provisions to protect freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, security against unreasonable search and seizure, and due process, among other rights. Because state-recognized corporations are public-private partnerships, they should be held to the same limitations on their conduct.

Thus, we arrive at an approach that meets the conditions described above. The technology giants that are currently engaging in censorious activities against viewpoints that they find disagreeable should be approached by the state and given two choices. Their first option is to begin respecting the aforementioned rights in accordance with the above argument and stop their censorious behavior. Their second option is to forfeit their corporate charters and right to do business as a corporation in the United States. This means that they would lose access to all government contracts, loans, and grants, could not be bailed out by taxpayers if their businesses falter, could not receive property taken through eminent domain, and the personal assets of everyone in the company would be available for paying civil damages. In other words, the leadership of the technology giants would have to choose whether to contribute to a more open marketplace of ideas or to become free-market businesses, either of which would be an improvement upon the current state of affairs. Even the hint that such a proposal is being considered by high-ranking federal officials would have the technology giants rushing to behave better, and could accomplish the same results as public utility regulation with far less threat to innovation.

Now let us apply the test described above,

“This approach should use state power in a manner which does not expand said power beyond its current size and scope, but will solve the problem with minimum malign interference in the economy.”

Currently, the federal government enforces anti-discrimination laws on bases other than those involving the people being de-platformed by the technology giants. This proposal implicitly adds the basis of political ideology to race, gender, age, sexual orientation, and other currently protected categories. While this may appear to be an increase in scope, it would actually work to level out some of the discrepancies caused by protecting only the aforementioned categories. In order to evade constitutional restrictions, the federal government typically uses carrots rather than sticks to gain compliance from state government and large corporations, in the form of only awarding federal funding to compliant entities. Here, strings attached to continued recognition of corporate charters takes the place of strings attached to funds, but the overall methodology is unchanged.

As for malign interference in the economy, the latter option may appear to be so, but it is not upon closer scrutiny. First, no rational person in a leadership position at a technology giant would choose it due to the enormous risks involved in running such a large business without the legal shield of a corporation. Second, if any technology giants did choose the latter option, the change of ending state-recognized corporations in favor of government independence and full responsibility would be a beneficial move toward a more free-market economy.

Objections

Such a novel and radical approach is certain to meet objections, so let us attempt to anticipate and deal with some likely criticisms. First, there is the potential for technology giants based in the United States to balk at this dilemma and respond by leaving the United States for more favorable conditions elsewhere. Though this may be extremely disruptive in the short term, it would remove the canopy that is blocking the sunlight needed by the seedlings that seek to grow and replace the technology giants. The end result would almost certainly be both a more open and a more free market in the long term. But this is an unlikely result, as they would not wish to lose such a large and wealthy customer base as the American people.

Second, such a move would certainly be challenged in court, and the Supreme Court may see fit to rule against it. If this happens, then nothing will be lost and awareness of the need to appoint justices who are more friendly to the anti-censorship cause will be raised. It would also provide a strong President with a chance to ignore the Supreme Court and force the issue, especially if public opinion is against the side of the technology giants. The dominance of the judiciary in the American system is a longstanding problem, and any opportunity to challenge its power is a welcome development.

Third, there is the claim that this proposal is more about open markets than free markets. This claim is not without merit, but the current market conditions are neither open nor free. Working toward free markets is the primary economic objective of libertarian philosophy, but in the meantime, an open unfree market is superior to a closed unfree market. It is important not to fall into the trap of political autism by doing nothing until an ideal libertarian textbook solution hopefully comes along, which may not happen.

Finally, one may wonder why the issue cannot be left up to the market. In the long term, the market is essential for solving the problem posed by the technology giants. But although this is necessary, it is not sufficient for dealing with the immediate problem at hand. Through their current market share and their abuse of the power that said market share provides them, the technology giants are making the market unfree. Like it or not, the state is the weapon currently in play, and unless it is going to be eliminated in the near future, its power will either be used to favor the established companies or their upstart competition.

Conclusion

The technology giants have managed to acquire an unprecedented amount of power over the lives of people all over the world. As Frank Herbert observed, “Power attracts pathological personalities. It is not that power corrupts but that it is magnetic to the corruptible.” If the leadership of these companies decide that they wish to silence someone and ruin their finances for whatever reason, it is within their capabilities to do so. Some may cheer because such a fate is currently befalling the alt-right. But what they do to Christopher Cantwell and The Daily Stormer today, they can and will do to anyone they dislike in the near future. Unless the technology giants are reined in, they will provoke the state into regulating their industries as public utilities, which will set back innovation by decades. The mere threat of the above proposal is capable of not only stopping their censorious behavior, but of opening the markets enough for private competitors to free them.

Thirteen Observations on Events in Charlottesville

On the weekend of August 12, 2017, various activist groups came together in Charlottesville, Va. for the Unite the Right rally organized by James Kessler and Richard Spencer. A torch-lit march to the statue of Robert E. Lee on the University of Virginia campus took place on the night of August 11. This resulted in clashes between alt-right and Antifa demonstrators, which the alt-right won. The next day, the mayor of Charlottesville illegally shut down the rally. Violence then ensued between alt-right and Antifa, which culminated in a car crashing into leftist protesters, killing one and injuring 19. Two police officers also died in a helicopter crash after monitoring the events. Thirteen observations on these events follow.

1. Permits are not worth the paper on which they are printed. One week before the event, Charlottesville mayor Michael Signer and vice-mayor Wes Bellamy illegally revoked Kessler’s permit. The ACLU took the case before a judge, arguing that civil liberties were being tread upon and that the city was not allowed to stop the march. Kessler and Spencer won a legal injunction, and the city of Charlottesville was legally responsible for enforcing it and providing protection for the rally. If the Charlottesville police had formed a line to separate the alt-right from Antifa, as was done in Pikeville on April 29, it is unlikely that most of the violence would have occurred. But Mayor Signer failed to uphold the court injunction and protect the rally. Instead, he illegally revoked the permit and sent police in riot gear to declare the rally an unlawful assembly and disperse it. Several participants were attacked by riot police, while Antifa attacked other participants. Not only this, but Mayor Signer issued a stand-down order to the police after the alt-right gathering was forcibly dispersed. This left the alt-right and Antifa to battle in the streets. Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe then declared a state of emergency and deployed the National Guard, after which the car crash and helicopter crash occurred, among more violence. If this is the result of trying to go through legal channels, then there is no point in doing so.

2. Unscheduled, spontaneous events are more effective for right-wing activism. Given the above result, going through the legal process to get permits and police protection is actually counterproductive. In fact, it is tantamount to a general handing his battle plans to the enemy. There was only token opposition from Antifa and no real interference from state agents during the torch march, and this was partly because it was not announced or planned ahead of time as an official event. All right-wing and libertarian activists would do well to be more spontaneous in future to keep leftists and politicians from having the intelligence necessary to attack and shut down activities.

3. Public property is an oxymoron. Property is an object external to a person’s physical body in which that person has acquired an ownership right through mixing one’s labor with unowned natural resources, trading, or inheritance. Ownership is a synonym for a right to exclusive control, and this requires either an individual owner or a collective that is in full agreement as to the use of the property. What is called ‘public property’ in a statist society is really state-occupied property that is set aside for state-approved common use. No one truly owns such property because no individual or fully agreeing collective exercises exclusive control over it. This leaves it open not only to use by groups of people who are at cross purposes with each other, but to an occupation by one group for the purpose of denying access to another group.

4. Coordinating with state agents is a tactical mistake. Though many rank-and-file state agents are sympathetic to various right-wing and/or libertarian causes, their commanding officers tend to be progressive leftists. When the order comes from above to shut down right-wing events or avoid suppressing communist rioters, they almost invariably choose to obey such orders rather than resign en masse to provide private defense or disobey their orders in order to perform their jobs as they normally would. This should tell the organizers of right-wing events in no uncertain terms that government police are not ultimately on their side.

5. The torches and some of the chants during the march provided terrible optics. When the average American sees a mass of people carrying torches, it makes them think of the Ku Klux Klan and all of the terrorist activity its members have perpetrated over the years. When the same people are chanting “blood and soil,” an English translation of the Nazi phrase “Blut und Boden,” and “Jews will not replace us” while carrying flags of a power that the United States waged war against, it causes a neutral observer to view them as alien enemies. These associations are not entirely inaccurate, as both neo-Nazis and Klansmen participated in the event. Though some critics of such a demonstration would never be satisfied (see observation #8), and some alt-righters would claim that they might as well act the part if they will be accused of Nazism anyway, marginal observers who could be swayed one way or another would be far more sympathetic to a candlelight vigil rather than a torch-wielding procession, a lack of Roman salutes, phrases which do not make anti-Semitic references, and a lack of Nazi and Klan flags.

6. Terry McAuliffe, Michael Singer, and Wes Bellamy wanted violence. They used the Charlottesville police and the National Guard to bring alt-right and Antifa groups together, then ordered them to stand down while the two groups fought. Previous incidents, such as the Battle of Berkeley, clearly demonstrated that these two groups cannot be in close proximity without violence erupting between them. Though the idea that the governor, mayor, and vice-mayor actually wanted a violent conflict on the streets of Charlottesville is a very cynical explanation, it fits best with the facts of the case.

7. Though the results were terrible, James Fields may have acted in self-defense. According to the establishment press, Fields engaged in domestic terrorism by intentionally running over leftist counter-protesters. His history of psychiatric problems and violent behavior does not help his case. But the press seems intent on ignoring two videos which support a much different chain of events. The first shows someone striking the car with what appears to be a baseball bat. The sound of the bat impacting the car is heard, followed by the sound of the car engine. The car quickly accelerates, crashing into other vehicles and the crowd that was blocking traffic by standing in the street. The second video thoroughly examines the chain of events, freezing at multiple points to point out a bicyclist on the sidewalk behaving normally, the car being operated at appropriate speeds, the strike by the apparent baseball bat, an attempt by Fields to brake and change direction, and finally Fields flooring the accelerator to escape a mob of people closing in on him.

8. It is impossible to appease the left without submitting to the left. President Donald Trump spoke on the events on the afternoon of August 12, saying in part,

“We condemn in the strongest possible terms this egregious display of hatred, bigotry and violence on many sides, on many sides. It’s been going on for a long time in our country. Not Donald Trump, not Barack Obama, this has been going on for a long, long time. It has no place in America. What is vital now is a swift restoration of law and order and the protection of innocent lives. No citizen should ever fear for their safety and security in our society. And no child should ever be afraid to go outside and play or be with their parents and have a good time.”

That Trump accurately pointed to violence from “many sides” rather than just white nationalists set off a media firestorm, with pundits, Democrats, and establishment Republicans alike rushing to virtue signal against Trump and the alt-right. On August 14, he said in part,

“As I said on Saturday, we condemn in the strongest possible terms this egregious display of bigotry, hatred, and violence. It has no place in America. And as I have said many times before, no matter the color of our skin, we all live under the same laws; we all salute the same great flag; and we are all made by the same almighty God. We must love each other, show affection for each other, and unite together in condemnation of hatred, bigotry, and violence. We must discover the bonds of love and loyalty that bring us together as Americans. Racism is evil, and those who cause violence in its name are criminals and thugs, including the KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other hate groups that are repugnant to everything we hold dear as Americans. We are a nation founded on the truth that all of us are created equal. We are equal in the eyes of our creator, we are equal under the law, and we are equal under our constitution. Those who spread violence in the name of bigotry strike at the very core of America.”

This did not satisfy Trump’s leftist critics in the media or either major party, nor would it, for this is not how leftists operate. As Vox Day writes in SJWs Always Lie,

“Do not say you are sorry if anyone’s feelings were hurt, do not express regret, remorse, or contrition, do not say anything that can be taken as an apology in any way. Just in case I am not being sufficiently clear, do not apologize! Normal people seek apologies because they want to know that you feel bad about what you have done and that you will at least attempt to avoid doing it again in the future. When SJWs push you for an apology after pointing-and-shrieking at you, what they are seeking is a confession to bolster their indictment. They are like the police down at the station with a suspect in the interrogation room, badgering him to confess to the crime. And like all too many police these days, the SJWs don’t really care if you did it or not, they’re just looking for a confession that they can take to the prosecutor. Be aware that once they have launched an attack on you, they will press you hard for an apology and repeatedly imply that if you will just apologize, all will be forgiven. Do not be fooled! I have seen people fall for it time and time again, and the result is always the same. The SJWs are simply looking for a public confession that will confirm their accusations, give them PR cover, and provide them with the ammunition required to discredit and disemploy you. Apologizing will accomplish nothing more than hand them the very weapons they require to destroy you.”

Trump eventually showed some understanding of this concept, returning to his earlier statements when questioned by the media again on August 15. He also elevated the term ‘alt-left’ to prominence to refer to Antifa and other violent left-wing groups. But a stronger intellect would have resisted the urge to punch right while kowtowing to SJWs on August 14.

9. The mainstream press serves the establishment and mammon at the expense of truth. The news coverage of what happened in Charlottesville was perhaps more worthy of the term lügenpresse than anything in recent memory. Even though there appears to be exculpatory evidence for James Fields, the establishment press was determined to advance the narrative that he had intentionally planned an ISIS-style terrorist attack with his car. They have done all they could to portray everyone on the alt-right side as a racist terrorist, while tacitly supporting the communist terror group Antifa. They have done their best to portray anyone affiliated with Donald Trump in any way, real or imagined, as a white supremacist equal to the worst elements present in Charlottesville. Compare this to the response when a Muslim perpetrates a terrorist attack; the act is said to be independent of Islam itself and the focus is turned to anti-Muslim hate crimes. Never would the establishment press equate everyone affiliated with Islam to a terrorist, or investigate anti-white hate crimes.

The simplest explanation for the behavior of the establishment press is the desire for money and power. As long as they give the party line like good Soviet-era apparatchiks, they can enjoy a comfortable life of repeating state propaganda and running advertisements for large corporations whose leadership marches in lockstep with the political establishment while not performing any authentic journalism. Should they deviate from this, they will lose access to important political sources and events. As for the chaos, they thrive on it and hope for more, as it drives traffic to their programming and revenue to their bank accounts.

10. Ignoring the legitimate grievances of the alt-right will not work. Despite the lies of the establishment press, not everyone at Unite The Right was a Klansman or Nazi. Some attendees were simply concerned about the potential removal of historical monuments that reflect their heritage, the demographic shift toward a white minority in a democratic system, an economic system which threw them overboard decades ago, and the rise of identity politics among women and non-whites following decades of leftist agitation. Ignoring and suppressing the concerns of the alt-right will not be any more effective than any other form of prohibition; as has followed other prohibition efforts throughout history, the prohibited behavior will then manifest in a manner that is less open and more violent. Furthermore, when people feel that they have no exit and that no one will listen to their voices, their only remaining option is to revolt.

11. Democracy does not receive enough blame for heated rhetoric and political violence. Though it is important to deal with proximate causes and understand the nuances of a particular case, it is also important to address the ultimate sources of problems. One such root is democracy itself. Democracy replaces the theoretical Hobbesian war of all against all with an actual civil war of half against half, and it is only a matter of time before this cold war flares up. Rulers intentionally create such a system in order to manufacture perpetual conflict in society, which keeps the masses fighting amongst themselves so that they do not join together to overthrow the ruling class. Because a democratic system grants each citizen who is eligible to vote a small piece of political power, each person can—at least in theory—mobilize other people into a voting bloc to advance a political agenda that would use state power in a manner hostile to another group of people. This makes each politically active person an unofficial soldier in the aforementioned democratic war, and thus a target for various abuses by the other side. It is this dynamic that produces the degeneration of political discourse into physical violence. Though there will always be some level of societal conflict, removing such a disastrous generator of malignant incentives as political democracy can only be a net improvement.

12. The only solution to the problem of the commons is to eliminate the commons. As long the fiction of public property persists, groups will continue to fight over control of it. If all property in the Charlottesville area were privately owned, then the statue of General Lee would be on the property of someone who wants it to be there, and anyone taking action to remove it would be guilty of trespassing and vandalism. If the UVA campus and the roads in Charlottesville were privately owned, then their owners could decide which people to allow and trespass the others. There is a fundamental philosophical error at work, in that the state exercises monopoly control over certain spaces in the name of preventing monopoly control over those spaces. Until this error is resolved by eliminating the commons through returning common spaces to private ownership, conflicts over who gets to use the commons and when they get to use them will continue to occur.

13. Matters will only escalate from here. Because the problems outlined in observations #1, #3, #5, #6, #9, #10, #11, and #12 are unlikely to be addressed and resolved by the appropriate parties, violent conflicts will escalate in frequency and intensity. In fact, many local government leaders across the United States and social media companies have proceeded to do the opposite, seeking to de-platform prominent alt-right members and remove more Confederate statues. Unfortunately, the escalation of hostilities is a necessary development because humans tend not to do what is necessary to solve difficult problems until they run out of other options.