Authority, Anarchy, and Libertarian Social Order

On May 8, Fritz Pendleton published an article at Social Matter in which he argues that liberty is best preserved by authority rather than anarchy. He then proceeds to launch a misguided attack against libertarianism, all while misunderstanding authority, anarchy, liberty, and the nature of a libertarian social order. Let us examine what is wrong with Pendleton’s case on a point-by-point basis.

Stateless In Somalia

Pendleton begins with the old canard of Somalia-as-libertarian-utopia, though to his credit, he does not invite all libertarians to emigrate there. His description of the situation is essentially correct:

“It is a patchwork of warlords who have each parceled out a slice of mud to call his own, to rule according to his whims and fetishes. There are the Islamic warlords of al-Shabaab in the south, the government strongmen who collaborate with al-Shabaab when it suits them, the Somaliland separatists who want a separate nation in the north, and a thousand other men of questionable loyalties.”

Pendleton claims that “it takes a certain type of idiot to look at Somalia and see something promising,” then that “it requires an idiot of some erudition to see promise in a failed state like Somalia.” These are not equivalent. To look at Somalia and see something promising is to examine the entirety of their culture and find that there is at least one idea which could be adopted elsewhere to improve another society. To see promise in a failed state like Somalia is to believe that the situation in that particular place can be greatly improved in the foreseeable future. The former endeavor makes far more sense than the latter.

Though he is correct to say that “libertarians are interested in Somalia primarily because its central government is weak and has no effective presence throughout most of the nation,” his assertion that anarchy is not an effective solution to much of anything is confused. An absence of rulers is not meant to be a solution to anything in and of itself; its role in libertarian theory is to remove the statist intervention in the market economy that inhibits and/or prevents individuals from working together to find effective solutions to problems. Pendleton’s passing mention of human biodiversity is also misplaced, as the best means of analyzing anarchy in Somalia is to compare it to statism in Somalia, not to anarchy elsewhere or statism elsewhere. We are thus considering the same thede under different conditions rather than different thedes under the same conditions. His claim that “whatever the merits of decentralization in theory, in practice it mostly involves being subject to the whims of the local warlord and his cadre” is particular to the current cases of failed states. There is good reason to believe that a controlled demolition of a state apparatus by people who wish to impose a libertarian social order would not be like this because the people would have the will and means to disallow it. Even so, a nation-state government is essentially a warlord writ large. Localizing this evil and reducing its strength makes it easier to bribe, escape, or overthrow, which is a definite improvement.

Pendleton claims that a libertarian must search hard to find supporting evidence in Somalia, but the evidence is clear. Before Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime fell in 1991, the annual birth rate was 0.46 percent, the infant mortality rate was 11.6 percent, the life expectancy was 46 years, the annual death rate was 0.19 percent, the GDP per capita was $210, the adult literacy rate was 24 percent, and 35 percent of the people had access to safe water. The most recent measurements are that the annual birth rate is 0.40 percent (2016), the infant mortality rate is 9.66 percent (2016), the life expectancy is 52.4 years (2016), the annual death rate is 0.133 percent (2016), the GDP per capita is $400 (2014), the adult literacy rate is 38 percent (2011), and 45 percent of the people have access to safe water (2016). The telecommunications and money transfer industries have also improved to offer some of the best service in Africa.

It is easy to argue, as Pendleton does, that these improvements are negligible from his relatively cushy first-world environs, where such improvements on either a real or a percentage basis are barely noticeable. But in the third-world hellhole that is Somalia, such improvements can be the difference between life and death, not to mention the difference between having some basic quality of life or not having it. His claim that anarchy is not much different than communism is asserted without evidence and may therefore be dismissed without evidence.

The Case of Tudor England

Pendleton seeks to contrast the anarchy of Somalia with the historical Tudor monarchy of England. His contention that giving people more freedoms is not a prerequisite for a well-run society is technically correct but beside the point. The fact is that a society need not be ‘run’ at all in the sense of top-down management by a ruling class. People can (and in the absence of interference, do) form voluntary associations to solve problems without being ordered around at gunpoint by government minions. That people have flourished in times of gentle oppression, a strange phrase indeed, says more about human resilience than it says about the merits of oppression.

He continues,

“Henry VII and VIII set in motion a series of clever reforms that reached a climax during the rule of Elizabeth I. England had finally found its stride. It must be noted that Elizabethan England, despite its relative freedom, was not keen on handing out legal recognition of liberties to its people. The era was one of unapologetic centralization. The crown’s subjects were given no guarantees of free speech at all; in fact, the censors worked hard and fast to clamp down on anything they perceived as dissent. Freedom of speech was still very far over the political horizon. And yet, despite the book burnings, despite the cages, despite the severed heads around London Tower, the Elizabethan era gave us Shakespeare, Marlowe, Spencer, Jonson, and Bacon. Imagine an era that gave the English language so much genius and not one assurance of free speech to go with it!”

One must ask whether this occurred because of oppression or in spite of it. It is possible, of course, that the great writers of the day produced such memorable works because the adversity of censorship forced them to innovate novel speech patterns in order to evade the censors. In an earlier age, Chaucer gained a lasting place in the canon of English literature for doing just that. But one must wonder, what potential was wasted? What great works were never penned because their would-be-authors feared for their lives? Perhaps the literary marvels of Elizabethan England were due to its relative freedom rather than its censorship, and more liberty would have been better.

Pendleton asks us to consider that the Elizabethan era was when the British Empire began in earnest, but does not explain how this happened. Spain, Portugal, and even France were ahead of England in colonizing the New World and expanding trade routes in the latter half of the 16th century. It was not until Elizabeth died and James VI and I became King of Scotland and England that the English shifted their attention from attacking the colonies of other nations to the business of establishing their own overseas colonies. The burdensome regulations of the day may disappoint a contemporary libertarian, but the English trade policies were about as good as there were at the time.

Chile and Singapore

Next, Pendleton presents Augusto Pinochet’s Chile and Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore as examples of anti-libertarian success stories. Both pursued economic liberty while restricting social and political liberty; as Pendleton says of the left-libertarians, “a libertarian would rather choke on his bow-tie than defend [their political policies].” Though left-libertarians tend to recoil at such measures, a reactionary understanding of libertarianism provides quite a different view. The libertarian reactionary understands that the desired goal of a libertarian social order can only be achieved by physically removing the state from power. Doing this, however, requires a critical mass of the population to use self-defense against the current system. If such a critical mass is absent, then those who seek liberty must turn to other methods. Those libertarians who are capable of checking their autism and doing what is necessary within context may come to support a Pinochet- or Yew-type for the purpose of restoring a balance of political terror. The idea is for libertarians to use a reactionary authoritarian approach in order to suppress leftists and reverse the damage they have done, overthrow the regime once the left is defeated, then maintain the power vacuum by continuous application of defensive force. Furthermore, a libertarian social order will not necessarily offer a great deal of social and political liberty, especially to those who do not hold allodial title over private property and/or disagree with anarcho-capitalism. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe explains,

“As soon as mature members of society habitually express acceptance or even advocate egalitarian sentiments, whether in the form of democracy (majority rule) or of communism, it becomes essential that other members, and in particular the natural social elites, be prepared to act decisively and, in the case of continued nonconformity, exclude and ultimately expel these members from society. In a covenant concluded among proprietor and community tenants for the purpose of protecting their private property, no such thing as a right to free (unlimited) speech exists, not even to unlimited speech on one’s own tenant-property. One may say innumerable things and promote almost any idea under the sun, but naturally no one is permitted to advocate ideas contrary to the very purpose of the covenant of preserving and protecting private property, such as democracy and communism. There can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and expelled from society.”[1]

This is quite similar to the standard of no voice and free exit advocated by Nick Land and some other prominent neoreactionaries. The only real difference is that the libertarian reactionary is especially concerned with making the sovereign units as small as possible. It is worth noting that both proposals blend anarchy with authority, in that there is an irreducible anarchy between sovereigns who have authority within their private properties.

Pendleton wonders how Singapore would have preserved liberty in the midst of conflicts between the various ethnic groups present there without Yew’s rule, and how the various religious groups could have been kept from fighting in England without Elizabeth I’s despotism. The possible answers to such questions are the same in each case. First, groups may hire neutral third parties to resolve disputes. Second, the groups may voluntarily segregate themselves so as to avoid contact with each other. Third, some groups that cannot get along with others may have a mass exodus. Fourth, a troublemaking group may be forcibly exiled by all of the other groups. Fifth, each side may be armed to such an extent as to create peace through mutually assured destruction. Sixth, the groups may simply choose to fight it out, as some hostilities reach a point of no return. In the first five cases, the preservation of liberty is maximized. The sixth case is far more troublesome, but such quarrels can be formalized and separated so as not to catch innocent bystanders in the crossfire. A system of dueling has filled this role in many historical societies. There are thus many options other than authoritarianism for preserving liberty; the only question is whether people care to utilize them.

Libertarianism and Reaction

Pendleton writes,

“The reactionary and libertarian both agree that small governments are good. But the reactionary feels that small governments are made not by relinquishing authority, as the libertarian would do, but by strengthening it. Liberty is too precious to be entrusted to anarchy in the same way that diamonds are too precious to be entrusted to one’s doorstep.”

Here, he misunderstands what a libertarian would do, at least those who are not leftists. A libertarian reactionary seeks not to relinquish authority, but to make it as absolute as possible in the hands of the private property owner within that person’s private property. And contrary to Pendleton, liberty requires anarchy because the freedom to do as one wishes as long as one respects the right of other people to do likewise and commits no aggression against them is violated by a state apparatus by definition. If a state is present, it will fund its activities through taxation and civil asset forfeiture, take private property through eminent domain, and restrict the use of property through intellectual monopoly, zoning, and environmental regulations. Its officials and agents will choose the nature of the law and the enforcement thereof, meaning that they rule the law and not vice versa. Its enforcers will initiate the use of violence against people who are known to disagree with government statutes and acts upon their disagreements, thus presenting a constant threat to peace. Its agents are allowed to do that which is considered criminal for anyone else to do, and the system is set up to keep them from being held to account. It will force people to associate with it regardless of whether they want to use or pay for its services. Therefore, it is clear that liberty cannot be protected by state authority; such a threatening protector is a contradiction of terms.

Final Arbitration

Next, Pendleton presents a case to make the ‘final arbiter of disputes’ criticism of libertarianism:

“Suppose we have one of those highly attenuated legal battles where the details of the case are complicated and emotionally charged. Let us suppose that a drunk driver crashed into a tree and his passenger was killed when she flew through the windshield; she had not worn her seat belt. The grieving husband of the passenger demanded compensation from the driver to help take care of his kids in place of his now deceased wife. Daycare is expensive these days, after all. The driver apologized profusely but pointed out that the passenger was just as responsible for her death because she was not buckled into her seat. The husband countered by saying that the belt would not have been an issue if the driver had not been drunk and crashed into a tree.

Since these men live in a libertarian utopia, there is no superseding legal authority to arbitrate: a third-party arbitration company will have to be hired. Now let’s suppose that one of these arbitration companies is owned by a brother-in-law of the driver, and not surprisingly, the driver only agrees to hire that company. The husband refuses. The driver in turn refuses to pay any compensation whatsoever. The furious husband now threatens to kill the wife of the driver to make him understand what it feels like to lose a loved one.

How can any libertarian who sings the praises of anarchy not see how this situation will only continue to escalate? How can there be any justice for the woman who lost her life in the original crash and what about the violations of liberty that will ensue when this conflict devolves into a family feud? If there had been one authority to take control of this dispute the liberties of everyone involved would have been much more safely guarded. In a world where emotion forms the greater part of human action, liberty requires authority.”

This situation may be resolved in advance through contracts. The owners of the road set the conditions for operating vehicles on their private property, with violators subject to physical removal not unlike the traffic stops, arrests, and impounding of vehicles today. They may demand that everyone using their roads have arbitration services which do not involve such conflicts of interest, and contrary to some myopic analysis to the contrary, are almost certain to frown upon drunk drivers. They might even have all cars on their roads driven by robots, which nips this scenario in the bud. Failing this, a person who has committed an offense and refuses to make restitution can be ostracized from society until compliance is gained. Furthermore, such a person may rightly be forced to make restitution because an unrepentant aggressor is not subject to the non-aggression principle through his continuing violation of it. The driver’s wife, however, is an innocent bystander unless she was responsible for getting him drunk and/or making him drive while intoxicated. Threatening her absent these conditions makes the widower an aggressor to be subdued. As a libertarian society would have several private defense agencies available to handle such applications of defensive force and almost everyone would have a protection policy with one of these companies, an escalation is quite unlikely. Even if this kind of situation does escalate, it pales in comparison to the carnage wrought by the one authority that Pendleton defends. States were responsible for 203 million democides and war deaths in the 20th century alone. This is hardly a price worth paying to stifle a few family feuds.

More generally, a final arbiter of disputes cannot exist because no person or institution can absolutely guarantee that any issue will be resolved forever with no possibility of review. The way that disputes ultimately end in any social order is that some party finds the dispute to no longer be worth continuing. Everything else, whether statist courts and legislatures or anarchic arbitration services and private defense agencies, is simply window dressing on this immutable truth.

Of Rules and Rulers

Pendleton writes,

“A libertarian who is honest with himself has to ask why even jungle tribes have a chief and why high schools have hall-monitors. Human beings require authority, and if authority is to mean anything at all, it requires the power of compulsion; liberty cannot last long in a nation that thinks of its authority as a polite suggestion.”

It is important to understand the true meaning of anarchy. Anarchy comes from Greek ἀναρχία, which is typically translated as ‘without rulers.’ More precisely, it means ‘without beginning to take the lead.’ This is not the same as ‘without rules’ or ‘without leaders.’ Having a ruler means that there are no rules because the ruler has authority over the rules and not vice versa. That the lead is not taken does not mean that no one can lead because leadership can be freely given. This is well-understood in every aspect of life other than politics. In the words of Mikhail Bakunin,

“Does it follow that I reject all authority? Far from me such a thought. In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or engineer. …But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism and censure. I do not content myself with consulting authority in any special branch; I consult several; I compare their opinions, and choose that which seems to me the soundest. But I recognize no infallible authority, even in special questions; consequently, whatever respect I may have for the honesty and the sincerity of such or such an individual, I have no absolute faith in any person. Such a faith would be fatal to my reason, to my liberty, and even to the success of my undertakings; it would immediately transform me into a stupid slave, an instrument of the will and interests of others.”[2]

Additionally, compulsion and initiatory force are not equivalent. This is because compulsion may take the form of defensive force or of less violent means such as shaming and ostracism. Thus, if human beings require authority (and Pendleton does not prove that they do), a libertarian social order is quite capable of compelling people through contract law, ostracism, and private military forces.

Mischaracterization

Pendleton laments that not many libertarians will be swayed by his arguments, but does not understand why. It is not the case that libertarians are “far too busy sketching intricate political systems on paper to be bothered with considerations of human psychology.” Libertarianism, properly understood, is anti-political; its primary interest in political systems is in finding ways to destroy them without causing unnecessary damage to the social fabric. As for considerations of human psychology, they should lead one to reject the state as an enabler and multiplier of evil in the world. Ultimately, libertarians are not swayed by his arguments because they are easily refuted, as shown both above and below.

The Definition of Liberty

Pendleton writes,

“Liberty, as we now know it, is a set of unquestionable boundaries that are owed to all citizens: the right to peaceable assembly, the right to free speech, the right to a free press, and so on. The problem with these ‘rights’ is that they are very enticing ideas that are very murky in their specifics. They exist in the minds of Americans as a hazy bundle of entitlements, as things that they are owed, rather than things that they must earn.

The greatest problem with this notion of liberty as an entitlement is that once citizens start declaring rights as ‘universal’ and ‘God-given’ there is no mechanism to stop them from continually inventing new ones. The ‘right to privacy’ or the ‘right to universal healthcare’ are muddled ideas that our founding fathers never anticipated. Jefferson and Madison almost certainly would not have approved of them, but they are ideas that have as much legitimacy as America’s own Bill of Rights: if Madison can conjure up new rights with a few quill strokes there is likewise nothing to stop Supreme Court justices from doing the same thing. And so the list of entitlements owed to Americans steadily grows longer as its list of responsibilities dwindles.”

He correctly criticizes the contemporary understanding of liberty in liberal democracies. As I have explained elsewhere, these rights belong to private property owners within the spaces that they own. No one has a right to assemble, speak, print, and so on within private property if the owner disagrees with such activities. Those who would do so are trespassing and thus subject to physical removal. The current problem is that the state has greatly interfered with private property. This is a problem of the commons, and the only solution is to eliminate the commons and return it to private ownership.

From here, as Pendleton realizes, it only gets worse. When people fail to connect rights to logic and ownership of property, or more simply, to thought and action, they confuse negative rights with so-called “positive rights.” These positive rights cannot be valid because their provision violates the negative rights of other people. For instance, a right to healthcare implies that someone must be forced to provide healthcare, even if it against the provider’s wishes to serve that person.

But though he correctly identifies the problem, Pendleton proposes an incorrect solution. He seeks to restore the ancient Roman ideal of liberty rather than to correct the errors in the practice of modern liberty. The Romans viewed liberty in a collective sense, as imposing responsibilities to the state in eschange for individual rights. In truth, liberty is neither a list of entitlements nor a reward for serving society or the state; it is the result of gaining and defending private property. With this understanding, it is not ironic at all that libertarians would condemn a system which subordinates the individual to a collective as fascism (or more appropriately, as communism).

Rationalism and Empiricism

Pendleton claims that the Roman notion of liberty has the example of Singapore while the libertarian has no compelling models; only fantasies and Somalia. Implicit in this claim is a sort of historical determinism that demonstrates a lack of courage and imagination to look beyond what has been and see what is possible but as yet unrealized. As explained above, Somalia has shown improvement without a state. And fortunately, libertarians have more than fantasies; we have a priori theory. In the words of Hoppe, “A priori theory trumps and corrects experience (and logic overrules observation), and not vice-versa.”[3] This is because one may use rationalism without using empiricism, but one cannot use empiricism without using rationalism. That rationalism is independent and empiricism is dependent establishes a clear hierarchy between the two ways of knowing. Of course, this will not convince a strong empiricist of the historical determinist variety, but this has no bearing upon the truth value of the argument.

That being said, it is worth considering why there are no empirical examples of a stateless propertarian society in recent times. The obvious answer is that states initiate violence to sustain their operations, and libertarians have yet to suppress this aggression with enough defensive force to stop it. The other, less obvious explanation is that those who govern in statist systems know at one level or another that their institutions are unnecessary for the functioning of society, but that most people are more empirical than rational in their thinking. It is for this reason that they cannot allow a working example of a stateless society to be created, as this would permanently turn the masses against the state. They thus use force not only to maintain their power, but to ensure that most people never consider alternatives which do not include them.

Conclusion

Pendleton closes by contemplating the issues on the horizon for America, from racial tensions to Islamic terrorists, though he says nothing of the various economic issues. However, the “furious, explosive derailment” he fears is not only unavoidable, but necessary. The current system cannot be fixed; it must end in either a controlled demolition or a chaotic collapse. In any event, the answers are to be found in the restoration and enforcement of private property rights and freedom of association, with physical removal for those who challenge these norms. It is best to work toward emerging from this chaos looking neither like Singapore nor like Somalia, but as something completely novel in time memorial: a functional stateless society of covenant communities.

References:

  1. Hans-Hermann Hoppe (2001). Democracy: The God That Failed. Transaction Publishers. p. 218
  2. Bakunin, Mikhail (1871, 1882). God and the State. Mother Earth Publishing Association. Ch. 2
  3. Hoppe, p. xvi.

Book Review: The Essential Guide to Freelance Writing

The Essential Guide to Freelance Writing is a how-to manual on the subject by author and editor Zachary Petit. The book discusses all of the fundamentals of freelance writing that an aspiring writer needs to know.

Petit begins by discussing full-time versus part-time freelancing, as well as the different venues for which a freelancer can write. He offers the wise advice to avoid content mills and be open to writing for almost every other type of publication, which would have saved me a lot of trouble had this book been published four years earlier. The second chapter is about what to write and how to get ideas for articles. Again, the advice is sound: go out and find stories rather than expecting them to fall into your lap, use your knowledge and expertise from other disciplines, cover events local to you, express yourself, and never stop studying.

The next three chapters discuss the process of getting a freelance assignment. First, there is the matter of one’s online and offline presence, as well as adherence to stylebooks (which felt like it belonged in the fourth chapter rather than the third). Next, Petit takes the reader through the structure of a magazine and the writing opportunities (or lack thereof) presented by each part. The fourth chapter concludes with a brief discussion of what is necessary to write for major publications immediately. The fifth chapter explains in great detail how to (and how not to) query a publication in order to get a freelance assignment and briefly discusses the typical hierarchy of publishers, editors, assistants, and interns.

The sixth chapter covers everything that a novice writer needs to learn about interviewing people, from the pros and cons of in-person, phone, and email interviews to journalistic ethics to dealing with troublesome sources and celebrities (and both). In general, in-person interviews are better than phone interviews are better than email interviews, though one must take what one can get sometimes. The seventh chapter discusses almost every other type of writing available to a freelancer, such as front-of-the-book content, newspaper articles, feature articles, Q&As, and profile pieces. To Petit’s credit, the puff pieces and hit pieces which are far too common in formerly respectable publications are absent, as new writers should make an effort to be better than that.

The eighth chapter deals with a writer’s relationship with editors; how to treat them, how to think of them, and how to make sure that an article is ready to be seen by them. The most important advice here is to take no criticism personally, eliminate as many errors as possible on one’s own, double-check everything before submitting an article, and realize that editors can be busy people with tight schedules that limit their ability to respond promptly. The ninth chapter concerns the business side of being a freelancer, including proper payment, negotiating contracts, dealing with delinquent clients, avoiding shady clients, and navigating the unique tax situation of being an independent contractor. The book ends with a short conclusion of encouraging words and an appendix which mostly contains more information about writing queries.

Overall, I cannot recommend this book highly enough. Petit explains the ins and outs of freelancing as only a veteran of the business can, and it can save an aspiring freelance writer a lot of trouble from learning the slow and hard way.

Rating: 5/5

On Market Failure

The idea of market failure is a widely believed misconception which has found widespread use in statist propaganda for the purpose of justifying government intervention in the private sector. Though the term itself has only been in use since 1958, the concept can be traced back to Henry Sidgwick. It is used to describe a situation in which the allocation of goods and services is Pareto inefficient. This occurs when the rational self-interest of individuals is at odds with the optimal outcome for a collective. Such a situation is frequently blamed on conflicts of interest, factor immobility, information asymmetry, monopolies, negative externalities, public goods, and/or time-inconsistent preferences. Among these, monopolies, negative externalities, and public goods receive the most attention from mainstream economists.

But let us pause to consider what a market is. A market is a structure that allows buyers and sellers to exchange goods, services, and information. The participants in the market for a particular commodity consist of everyone who influences the price of that commodity. To say that a market has failed is to say that this process of assembling the information about a commodity which is reflected in its price and its change over time has failed. But the causes listed above are either inconsistent with a free market or unresolvable by interventions which bind the market. Let us explore this in detail.

Monopolies

While monopolies are frequently blamed for market failures, a monopoly in a particular market is typically the result of government intervention which has raised barriers to entry in that market. Through a vicious cycle of regulatory capture, larger businesses can put smaller competitors out of business by bribing politicians and regulators to favor the former and harm the latter. This continues until a market is effectively monopolized. Therefore, this type of monopoly is actually a government failure rather than a market failure.

Another type of monopoly can occur when there are natural barriers to entry, such as the need to build vast amounts of infrastructure in order to provide a good or service. This can give the first entrant into a market an insurmountable advantage. Consumers may then complain that this monopolist is abusing them rather than show gratitude that they are getting a service which was formerly nonexistent. But if the monopolist were really overcharging, then it would become feasible for another provider to either challenge the monopoly directly or provide an alternative service. This type of monopoly is actually a market signal that a particular good or service would be better provided by another means, and entrepreneurs should look for those means.

Third, a monopoly can arise in a free market if one business satisfies all consumers of a good or service to such an extent that no one cares to compete against them. This kind of monopoly is not a market failure, but an astonishing market success.

This leaves only the ‘public goods’ argument, which merits its own section.

Public Goods

Public goods and services are those whose consumption cannot be limited to paying customers. It is frequently argued that this produces waste in the form of unnecessary duplication and excess costs born by those who are not free riders. There is also the matter that non-excludable and rivalrous resources in a commons may be depleted without intervention. The latter can only be fully resolved by eliminating the commons, as restoring exclusive control to the resource is the only method of eliminating the perverse incentives created by a commons. The concerns over free riding and unnecessary duplication ignore incentives, prove too much, and commit the broken window fallacy.

If we wish to have a rational discussion, it is essential to define terms. A problem is an undesirable situation which can be remedied. This is because a situation which is not undesirable presents no problem to solve, and an undesirable situation which has no remedy is just a fact which must be tolerated. The free rider “problem” is a situation of the latter type, as it is impractical to make sure that everyone pays exactly what they should pay for the amount of public goods that they consume. That government monopolies destroy competition, and thus the market price system, makes the free rider “problem” impossible to solve, as the information needed to determine how much each person should pay for the amount of public goods that they consume is destroyed beyond repair.

If taken to its logical conclusion, the idea that no one should be able to consume more than or pay for less than their fair share of a public good means that the state should be eliminated, as the very presence of a state means that some people are consuming more than and paying for less than their fair share of the total wealth in the economy, as states are funded by coercive means which violate private property rights. Those who receive government welfare payments, bailouts, grants, or any other form of government funding are free riding upon the backs of taxpayers and anyone else who uses currency printed by a government’s central bank. The latter group of people are forced riders who are required to pay for public goods from which they receive insufficient benefit. Charity would also be unjustifiable if the concept of the free rider problem is taken to its logical conclusion, as those who receive charity are not paying the full cost for what they are using.

But suppose we ignore this as well. If we accept for the sake of argument that there are public goods and that no one should be able to consume more than or pay for less than their fair share of a public good, then the result will be a massive distortion of the economy, as both the state and private charity must go. While the demise of statism is nothing to lament, the absence of any form of private charity would lead to the very sort of Hobbesian war that statists fear and think that they are preventing. It must also be noted that the money for payments for public goods which are now being made was once being put toward another purpose. Whether that purpose was spending on other goods and services or investment (which is really just another form of spending), the diversion of spending away from these purposes and toward public goods will eliminate some other economic activities that were occurring.

Nearly all competitive production involves supposedly wasteful duplication, in that each provider must have the infrastructure necessary to produce that which is being provided. But if the duplication is truly wasteful, the market signals this by rendering the wasteful duplication unprofitable. Government intervention interferes with such signals, and government control over an industry completely eliminates them, leading to far worse government failures than any failure of the market.

Externalities

A problem related to public goods is the problem of externalities, in which costs or benefits affect a party who did not choose to incur those costs or benefits. When firms do not pay the full cost of production, each unit costs less to produce than it should, resulting in overproduction.

The most frequent examples given are pollution, traffic congestion, and overuse of natural resources, but all of these contain externalities because the market has been prevented by governments from internalizing the costs. Air and water pollution are externalities because government intervention on behalf of polluters has eliminated the common law system of private property rights with regard to pollution. Before the Industrial Revolution, pollution was correctly viewed as an act of aggression against people and their property. Those victimized could sue for damages and obtain injunctions against further pollution. Polluters and victims can also bargain to reach an optimal level of both production and pollution. Additionally, the victims would be justified in using violence in self-defense against polluters, though this is an historical rarity. But government monopolization of environmental regulation has prevented these market solutions from being implemented. Therefore, pollution is a government failure rather than a market failure.

Traffic congestion is another tragedy of the commons that causes externalities in the form of pollution, wasted fuel, and lost time. But this is another case in which governments have monopolized a good and produced it out of accordance with market demand. Without competing private firms to build different traffic systems in search of more efficient ones and without private property rights determining location and control over the transportation system, we are left with a non-excludable good that is incentivized toward overuse. Attempted solutions of congestion pricing, mass transit, and tolls mitigate some effects, but not to the extent that private service providers might implement such methods. Again, we have government failure at work.

A third example of externalities occurs with overuse of natural resources, such as fish and lumber. But once more, we see government intervention against private property mechanisms creating problems. Because state personnel in modern democracies do not personally benefit from maintaining the value of state-controlled property and work almost solely with the usufruct thereof, they are incentivized to engage in bribery and corruption. When states sell only the resource rights but not the territory itself, they get a renewable source of income. But firms that harvest renewable resources can abuse this system, stripping the resource bare then vanishing when it is time to replenish. These ‘fly-by-night’ lumber companies, fishers, and other such exploiters lead to the fast demise of resources which were harvested and preserved for centuries prior to state intervention. In short, government fails yet again.

Before moving on, a quick word about positive externalities is in order. This is another way of talking about the free rider problem, so the same criticisms discussed above apply. But we should also consider the benefits of free riders. Although some people will argue that free riders are responsible for higher costs, they are actually signaling that a good or service is overpriced. While degenerate freeloaders do exist, most free riders who are aware of their free riding are willing to pay for what they are receiving but believe that said goods or services are overpriced. In the state-enforced absence of another provider, they choose to “pirate” the public goods rather than pay the cost which they believe to be too expensive. If there are rational, knowledgeable people in charge of a public good that has many free riders, then they will respond by lowering the cost to convince more people to contribute, which can actually raise the total contribution.

The above result is rare, of course, as rational, knowledgeable people tend to be productive rather than become part of the state apparatus. The more useful role of free riders is to crash government programs which cannot be ended by normal political means. Most government programs help a few people by a large magnitude while harming a much larger number of people by a much smaller amount. This means that an irate and tireless minority will work to keep their sacred cow from being gored, while the majority is not being harmed enough to take action to end the harm. Thus, there is nothing more permanent than a temporary government program, and it is politically impossible to abolish entitlement and welfare programs. While the strategy of overloading such programs was first proposed by leftists who wished to replace them with far more expansive redistributions of wealth, it could also be used by libertarian-minded people who wish to replace such programs with nothing.

Other Culprits

The less-discussed causes of market failure are conflicts of interest, factor immobility, information asymmetry, and time-inconsistent preferences. This is mostly because government intervention is more widely known to either cause these problems or fail to solve them. Conflicts of interest typically occur when an agent has a self-interest which is at odds with the principal that the agent is supposed to serve. For example, a lawyer may advise his client to enter protracted legal proceedings not because it is best for the client, but because it will generate more income for the lawyer. A politician may vote for a law not because it is in the best interest of the people in her district, but because she was bribed by lobbyists who support the law. The only solution to a conflict of interest is to recuse oneself from the conflict, and government offers no answer, especially since it inherently operates on conflict of interest.

Factor immobility occurs when factors of production, such as land, capital, and labor, cannot easily move between one area of the economy and another. This sometimes occurs due to malinvestment caused by government distortions of the economy; in other cases, it results from technological advancement that puts an industry into obsolescence. In any event, government regulations frequently make it more difficult to change occupations and maneuver capital than it would be in a free market. Interventions to help workers in a declining field typically fall victim to the knowledge problem; it cannot accurately retrain workers or educate future workers because it cannot know what the economy will need by the time the retraining or education is complete.

Information asymmetry occurs when some parties in a transaction has more and/or better information than others. This creates a power disparity which is sometimes called a market failure in the worst cases. Common sub-types of information asymmetry include adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when one party lacks information while negotiating a contract, while moral hazard involves a lack of information about performance or an inability to obtain appropriate relief for a breach of contract. These cases are made worse by government laws, as laws can lead to both adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, an insurance firm that is legally disallowed from discriminating against high-risk customers is itself put at a higher risk through no fault or will of its own, being unable to turn away those who cost the most to insure or cancel insurance policies for reckless behavior by the insured. Fortunately, there are market methods for resolving informational asymmetries, such as rating agencies.

Time-inconsistent preferences occur when people make decisions which are inconsistent with expected utility. For example, one might choose to have ten ounces of gold today rather than eleven ounces tomorrow. Time preferences are expressed economically through interest rates, in that interest rates are the premium placed upon having something now rather than waiting for it. Governments interfere with interest rates through central bank monetary policies, leading to alterations of time preference that can be inconsistent. This is still another example of government failure rather than market failure.

Resource Failure

Another possibility for market failure which is rarely discussed is that of resource failure. If an economy becomes dependent upon a certain non-renewable resource, that resource becomes scarce, and there is no viable alternative, the result can be devastating not only to markets, but to peoples’ lives as a whole. For example, if peak oil occurs and there is no alternative energy source available to meet the energy demands fulfilled by fossil fuels, a market failure will occur due to resource failure. Another historical example is the destruction of trees on Easter Island. Resource failure is generally not amenable to government policy, and may be exacerbated by it if subsidies alter the market to keep it from finding the best solution to a resource shortage.

Complainer Failure

The last type of failure is not a market failure at all, but a failure by a critic to understand the nature of the market. Consumer demand does not drive the economy; capital investment does. The over-reliance on gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of economic output has fooled many people into believing otherwise, but GDP neglects intermediate production at the commodity, manufacturing, and wholesale stages of production. As such, consumer demand and spending are an effect of a healthy economy and not the cause.

With this in mind, the idea that the market has somehow failed when it does not produce everything that a particular person might want and deliver it exactly where they want it for a cost that the person finds agreeable is ridiculous. A person levying this criticism should be advised to check their hubris. If a certain good or service is not produced in a free market, it is because such production is not sufficiently worthwhile for anyone to make a living through doing so. The fact that everyone gets by without that good or service indicates that no failure has taken place. Those who desire that good or service so much should make an effort to provide it so that they can have it.

Standards

The entire idea of market failures is based on Pareto efficiency. But there is no reason why we must choose Pareto efficiency as the measure of market success. One could just as well define market efficiency as the degree to which it permits its participants to achieve their individual goals. (Note that these are equivalent if the conditions of the first welfare theorem are met.) Another possible standard is that of productive efficiency, which is optimized when no additional production can occur without increasing the amount of resources, time, and/or labor involved in production. An economy with maximum productive efficiency cannot produce more of one good without producing less of another good.

Conclusion

In every case, that which appears to be a market failure is actually a failure of government policy, natural resource management, or economic understanding. We may therefore reject the very idea of market failure as yet another form of statist propaganda.

Why JASTA Is Good

On September 28, Congress voted to override President Obama’s veto of a bill that allows relatives of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to sue Saudi Arabia for any role in the plot. The Senate defeated the veto by a 97-1 vote, then the House voted 348-77 to override the veto hours later. Therefore, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, or JASTA, is now a law. The bill passed both houses of Congress without objection earlier in 2016.

It was the first veto override of Obama’s presidency, and the first since 2008. Under Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2-3 of the United States Constitution, Congress may override a presidential veto by a two-thirds majority vote in both the House and the Senate.

Although no member of Congress spoke out against JASTA during the override procedure, Obama has argued that the law sets a dangerous precedent. It grants an exception to the legal principle of sovereign immunity, which could be a double-edged sword if other countries pass reciprocating legislation. This could expose American corporations, diplomats, politicians, and soldiers to lawsuits for their conduct overseas. This caused CIA Director John Brennan to warn that JASTA had “grave implications” for national security. Additionally, 28 senators signed a letter expressing reservations about the potential that JASTA will cause the United States to be sued in foreign courts “as a result of important military or intelligence activities.”

Why JASTA is Good

While the national security statists are scared of what Pandora’s box might have just been opened, this is excellent news for libertarians. This is because it chips away at the anti-libertarian idea of sovereign immunity, could give victims of American foreign policy a peaceful means of addressing their grievances, and could reveal clandestine activities to the American people about which they have a need to know.

Sovereign immunity is the legal doctrine by which the state can do no wrong and is immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution. It is the ultimate manifestation of the fact that government will not hold government accountable because it is against the rational self-interest of those who wield state power. With the ability to grant immunity to themselves, government agents can engage with impunity in activities which are criminalized for the commoner, and they do so on an enormous scale. A double standard of this sort could never be tolerated in a libertarian social order. In a free society, the standard would have to be that actions which are criminal for one person are criminal for another. Wearing a costume and claiming affiliation with a government would be meaningless. For example, just as taxation is robbery, slavery, receiving stolen monies, transporting stolen monies, and conspiracy if private citizens behave identically to government tax collectors, so would a libertarian private court prosecute tax collectors. JASTA and potential reciprocating legislation does not go nearly far enough in this sense, but it is a potential first step toward more justice for the crimes of government personnel.

Speaking of crimes of government personnel, the American military and the civilians who preside over it have committed a great number of them. Since the end of World War II, American foreign policy has caused between 20 million and 30 million deaths. Economic sanctions have contributed to this death toll, while impoverishing many people who have survived and generally failing to achieve their stated objectives. These multitudes of victims deserve justice. With sovereign immunity in place, there is no forum in which they may seek judicial relief. Making peaceful dispute resolution impossible makes violent dispute resolution inevitable, so some people wronged by the United States government decide to seek vengeance in the form of joining terrorist groups to attack innocent Americans in retaliation for their losses. While such acts cannot be morally defended, they are certainly understandable. Reciprocation to JASTA provides a pathway to a more peaceful system of addressing grievances caused by American foreign policy. Even the possibility that Americans may be sued for their wrongful deeds overseas would create a chilling effect against bellicosity that libertarians should welcome.

As such cases begin, the discovery process of these lawsuits could make public certain activities being done in the name of all Americans which are currently unknown to the American people. While the civil religion of democratic statism should not be taken at face value, most people do, so it makes sense in context to have an informed electorate. The people cannot judge various military and intelligence operations if they never find out about them. With JASTA and reciprocating legislation, the newly possible lawsuits filed by foreigners victimized by Americans could serve to educate the American people on the nature of what is being done in their names. Even libertarians who oppose democracy should favor this result, as one cannot protest wrongs of which one remains ignorant.

Objections

JASTA could result in lawsuits for vicarious liability against civilian contractors who provide armaments and other equipment to people who are directly involved in foreign atrocities. This is a feature, not a bug. Knowingly providing a violent criminal institution with the means to victimize the innocent should be treated not only as a civil wrong, but as criminal behavior. Lawsuits against such parties could result in a chilling effect against providing the state with the means to perform its pernicious deeds, which would benefit the American people by weakening the state and resulting in less motivation for retaliatory terrorism against innocent Americans.

Because there is a condition of anarchy between sovereigns, there is no higher court whose judgments are binding and enforced across national boundaries. This means that citizens can sue foreign nation-states as they see fit, but winning a judgment offers no guarantee of payment because the foreign nation-state can simply ignore the court’s decision. This is true, but it does not diminish the indirect consequences of JASTA, which are the real reasons to support it.

Should such cases not be summarily dismissed, there is the potential for many thousands of cases to bog down the court system. But this can create a demand to privatize courts, or at least give more business to private arbitrators of disputes. Should the cases remain in government courts, it will take up time and resources which could otherwise be used to cause more harm to innocent Americans.

Finally, there is the concern that allowing such lawsuits will damage foreign relations after such judgments are ignored. This is also a feature rather than a bug, as the possibility of damage to foreign relations for denying claims for wrongdoing in foreign policy provides an incentive for governments to avoid committing so many atrocities overseas. A world in which citizens may sue foreign governments for damages is thus likely to be a more peaceful world.

Conclusion

Although one would be correct to be skeptical of any legislation that passes by such a wide margin, the likely secondary results of JASTA are intriguing and the fears of it are overblown. From a philosophical libertarian perspective, JASTA is clearly a net benefit.

On the Use of Force Against the Commission on Presidential Debates

This is the second essay in a three-part series. In this essay, we will consider the philosophical case for using forceful means to protest the policies of the Commission on Presidential Debates, which are geared toward ensuring that the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates do not have to debate anyone else. The first essay discussed a peaceful method of protesting the policies of the CPD, and the third essay will detail the campaign of a hypothetical future third-party presidential candidate who makes use of the tactics described in the first and second essays.

History

In the weeks leading up to every United States presidential election, a series of debates between the candidates are held. When the current series of regular debates began in 1976, this was handled by the League of Women Voters. By 1987, the Republican and Democratic parties decided to take over control of the debates by creating the Commission on Presidential Debates, which was co-chaired by Frank Fahrenkopf and Paul G. Kirk, the Republican and Democratic national chairmen at the time. In 1988, the League of Women Voters announced their withdrawal from debate sponsorship, saying in a statement that

“…the demands of the two campaign organizations would perpetrate a fraud on the American voter. It has become clear to us that the candidates’ organizations aim to add debates to their list of campaign-trail charades devoid of substance, spontaneity and honest answers to tough questions. The League has no intention of becoming an accessory to the hoodwinking of the American public.”

The CPD has controlled all presidential debates involving Republican and Democratic candidates since 1988. At a 1987 press conference announcing the commission’s creation, Fahrenkopf said that the commission was not likely to include third-party candidates in debates. Kirk said that third-party candidates should be excluded. A third-party candidate has only been invited once; Ross Perot was allowed to debate in 1992 because both major-party candidates believed that his presence was in their self-interest and would help to draw support away from their major-party opponent. Perot was excluded when he ran again in 1996, and finished with less than half of the votes he earned in 1992. In 2000, the CPD established a rule that for a candidate to be included in the national debates he or she must garner at least 15 percent support across five national polls. This arbitrary and capricious standard has kept all third-party candidates from debating since its inception.

Peaceful Efforts

There have been many efforts by third-party candidates to gain access to the debate stage. The direct approach of trying to reach 15 percent in national polls has obviously been tried by all, with universal failure. The American election system encourages two parties, the media enables the exclusion of alternative voices, campaign financiers donate to the two major parties to maintain their corrupt bargains with the state, ballot access laws are rigged against third parties, and the pollsters either exclude the names of third-party candidates or ask about them after focusing on a two-candidate match-up which will not appear on the ballot. This creates an uphill battle to reach 15 percent which has proven too difficult for any third-party candidate since Perot, and it likely requires the billions of dollars that he had available. These factors together create a Catch-22: A third-party candidate needs to be in the debates to get the polling numbers needed to be in the debates.

Some candidates have realized the absurdity of this setup and tried to fight against it. In 2000, Green Party candidate Ralph Nader filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission, alleging that corporate contributions to the CPD violate the Federal Election Campaign Act. The FEC ruled that they do not, and the D.C. Circuit Court declined to overrule the FEC. In 2004, Libertarian candidate Michael Badnarik and Green Party candidate David Cobb were arrested in St. Louis, Mo. when they attempted to enter a debate to serve an order to show cause to the CPD. In 2012, Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson filed an anti-trust lawsuit against the CPD, the Democratic National Committee, and the Republican National Committee in D.C. Circuit Court, citing the Sherman Act and claiming “illegal conspiracy or contract in restraint of trade.” The injuctive relief was denied, and the case was eventually dismissed in 2014 due to lack of jurisdiction. Also in 2012, Green Party candidate Jill Stein and her running mate Cheri Honkala were arrested by Hofstra University campus security when they attempted to enter the debate site. They were handcuffed and detained in a warehouse for eight hours before being released. In 2015, Johnson, Stein, the Libertarian Party, and the Green Party filed suit against the CPD, DNC, RNC, Barack Obama, and Mitt Romney, claiming violation of anti-trust laws. The case was dismissed in August 2016 on spurious reasoning, leaving an insufficient amount of time for an appeal.

Efforts to bring down the CPD by going after its sponsors have been similarly fruitless. While such efforts did lead to BBH New York, YWCA USA, and Philips Electronics withdrawing their sponsorship of the 2012 debates, no meaningful impact was made. As the CPD is only important every four years, it is difficult to maintain public engagement long enough to organize an economically significant boycott of the CPD’s corporate sponsors. Even if it were possible to effect such a boycott, the CPD is mostly funded by a small number of private donors who would be unaffected by a boycott in any meaningful way because their identities are hidden.

There have also been debates organized by Free and Equal which invite the most prominent third-party candidates along with the major-party candidates. But as part of the memoranda of understanding that major-party candidates make with each other, they have always agreed not to engage in non-CPD debates with other candidates. All non-CPD debates since the CPD was founded have featured third-party candidates only, and accordingly receive almost no press coverage.

Resorting To Force

It is clear that this problem is not going to be solved in a passive and peaceful manner. Just as government will not hold government accountable because it not in their self-interest to do so, government will not hold accountable a non-profit organization that serves the interest of those who control the government. If the CPD is to be brought down and its sorry excuses for debates either opened to third parties or shut down, a more active and forceful response is required. An active but peaceful method of filling the live audience with anti-duopoly hecklers was detailed in the first essay and is certainly worth attempting, but it is the sort of protest which the CPD could easily prevent in the future by further restricting the audience or holding its events without an audience. As such, let us make a philosophical case for a protest which resorts to force.

In order to justify the use of force within a libertarian moral framework, it is necessary to show that an act of aggression is being perpetrated and that the use of force in question defends against that act of aggression. Let us begin by laying out the facts of the case:

  • The CPD holds debates between presidential candidates.
  • Its criteria are clearly designed to exclude third-party candidates and produce a head-to-head presentation of the two major-party candidates.
  • All available evidence shows that a candidate must appear in these debates in order to win a presidential election.
  • Peaceful efforts to include third-party candidates have been stopped by force.
  • The President is the chief executive of the United States government, wielding immense power and influence over both the American people and the rest of the world.
  • The United States government, like any government, is a group of people who exercise a monopoly on initiatory force within a geographical area.

From these facts, it is clear that the CPD controls who gets to give orders to those who initiate force in American society, as well as who does not. Namely, only Republicans, Democrats, and those with enough money to run without either of the two parties gets a chance to do this. All others are excluded, and history shows that this exclusion is backed by violence. Involving oneself in third-party politics for the purpose of electing a president who will lessen the acts of aggression that government agents commit against people is unlikely to be the most effective method of defending oneself against the state, but it is a legitimate pragmatic option in a democratic statist system with a population that is unwilling to revolt. These defensive efforts are met with force by government agents who enforce the will of the CPD, DNC, and RNC. Further, the CPD and those who enforce their will act to silence the political speech of some people while amplifying the political speech of other people within a system in which there is no legitimate justification for doing so. Because such force is levied against defensive efforts, it is aggressive in nature, meaning that defensive force used against it is morally justified.

Next, we must consider which targets for this defensive force are legitimate and proper, concerns about organization, tactics and likely responses, and some potential objections.

Legitimate and Proper Targets

This is a case in which some legitimate targets for defensive force are not proper targets. This is because using force against them is within the bounds of the non-aggression principle, but doing so would not accomplish the goal. For example, using force against major-party presidential candidates is certainly justified as self-defense for other reasons, but doing so would be counterproductive in this case. The primary objective is to put third-party candidates on the debate stage for a proper discussion that informs the American people about all of their options, and this objective would be undermined by using violence against any presidential candidate. Neither would the secondary objective of shutting down CPD events be served by using force against the major-party nominees, as the DNC and/or RNC could simply substitute a new candidate and continue as before.

Likewise, using force against debate moderators, establishment press members covering the debate, or administrators of the hosting university would harm the cause. Even though they are complicit in acts of aggression against third-party candidates and their supporters, using force against them would make the protesters appear far less sympathetic to the American people. The legitimate and proper targets are the CPD board members, the debates themselves, and those who use force to protect them. The use of defensive force should be limited to them if at all possible. This would only become difficult in the event of a counter-offensive against the protesters in which major-party candidates, debate moderators, establishment press members, or university faculty decided to participate. Government agents are almost certain to disallow them from doing so, making this a dismissible concern.

Organization

A third-party candidate who has been excluded from the debates by the 15 percent rule but has enough ballot access to win the election and is constitutionally eligible to serve as President would have to be involved in any successful plan for forceful action. This is because it would be all but pointless to hear from a candidate who cannot win and serve, and fruitless to use force to place a candidate in the debates if the candidate does not wish to be so placed. An effort independent from any campaign to organize such an effort would be unlikely to result in anything other than a visit from federal agents to the organizers of said effort. But the candidate cannot be too involved. The candidate needs plausible deniability in order to avoid criminal charges, disavow anyone who goes off script, and be able to become President without having to worry about immediate impeachment.

A forceful protest would have to be organized outside of publicly available channels such as social media platforms, as using non-clandestine communications would alert government agents and result in the protesters being raided and arrested before they could begin. Plans would need to rely primarily upon existing groups near the area of a protest (such as local militia organizations) as well as campaign activists who are not officially connected to a campaign. This is because bringing in large numbers of armed people to a location from elsewhere would arouse suspicion, and involving official campaign staff is likely to get the candidate charged with crimes. Finally, such an effort would need to be planned several months in advance in order to get participants organized, mobilized, and familiarized with the specifics of the operation.

Tactics and Responses

A forceful protest against the CPD could take several forms. The most direct approach would be for a third-party candidate to march on a debate site with a group of armed supporters, declare that they are entering the debate site to place the candidate on stage, and indicate a willingness to escalate the use of force as far as necessary to accomplish this goal. The two most likely responses to this approach would be a violent skirmish in which the third-party candidate and many other people are injured or killed, or the cancellation of the debate due to the security risk being presented. Which one of the two occurred would depend on whether the security forces believed they could win a battle with the protesters. Further debates would be under much heavier guard to make sure that no other candidate attempts such an effort. As such, the direct approach strategy may be crossed off the list.

A second strategy would be to occupy the CPD offices in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of shutting down the CPD at the source. This would involve holding CPD personnel captive inside their headquarters and demanding open debates as the condition for their release. This approach is also very likely to go awry. Resistance on the part of the CPD personnel could very easily result in bloodshed, as could ignoring the protesters’ demands. If this were the only activity undertaken by protesters, then the debates could proceed as planned, putting the protesters in a position of either having to back down or escalate to harming the CPD personnel. This method would also be a public relations nightmare, as no one likes people who take hostages. The most likely response would be a SWAT raid that exterminates the protesters, followed by an establishment media demonization of all third-party candidates. As such, the office takeover strategy is also unviable.

A third method would be to occupy debate venues in advance for the purpose of shutting down CPD events unless they abolish the 15 percent rule and open the debates to all candidates who meet the constitutional eligibility and ballot access requirements. The CPD typically chooses three presidential debate sites, one vice presidential debate site, and an alternate site to use in case one of the former four becomes unusable for some reason. An armed occupation of all five sites for the duration of the debate season would require a few hundred people at each site and provisions to last three to four weeks. More protesters would need to be ready nationwide in order to prevent any hastily scheduled alternatives from having a venue, but given the amount of planning that is required for construction and security, these are not events which could be moved easily. Unlike the former two methods, the protesters would be in a defensive rather than an offensive posture once in position. This method also does far more to stop CPD activities because it targets said activities directly.

While it is true that government agents could overpower the protesters, doing so would needlessly spill a great amount of blood and give them some very negative press. Given the history of standoff incidents and the retaliations which have resulted from them, government agents tend to be more reserved about such confrontations than they once were. Thus, the most likely response by the CPD would be to cancel the debates for the election cycle, with the next most likely response being to give in to the protesters’ demands. Of course, the establishment media would have every reason to demonize the protesters, so there would have to be eloquent and reasonable public speakers among the protesters who could clearly articulate their objectives, why they are resorting to forceful means, and refute establishment media lies and fallacies. The rise of alternative media is certain to make a positive narrative easier to craft.

Objections

The first objection which may be raised is that the CPD is a private organization, and therefore its members have the right to admit or exclude whomever they want. This is an autistic response, as it completely denies the context of the situation. Neither the CPD, the DNC, nor the RNC are free market entities that operate by providing goods and services through voluntary means. These are organizations that are used by the elite to maintain their stranglehold on state power and the unfair advantages that they gain therefrom. While the CPD is considered a private, non-profit organization for legal purposes, it should not be regarded as a private organization for the purpose of determining what its members should be allowed to do because it is an instrument used by those who control the government as a means of perpetuating that control.

Second, some will argue that using force against the CPD violates the non-aggression principle. This stems from the proportionality of force doctrine and the immediate danger doctrine, two perversions of libertarian theory which were introduced by leftist entryists. If a defender may not use any amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor, then all an aggressor need do to get away with immoral behavior is to use force in such a way that the defender cannot use enough force to stop the aggressor. If one may only use force in a situation of immediate danger, then people are left without a way to recover stolen property, stop someone who hires hitmen, defend themselves against state aggression, or do much of anything about criminals who can obfuscate responsibility. With these fake libertarian theories rebutted, the facts of the case discussed earlier clearly demonstrate that the CPD is an aggressor.

A third objection is that all of the above uses of force described in the previous section can result in multiple felony charges for each protester. This is true, but it is no argument against such strategies. As Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote in Letter from a Birmingham Jail,

“One may well ask: ‘How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?’ The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that ‘an unjust law is no law at all.’”

Just as government will not hold accountable itself or a non-profit organization that serves the interest of those who control the government because it is against their rational self-interest to do so, it is also in their self-interest to criminalize methods of protest which are capable of meaningfully challenging the establishment. Note that should a third-party candidate win a presidential election because his or her supporters resorted to force to stop the CPD from hosting exclusionary debates, the powers of the Presidency could be used to grant a full pardon to everyone involved. The only caveat is that the candidate must maintain a degree of distance from the protesters, as failure to do so could lead to impeachment proceedings.

A fourth concern is that presidential elections do not seem to change the course of the nation very much. Regardless of who wins, the deep state continues as before because there is no rational incentive for a politician to rein it in. In the current framework, this is true. But political campaigns can function as an outreach method for anti-establishment movements of all types because people give more weight to someone who is in the running to have a position of political authority over them. People who would normally never be listened to can gain a platform for their messages by running for office. That being said, it is likely that altering or abolishing the presidential debate structure would allow for different kinds of presidential candidates to win elections, some of whom may eschew realpolitik to rein in the deep state for ideological reasons.

Fifth, one may wonder why we should go after the presidential debates when there are bigger fish to fry. After all, liberty requires revolution, so why not try to end the state now? The answer is that the manpower and resources to succeed in such an endeavor are not yet available. The number of people required to stop the CPD would probably be a thousandfold less than the number of people required to abolish the United States government, and we must work within our means if we wish to be successful. That being said, a large conflagration begins with a single spark, and using force to attempt to stop the CPD could achieve this regardless of the end result. If the protest is successful, then those who would address their grievances by direct action will be emboldened. If government agents crush the protest, then many people will be angry and willing to seek retribution. Either outcome is favorable for a more broad revolutionary movement.

Conclusion

Finally, there is the objection that the use of force to gain debate access does not bear thinking about because no candidate is willing to do it. Unfortunately, this is true at the time of this writing. There are only two third parties of significance in 2016; the Libertarian Party and the Green Party. Addressing a grievance by force of arms is not the style of the Green Party. The 2016 Libertarian ticket consists of moderate ex-Republican governors, not revolutionaries who would be willing to resort to forceful tactics. The Constitution Party and other small third parties lack the voter base and popular support to mount such an effort, even if they were willing. It is thus clear that we should expect to see no armed protests in 2016, and the CPD will get away with their shenanigans once again. But as this may not always be the case, the third essay will consider a hypothetical future election in which there is a third-party candidate who decides to force his way onto the debate stage.

The Ethics Of Political Assassinations

At a campaign rally on August 9, Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump was discussing the possibility of Hillary Clinton appointing justices to the Supreme Court who could weaken gun rights, as well as what might be done about it. He said,

“Hillary wants to abolish — essentially abolish the Second Amendment. By the way, if she gets to pick, if she gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks. Although the Second Amendment people, maybe there is, I don’t know. But I tell you what, that will be a horrible day, if Hillary gets to put her judges in, right now we’re tied.”

Predictably, every element of the establishment went apoplectic. Though the Trump campaign tried to clarify that he was speaking of energizing voters to stop Clinton at the polls, the Secret Service spoke with the Trump campaign, Clinton used the remarks for political hay, other Republicans denounced the remarks, and the lapdog media devoted entire blocks of programming to attacking Trump, accusing him of calling for Clinton’s assassination. How dare anyone speak of self-defense against a tyrannical government, they effectively said? How dare anyone inform the populace, even accidentally, of the true purpose of the Second Amendment? How dare anyone to the right of Leon Trotsky even think of political violence? On and on they went, decrying such a move as yet another sign of Trump being too dangerous a choice for the Presidency.

But should Trump be backpedaling? Was he really wrong to make such a suggestion, or is there a case to be made for political assassination? Let us examine both the moral and practical cases for political assassinations at an abstract and philosophical level, that we may apply them not to one politician, but to all.

The Moral Case

The word ‘assassinate’ is defined as “to kill (someone, such as a famous or important person) usually for political reasons.” Thus, it is just a fancy term for killing a particular kind of person for a particular reason. But a person’s fame or importance in the opinion of other people is of no concern with regard to objective moral standards. As such, we need only consider when it is justifiable to kill any person, regardless of their standing or affiliation. Fortunately, libertarian philosophy makes this simple. The non-aggression principle says that initiating the use of force is never acceptable, but using force defensively to stop an initiator of force is always acceptable. The question of how much defensive force may be used is also easy to answer. If a defender may not use any amount of force necessary to subdue an aggressor, then all an aggressor need do to get away with aggressive behavior is to use force in such a way that the defender cannot use enough force to subdue the aggressor. To believe in limitations on defensive force is to believe that might makes right, which is the antithesis of both philosophy and morality. Thus, unlimited force is justified in order to defend against an aggressor.

The state is defined as a group of people who exercise a monopoly on initiating the use of force within a geographical area. Some people are directly involved in this; these are the police, military, and other enforcement agents of the state. Other people are indirectly involved; these are the politicians, bureaucrats, and regulators. The enforcement class are clearly legitimate targets for defensive force, as they are direct aggressors. Their job is to initiate the use of force on behalf of the latter group, escalating the use of force as far as they must in order to gain compliance. But the political class are also involved in aggression, as they give the enforcers the orders that they carry out. To say that they may not be forcefully defended against equivalent to saying that one may kill aggressors in self-defense but must hold harmless any people who are hiring and directing the aggressors. This is an absurd result because it places the onus upon the would-be victim to spend one’s life either evading a practically endless series of aggressors or giving into their demands rather than allowing the would-be victim to end the threat. Because the political class gives commands to the enforcement class and will hire more members to join the enforcement class should some be killed by the civilian population, members of the political class are as legitimate a target as members of the enforcement class. Therefore, political assassinations are morally justifiable.

Practical Concerns

Although political assassinations are morally justifiable, they tend to be tactically unwise. Whenever a politician is assassinated, another one steps into the office to take his or her place. Abolition of a political office solely by the means of eliminating its current occupant is impossible by design. Whereas people have been assassinating politicians for almost as long as there have been politicians, those who wield state power have figured out the necessity of having a line of succession for positions which are essential for the functioning of the state apparatus in order to ensure continuity of said apparatus. In many cases, there is even a mechanism to keep power within the same political faction should a politician have to replace an assassinated politician. The state is a hydra; cut off one head and more grow back in its place. If the state is to be abolished by force (and it must be), its body must be destroyed, which is to say the enforcement class rather than the political class. After all, the political class cannot rule if no one is willing to enforce their rule because the citizenry have made that occupation too hazardous.

Another disadvantage is that assassinations are frequently used by the ruling class as a pretext to disarm the citizenry and seize more power for themselves. Not only does it follow the dictum of never allowing a crisis to go to waste, but it allows state propagandists to fear-monger and portray an environment of random predation that can strike even the rulers, necessitating an expansion of state power and curtailment of civil liberties because according to them, it is the only possible provider of security. The lapdog media would, of course, do its part to paint those who would use violence in self-defense against government as deranged lunatics and those in government as the heroes who will protect everyone from this “danger.” Lone assassins lack the means to shut enough of their lying mouths, and there are still few people in the alternative media who are willing to defend political assassinations, so the establishment narrative would become dominant. The end result is that the state is empowered by small, isolated attacks upon its figureheads. Only a more robust resistance against the enforcement class rather than the political class could overcome these challenges.

That being said, political assassinations can serve as a form of vigilante justice. Everyone knows that government will not hold government accountable, as the practical purpose of the state is to do that which would be criminal for anyone else and use the state’s monopoly on criminal justice to escape punishment. Politicians and their minions frequently victimize people, then hide behind the legal shield of sovereign immunity should people try to use the courts to seek justice. When people are wronged and they can find no justice through the system for dispute resolution because the system will not turn on itself, vigilante justice is better than no justice at all.

Finally, political assassinations can have value to an anti-state movement as propaganda of the deed. In any revolution, someone must make the first move, and there are usually many people who would be willing to revolt but are unwilling to make that first move. One assassin willing to eliminate a high-profile target and sacrifice one’s liberty (and possibly life as well) by doing so can be both the catalyst and the martyr for a revolutionary movement that topples an oppressive regime.

Conclusion

The probability that political assassinations will bring liberty by themselves is slim, but there is no objective moral prohibition against utilizing such tactics. Whether to resort to such measures is a subjective value judgment that each individual or group must make. As always, an essential feature of liberty is to take one’s own risks, reap one’s own rewards, and suffer one’s own consequences. What is certain is that, in the famous words of Otto von Bismarck, “It is not by speeches and majority resolutions that the great questions of the day are decided—but by iron and blood.”

Supreme Court upholds racism, rejects meritocracy

On June 23, the Supreme Court announced its decision in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, which decided whether an admissions system which considers the race of the applicant is constitutional. In Texas, the top ten percent of high school students are guaranteed admission if they want it. The remainder of the incoming freshman class, about 25 percent, is filled by considering the academic performance as well as other factors, race being among them. The “Top Ten Percent” law has been in effect since 1997, and UT-Austin has been using its current admissions process since 2004. UT-Austin adopted its current policy after concluding that its prior race-neutral process did not reach its goal of a more diverse student body. The justices decided by a 4-3 vote that “[t]he race-conscious admissions program in use at the time of petitioner’s application is lawful under the Equal Protection Clause.” UT-Austin may therefore continue using its current system.

The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy and was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Samuel Alito filed another dissenting opinion which was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Thomas. Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from the case.

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy said, “A university is in large part defined by those intangible ‘qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness.’ Considerable deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational mission. But still, it remains an enduring challenge to our Nation’s education system to reconcile the pursuit of diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and dignity. In striking this sensitive balance, public universities, like the States themselves, can serve as ‘laboratories for experimentation.’ The University of Texas at Austin has a special opportunity to learn and to teach. The University now has at its disposal valuable data about the manner in which different approaches to admissions may foster diversity or instead dilute it. The University must continue to use this data to scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems necessary. The Court’s affirmance of the University’s admissions policy today does not necessarily mean the University may rely on that same policy without refinement. It is the University’s ongoing obligation to engage in constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies.”

In his dissent, Justice Thomas said, “[T]he Court’s decision today is irreconcilable with strict scrutiny, rests on pernicious assumptions about race, and departs from many of our precedents. I write separately to reaffirm that ‘a State’s use of race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.’ ‘The Constitution abhors classifications based on race because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.’ That constitutional imperative does not change in the face of a ‘faddish theory’ that racial discrimination may produce ‘educational benefits.’ The Court was wrong to hold otherwise in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). I would overrule Grutter and reverse the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.”

In his dissent, Justice Alito said, “Something strange has happened since our prior decision in this case. In that decision, we held that strict scrutiny requires the University of Texas at Austin (UT or University) to show that its use of race and ethnicity in making admissions decisions serves compelling interests and that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve those ends. Rejecting the argument that we should defer to UT’s judgment on those matters, we made it clear that UT was obligated (1) to identify the interests justifying its plan with enough specificity to permit a reviewing court to determine whether the requirements of strict scrutiny were met, and (2) to show that those requirements were in fact satisfied. On remand, UT failed to do what our prior decision demanded. The University has still not identified with any degree of specificity the interests that its use of race and ethnicity is supposed to serve. Its primary argument is that merely invoking ‘the educational benefits of diversity’ is sufficient and that it need not identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether its plan is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests. This is nothing less than the plea for deference that we emphatically rejected in our prior decision. Today, however, the Court inexplicably grants that request. To the extent that UT has ever moved beyond a plea for deference and identified the relevant interests in more specific terms, its efforts have been shifting, unpersuasive, and, at times, less than candid.”

The case began in 2008 when Abigail Fisher, a Caucasian woman who was not in the top ten percent of her high school class, was denied admission to UT-Austin’s freshman class. She filed suit, alleging that the University’s consideration of race in its admissions process disadvantaged Caucasian people in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the University. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in 2013 and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals, which again sided with the University.

In the interest of fairness, it must be noted that this was an exceptionally poor test case. Of the 47 students with grades lower than Fisher’s who were admitted, only five of them were racial minorities. There were also 168 racial minority students with grades equal or greater to Fisher’s who were denied admission that year. Furthermore, Fisher turned down an offer under which she could have attended another Texas university her freshman year, earned at least a 3.2 GPA, and transferred to UT-Austin for her sophomore year. But what of a white student with a superior record to that of Fisher, but not quite in the automatic top ten percent? Such a student can be denied admission under standards like that of UT-Austin (which exist elsewhere as well) in favor of a student of minority race with inferior academic performance. The Supreme Court has affirmed a standard of racial diversity over pure meritocracy, and because there are measurable intelligence differences between population groups, has upheld a policy of anti-white and (anti-Asian) racism in doing so.

On Air Ownership and Pollution

The question of how to deal with air pollution is frequently asked of libertarian theorists, as it is an issue which has been dominated by governments for far longer than a human lifetime. Accordingly, it may be difficult to transition toward a free market alternative to government environmental regulations. Several other attempts have been made to address this issue, but let us tackle the problem rigorously from first principles.

The starting point for all of libertarian ethics is self-ownership, that each person has a right to exclusive control of one’s physical body and full responsibility for actions committed with said control. Note that in order to argue against self-ownership, one must exercise exclusive control of one’s physical body for the purpose of communication. This results in a performative contradiction because the content of the argument is at odds with the act of making the argument. By the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction, self-ownership must be true because it must be either true or false, and any argument that self-ownership is false is false by contradiction.

Because each person has a right to exclusive control of one’s physical body, it is wrong for one person to interfere with another person’s exclusive control of their physical body without their consent. This is how the non-aggression principle is derived from self-ownership. Because each person has full responsibility for the actions that one commits with one’s physical body, one may gain property rights in external objects by laboring upon unowned natural resources, and one owes restitution for any acts of aggression that one commits against other people or their property. But because the non-aggression principle and private property rights are derived from self-ownership, they are dependent upon it. That which is dependent cannot overrule that upon which it is dependent, therefore self-ownership takes primacy if there should be a conflict between the self-ownership of one person and the external private property rights of another person.

Now that a logical framework is established, let us consider the problem of air pollution through this framework. The essential fact about air pollution is that the polluter adds harmful substances to the air against the wishes of those who are exposed to it, either through inhalation, external contact, or ground or water pollution as the contaminants are left behind once polluted air has passed through an area. When such exposure occurs, the pollution is not only an act of aggression against private property, but against liberty and life as well in the event of illness or death caused by the pollutants. This means that a polluter may be guilty not only of damaging property, but of assault or homicide.

But what about the air itself? We can deduce what it means to own the air from what it means to own something in general, which has already been discussed. Given the above theoretical framework, a person may own land, but the air above the land is not labored upon and is not static upon the property. (One could gain ownership of some air by performing some labor upon it, such as enclosing in a container or pressurizing it therein, but this is mostly a separate issue from that of air pollution.) But a person must have some reasonable clearance above the land to be able to move freely upon it and generally enjoy the private property right in it. This clearance might also allow one to hunt game birds and to be free from spy drones flown by other people, but could not extend high enough to impede commercial air or space travel overhead. The extent of this clearance is impossible to determine a priori and must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis through negotiations and contracts.

At this point, one may be led to think that far from the leftist caricature that libertarianism is unconcerned with environmental pollution, this framework is actually too sensitive to pollution, as any amount of air pollution could be considered an act of aggression. If true, this would require a radical reorganization of society so as to eliminate all emissions. But this is where the Reecean proviso rescues libertarianism from a practically untenable position. Because self-ownership overrules external property rights, pollution that is required for survival is permissible. As Friedman points out[1],

“Carbon dioxide is a pollutant. It is also an end product of human metabolism. If I have no right to impose a single molecule of pollution on anyone else’s property, then I must get the permission of all my neighbors to breathe. Unless I promise not to exhale.”

Another example is the burning of wood in one’s fireplace or campsite to prevent hypothermia, cook food, sanitize drinking water, etc., as disallowing such activities (or their more modern equivalent of burning fossil fuels to generate electricity and heat) would result in a massive depopulation, which in turn would destroy the institutions of private property. But the Reecean proviso cannot defend non-essential pollution, such as that produced by modern transportation or tobacco smoke, as there is no self-ownership to weigh against private property rights. Fortunately, we need not alter civilization quite so radically, as there are other theoretical considerations which are somewhat more permissive.

The distinction between non-harm, non-violence, and non-aggression means that the maxim of ‘no victim means no crime’ is an oversimplification; the more accurate statement is that no victim means no restitution can be owed and no punishment beyond what is necessary to stop acts of aggression should be meted out. This distinction allows us to differentiate[2] between noticeable trespasses and unnoticeable nuisances, the latter of which are only actionable if some damage may be demonstrated. This is because a substance which cannot be noticed and does not demonstrably cause harm is functionally equivalent to being absent, and a lack of cause for restitution leaves a court with no sentence to impose.

The dispute resolution standards in use by the polluter and the pollutee also play an important role, as a different result will occur if both use a reasonable doubt standard versus a preponderance of evidence standard. Still another possibility is that the polluter will use a private court company with one standard of proof while the pollutee will use a different private court company with a different standard of proof. Such instances would need to be negotiated and contracted on a case-by-case basis, but any competent court company would be staffed by people who are aware of such problems and capable of performing such negotiations. Coase explained[3] that such negotiations will result in some level of pollution and some restitution that is satisfactory to both. Perhaps this is not ideal for nature, but it does minimize pollution levels beyond what alternatives to voluntary negotiations have produced thus far.

Another matter is that not all property claims are established at the same time. This means that it is possible for a right to pollute to be homesteaded, in that if all of the pollution generated by a property owner falls upon unowned wilderness and stays there, then anyone who establishes property in that wilderness tacitly consents to the current conditions of present and continuing pollution. Of course, another instance which would need to be negotiated and contracted on a case-by-case basis is that of a polluter ceasing operations for a time, as the newer property owners may come to expect this new, cleaner state of affairs and take action if the polluter resumes operations.

These deviations from a strict ban on air pollution still leave in place a far greater protection of the environment than do statist environmental regulations. Whereas a private owner both exercises exclusive control over a resource and may sell either the resource or stock in it, government officials cannot generally do the latter. This means that government officials lack an important economic incentive to take care of the air. A private owner of an airspace whose air becomes polluted would sue the polluter for damages and seek injunctive relief, but the Environmental Protection Agency or its state-level subsidiaries tend to block such lawsuits when filed by concerned citizens. This lack of incentive also leads governments to pollute the air, to the extent that the U.S. military is the worst polluter in the world.

It is clear that governments cannot be trusted to defend its citizens from such aggressions, but it has done worse; it has prevented free market solutions from being implemented. During the 19th century, people whose property was damaged by factory smoke took the factory owners to court, seeking relief from the pollution in the form of injunctions and damages. The government judges, realizing on which side their bread was buttered, sided with the factory owners, claiming that the “public good” of industrial progress outweighed private property rights. Legislators, also knowing who was more capable of funding their campaigns and bribing them, joined in for the polluters and against the pollutees by eliminating the option of class action lawsuits against polluters who cause damage over a large area. Rothbard recognized[4] that technology has therefore developed to produce air pollution because governments have interfered with private property rights in this area, and a society where this was far more restricted all along would have developed in a more environmentally friendly manner.

The criticism of libertarian theories of air pollution that is least addressed is that they do not effectively deal with situations in which responsibility is greatly dispersed, such as the pollution from driving automobiles leading to smog in large urban areas or places with geography that traps harmful particles. Pollution is no more acceptable if a million people produce it than if one person produces it, but the responsibility of each person becomes so small as to be unmeasurable for purposes of restitution. There is also the matter that crime consists of both an actus reus and a mens rea, and the everyday driver does not operate an automobile with the intent to harm the environment. As with individual cases, we may expect that a Coasean negotiation will occur to minimize both pollution and damages, but the major reason that theorists tend not to address this concern is that no theory can solve a problem of mass action; only a mass counter-action, such as driving less or using more environmentally friendly fuels, can solve such problems.

In closing, a libertarian approach to air pollution does not produce perfect results, but neither does anything else, and turning this problem over to the state has only produced and will only produce ecological disaster.

References:

  1. Friedman, David (1989). The Machinery of Freedom. p.168
  2. Rothbard, Murray (1982). Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution. Cato Journal, p. 55-99
  3. Coase, Ronald (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, p. 1-44
  4. Rothbard, Murray (1973). For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. p. 317-327

The Not-So-Current Year: 2015 In Review

Though the specific demarcation of the passage from one year into another is a rather arbitrary social construct, it does provide a useful annual period for self-examination and remembrance. Now that 2015 has entered the history books, let us take a look back at a year’s worth of essays and review the not-so-current year.

In December 2014, an assassination of two NYPD officers prompted many libertarians to signal hard against the use of force against agents of the state. I decided to argue the opposing case. The harassment of the Meitiv family by Child Protective Services prompted another such article. Julian Adorney resolved that good government police exist, and I responded by explaining why this is impossible. I used another NYPD incident to argue that when government agents and common criminals fight, we should pull for no one. When Tremaine Wilbourn killed a police officer during a traffic stop in Memphis, Tenn, I wrote a list of observations on the event which mostly follow the aforementioned articles.

Many libertarians praise decentralization, and rightly so. But it is neither good nor evil in and of itself. It can be used for good or evil ends, and I explored the latter.

On Burns night, I observed that a proper haggis was unavailable in the United States and found that as usual, the state is to blame. Staying on the subject of food, economically illiterate researchers blamed Walmart for causing obesity, and I explained why this is fallacious.

The 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz gave cause to examine how such an atrocity could be carried out without the state. The answer, of course, is that it would be all but impossible.

Entering February, I allowed my cynicism to wax to the point of formalizing it as a razor. It could use more detailing and strengthening, which is a project for a later time. I used the razor to explain why the Obama administration might want to disarm elderly people.

Alleged Silk Road creator Ross Ulbricht was convicted on February 4 and sentenced on May 29. I made lists of observations on both of these occasions. Some people were none too happy with the state’s treatment of Ulbricht, and their displeasure got them in hot water. This occasion also merited a list of observations.

The movie American Sniper did well at the box office, but a metaphor therein was left incomplete. I decided to complete the analogy of sheep, sheepdogs, and wolves by adding farmers of human livestock to the mix.

A video by Stefan Molyneux about two different types of statists compared them to warriors and wizards. I made the case that countering the state requires libertarians to be both character classes at once.

Ron Paul made a video appearance at the International Students For Liberty Conference, but some attendees decided to interrupt this by reading an open letter to him which was filled with leftist entryist nonsense. I wrote an open letter against them which gained wide recognition and helped run some of the people involved out of libertarian circles. It remains one of my proudest moments as a writer.

At the end of February, Republicans tried to use brinkmanship to force spending cuts, which failed miserably due to their track record of caving at the last minute. I wrote a list of observations on the event.

On March 9, I published my most popular article to date, which is also one of my most shallow, choir-preaching works. The correlation between the two can be most depressing at times. At any rate, here are 25 statist propaganda phrases and some concise rebuttals.

Several commenters have told me that I am at my best when I provide a sound defense for an idea that most people find to be outrageous. I did this several times in 2015, defending the killing of innocent shields in certain circumstances, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, letting Iran develop a nuclear deterrent, and the replacement of democratic elections with jousts to the death.

I went on a rebuttal streak in the spring of 2015. President Obama proposed that voting be made mandatory, and I argued the case against this. Michael Eliot argued that a violent revolution is not the correct strategy for creating a free society, and that the use of methods such as seasteading will be more successful. I explained why this is false. Walter Block argued in favor of Rand Paul’s presidential campaign, and I demonstrated why he is not a good choice. Austin Petersen effectively made a case against libertarianism itself, and I rebutted it.

Paul Krugman delivered some rather standard talking points about public goods, and I showed why they are wrong. I revisited the subject later in the year.

Rolling Stone decided to go ahead with a completely false story about campus rape, and did nothing beyond wrist-slapping to those involved in creating and editing the story. They also defended the ideas behind the story, with which I took great issue. Another sex-related story occurred on April 21 when the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration resigned due to a prostitution scandal that occurred on her watch. I explained why we should not be surprised, and should actually expect more of such behavior. The purity spiral of campus feminism has grown to such an extent that even left-wing feminist professors are not immune. Rape accusation culture struck once more at Amherst College, and the victim took the university to court.

Baltimore police officers arrested Freddie Gray, who died one week later as a result of injuries sustained during the arrest. Riots ensued, and I wrote a list of observations on the event.

Charles Murray published a book detailing a novel strategy for fighting the regulatory state: overwhelm it with civil disobedience, create a legal fund to defend victims of regulation, and start treating government fines as an insurable hazard. I argued that this would fail, but that it needs to be tried anyway.

The prohibition of excessive bail and fines, as well as cruel and unusual punishment, is a much-revered part of the United States Constitution. I argued that it should not be.

Dylann Roof carried out a mass shooting at a black church in Charleston, and I wrote a list of observations on the event.

Late June is Supreme Court season, and they delivered at least two bad decisions in 2015. First, they ruled very narrowly in favor of raisin farmers, but left the rights-violating practice of eminent domain intact. Then, they crammed same-sex marriage down the throats of all Americans.

Litecoin exchange rates suddenly spiked in early July. I took an educated guess at why, but it ended up being pure speculation.

Turmoil in Greece threatened to boil over into a default or even a Grexit. I took a deep look into the situation and concluded that only anarchy can fix the problems there.

Two seemingly disparate stories concerning Planned Parenthood and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine had a common thread: there is no such thing as non-lethal aid to an organization that conducts lethal operations.

I wrote a three-part series about fascism and communism in America, as well as how a nation can be both. Although I lated discovered that Lawrence Britt does not appear to be a real person, I found the 14-point list of fascist characteristics to be sound, so I did not revise the article.

A problem which is frequently cited as a reason why we must have a state is the problem of pollution. I dealt with the issues of water ownership and pollution in order to show why the state cannot solve the problem of pollution.

In one of my more controversial articles, I argued that Vester Flanagan, the man who murdered a reporter and a cameraman in Roanoke, Va., was a model social justice warrior. Examiner decided to pull it for offending their audience, but you can find it here.

Everyone knows that the Libertarian Party is not exactly a bastion of excellent strategic thinkers. I decided to offer them help, and a response to my essay advocating an alternate strategy is also worth reading.

Liberty Mutual created a series of advertisements that air regularly in my area, and they are full of economic fallacies. They annoyed me enough to dedicate an article to debunking them.

Reservation scalping occurred at Disney World restaurants, which outraged many people. I applied Walter Block’s reasoning for defending ticket scalpers to argue against the outrage.

September 11 always brings about discussions on security. I argued that there can be no such thing; only temporary and imperfect protection from particular dangers.

The term ‘cuckservative’ arose from alt-right circles to describe those who are insufficiently conservative, selling out their constituents, and/or acting against their own rational self-interests. I created the term ‘cuckertarian‘ to describe a similar problem among libertarians. Another problem with the libertarian movement that I addressed is the embrace of hedonism when libertarianism only requires that we not use aggressive violence to stamp out non-violent degeneracy.

After several years in prison for tax resistance, Irwin Schiff passed away. I wrote a list of observations on the event that gained praise from his son Peter.

I belatedly refuted Matt Zwolinski’s six reasons for rejecting the non-aggression principle. I had meant to do so when he published his piece back in April 2013, but other work took precedence and it languished in development hell. Next, I dealt with Youliy Ninov’s arguments against anarcho-capitalism in what is my most verbose article to date.

Islamic terrorists attacked Beirut and Paris on November 12 and 13, respectively. I wrote a list of observations on the events.

Many libertarians misunderstand immigration and borders, so after several pro-open-borders articles published in quick succession by other authors, I tried to set them straight.

Black Friday is revered by most libertarians as a celebration of free-market capitalism. I explained why this reverence is somewhat misplaced.

Robert Dear attacked a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado Springs, Colo., killing three people and wounding nine others. I made the case that although the use of force against Planned Parenthood is defensive in nature, it is frequently impractical and counterproductive.

The success of the Donald Trump presidential campaign, as well as growing support for it in libertarian and reactionary circles, led me to examine the phenomena. I concluded that Trumpism is not a libertarian form of reaction, though we may have some common enemies.

My final article of 2015 addressed the common phrase ‘give back to the community.’ In short, it is communist nonsense that must be rejected.

I began work on another case against a constitutional amendment, but it was not completed for publishing before the end of 2015, so it will appear first in next year’s review.

All in all, it was an interesting year full of occasions to make sharp libertarian arguments. May 2016 bring more of the same. Happy New Year!

Supreme Court gives raisin farmers fake freedom

On June 22, the Supreme Court announced its decision in the case of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, which decided whether the reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin Administrative Committee under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 is constitutional. The requirement forces growers to set aside a percentage of their crop for the government without charge. The justices decided by an 8-1 vote that “The Fifth Amendment requires that the Government pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. Any net proceeds the raisin growers receive from the sale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation they have received for that taking—it does not mean the raisins have not been appropriated for Government use. Nor can the Government make raisin growers relinquish their property without just compensation as a condition of selling their raisins in interstate commerce.” The Raisin Administrative Committee must therefore either stop taking raisins from farmers or pay a just compensation for their taking.

The majority opinion was delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts and was joined by Justices Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia. Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Elena Kagan joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts said “Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it comes to appropriation of personal property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home. …Nothing in this history suggests that personal property was any less protected against physical appropriation than real property. …When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. …Selling produce in interstate commerce, although certainly subject to reasonable government regulation, is similarly not a special governmental benefit that the Government may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional protection.”

So, why is this decision which is heralded by many as a victory for private property rights actually a fake triumph for freedom? While the Hornes have won the right to keep all of their raisins instead of handing over whatever percentage the USDA demands of them, this decision was intentionally kept narrow by the justices. The ability of the state to violate private property rights in the name of the “public good” was affirmed. The Court only found that the state must pay the property holders just compensation for doing so. Of course, agents of the state will be the ultimate arbiters of what constitutes just compensation, as they have a monopoly on the courts, so even this may be of little comfort to some victims of eminent domain. The Court also upheld that interstate commerce is subject to reasonable government regulation, and again, agents of the state will be the ultimate arbiters of what constitutes reasonable government regulation. The Court affirmed the idea that a government can legitimately claim and own property, even though everything that governments own has been stolen under color of law from private citizens by current and former government agents. The Court declined to apply the decision in this case to other, similar government programs that affect farmers who grow other crops, so those statist price control initiatives will remain in effect, perpetrating distortions on the market.

The reality of property rights in practice has not been changed by this decision. What is effectively thy property is whatever thou can take and defend from those who would seek to control it in thy stead, regardless of whether those seeking to control it have any logical justification for doing so and regardless of whether they choose to call themselves “the state.”