On Linguistic Warfare

Whereas the most basic purpose of language is to facilitate communication between people, its development is necessarily a social affair. That being said, the role of individuals in this process cannot be denied. Only individuals think, act, speak, and write; there can be no erection of social constructs without the sum of individual efforts. It is true that a collective endeavor is necessary in order for a particular word to come into use and be understood to have a particular set of meanings with regard to connotation, denotation, and exosemantics. But before this can happen, some individual must take the first step. Someone must have an idea that one cannot express in one’s extant vocabulary and thus feel the need to either borrow a word from another language or invent one out of thin air. Because ideas which cannot be put into words are very difficult to utilize, this creative process is necessary for the advancement of knowledge and technology.

Jargon 101

The next step toward a word gaining widespread acceptance and usage is use within a smaller group. At this stage, a word may be described as jargon. Merriam-Webster defines jargon as “the technical terminology or characteristic idiom of a special activity or group” or as “obscure and often pretentious language marked by circumlocutions and long words.” Those outside of the group in question often view the former as the latter, with varying degrees of accuracy. The majority of jargon consists of terminology within a specific industry created to allow for greater precision and efficiency among participants in that industry. As Étienne Bonnot de Condillac writes,

“Each science requires a special language, because each science has ideas which are unique to it. It seems that we should begin by forming this language; but we begin by speaking and writing and the language remains to be created.”[1]

However, any social group can have jargon; the defining characteristic is special vocabulary and/or definitions, not use by any particular type of group or toward any particular purpose.

There exists a wide range of applications for jargon within various social dynamics. Jargon can be used as a means of excluding outsiders by speaking in terms that they do not understand, in which case it is also known as argot. The particular pronunciation of a word can also denote in-group versus out-group; this is called a shibboleth. Conversely, a lingua franca is especially used to communicate with outsiders; examples include the various creole languages and pidgins that have formed when people who speak mutually unintelligible languages wish to trade. The general trend over the long-term is for the secrecy of argots and shibboleths to be dissolved, for technical jargon in a specific field to become part of the wider lexicon of a language, and for linguae francae to develop into full languages, but in each case some of these will be lost in the mists of time.

Politics and Weaponization

Because there are disagreements between groups of people and these are debated using language, such disputes necessarily manifest in the linguistic realm. The desire by each side to emerge victorious from these debates causes the above processes to become weaponized. This weaponization takes several forms. First, instead of inventing terms to advance knowledge by giving expression to new ideas, terms are invented for the purpose of attacking one’s political opponents. In some cases this creates a direct insult, but the majority of the examples of this are indirect, such as the term assault weapon. This was invented by gun control advocates in the 1980s and was alien to the practice of gun ownership. The goal of these terms was to attack gun owners indirectly by attacking something that they hold dear. With the 1994 assault weapons ban, the term had to be defined in the law as it had no clear prior definition. In any event, the goal of this strategy is not to debate but to ridicule, not to resolve disputes but to broaden them.

A related strategy for less creative political activists is to corrupt the meaning of existing terms. This is done to associate a present political opponent with a hated enemy from the past. A prominent example of this is the word fascist. Fascism refers to a particular type of political order consisting of nationalism, authoritarianism, protectionism, socialism, and cultural conservatism. But the work of radical leftists has debased the term into a general insult to be hurled at anyone who is perceived by them to be insufficiently leftist. The word racist has undergone a similar transformation; having once referred to hatred of people based on their external appearance, it has been corrupted to mean anything that is not sufficiently anti-white. Corrupting an existing word in this manner is less effective than inventing a new word because there are always large groups of people who resist the change in definition, but this only serves to amplify conflict by enabling rivalrous groups to talk past each other.

Of course, the wordsmiths responsible for such efforts are aware that the best defense can be a good offense. This has led to a strategy of curtailing efforts by the opposition to express their ideas, for that which cannot be expressed need not be rebutted. Those in power may resort to “hate speech” laws to criminalize speech that they oppose (another example of the invention of a term for the purpose of attacking one’s political opponents). These are made intentionally vague and are meant to be used to prosecute only a few high-profile cases. The intention is to create a chilling effect that deters those out of power from using linguistic processes to their full potential, as they will always be wondering whether they are engaging in crimethink. After all, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and self-censorship greatly reduces enforcement costs.

Because such direct censorship is generally resisted in the West, less direct means of interfering with the opposition’s ability to communicate are often employed instead. Because jargon is commonly used by religious cults to hide their true nature from outsiders and the public has a generally unfavorable opinion of cults, a political operative can conflate this with the efforts of an opposition group to expand a language so that they may express novel ideas. A simpler method is to accuse the opposition of making up their ideology as they go due to their invention of terms, which is surprisingly effective given that all words have been made up by someone sometime.

Unfortunately, the spread of democracy has exacerbated these problems. Because everyone in a democratic system has a slice of political power, everyone becomes a political target. The deliberate engineering of permanent conflict in society that is democratic government ensures that weaponization of language is omnipresent. Thus, all linguistic innovation is hindered to the detriment of rationality and real progress, as efforts which could have gone toward higher endeavors are misdirected into internal disputes.

Solutions and Pitfalls

The above examples have a distinctly leftist flavor to them, and this is not an accident. All of the above tactics are disproportionately used by leftists, and political democracy is an inherently leftist institution. Therefore, most of the solutions will have a rightist character to them, and the potential pitfalls will tend to resemble tragic flaws in which rightists try to adapt leftist methods without removing the aspects which make them distinctly leftist. Let us now counter the above tactics.

The first two, the invention and use of insults as well as the demonization of activities and objects present the pitfall of sinking to the level of the enemy. When confronted with someone who argues in bad faith, resorts to ad hominems, and denigrates one’s cherished hobbies and prized possessions, the desire to be nasty to that person is an understandable impulse. But it is the wrong course of action. The correct strategy is actually best summarized by an enemy of libertarians and reactionaries. To quote Michelle Obama, “When they go low, we go high.” It is best to remain calm and state for the record that what the opponent is saying is not a proper argument or that when an argument is lost, slander becomes the tool of the loser. If one must go further, then it is best to follow the advice of Sam Brown, “Never offend people with style when you can offend them with substance.” That is to say, whatever observations one makes should be clearly demonstrable and insightful.

Those who corrupt definitions are a more subversive lot, unlikely to be directly encountered. In most cases, one will be dealing with ignorant, misinformed college students who are convinced of their own competence and know no better. This challenge requires one to be well-informed about the truth, the lies that students are commonly taught, and why their professors are wrong. Most can be reasoned with if the correct approach is used, but forceful suppression is necessary in the most extreme cases. It is necessary to exercise discretion and only debate those who are willing to be convinced of other ideas.

Accusations of cultism or of making up one’s ideology in an ad hoc fashion can be extremely damaging if not rebutted properly. Although leftists frequently engage in these behaviors as well as psychological projection, this counter-accusation by itself is a tu quoque fallacy that does not rebut the accusation. A proper response should present a reasoned case for why one’s political movement is not comparable to a religious cult, or how one’s ideology is internally consistent.

Unlike the strategies discussed so far, the most fruitful approach for dealing with “hate speech” laws is likely to be a simple reversal. Instead of banning “hate speech,” the laws should be changed to ban “communist propaganda.” Such a ban should be as vague and fear-provoking as the laws which muzzle rightists, particularly outside of the United States. Of course, any non-critical discussion of the concept of “hate speech” would count as “communist propaganda.” The end goals of such a measure are both to suppress radical leftists and to show moderate leftists that any power they wish the state to have can and will be used against them when they are not in power. The potential pitfall is to lose sight of these goals and become right-wing counterparts of social justice warriors.

Finally, it will not do to hack away at the branches of evil without striking the root. Although such behaviors can occur on a small scale within non-democratic societies, democracy amplifies linguistic warfare to a fever pitch by making all disputes of sufficient importance into political disputes. As Carl Schmitt writes,

“The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship. The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense.”[2]

The historical method of abolishing democracy has been the imposition of an unelected government, whether a military junta, hereditary monarchy, or some combination thereof. Libertarians propose another methodology; that of a stateless propertarian society in which all property is privately owned and all goods and services are provided by competing firms in a free market. These systems deny the general public—those who do not have an ownership stake in the society—a political voice. The restriction of political power to those who have an ownership stake means that it makes no sense for most people living in these social orders to insult, bully, and attack one another over political disputes, as the winner of such a dispute has no direct influence over the direction of the society. When only the king or dictator can vote, or only the private property owner can make decisions over the property in question, only they and whatever underlings they may have are worth engaging with linguistic warfare. Even these attacks will be blunted by the fact that freedom to engage in such attacks is not a universal human right, but a privilege belonging to those who control territory. If one owns a space, one may say whatever one wishes within that space. Those who own no property and cannot convince anyone who does to let them speak are thus silenced, and society is better off for not having to hear their ignorant pablum.

Conclusion

There are two overarching tactics for opponents of the progressive establishment in the current environment of linguistic warfare: play to win or knock over the gameboard. Playing to draw or trying to lose gracefully, as establishment conservatives and libertarians have done for decades, has in large part allowed conditions to degenerate to their present status. Though playing to win is certainly necessary, it will not be sufficient because although it can defeat enemies, the current system is firmly entrenched and designed to produce ever greater numbers of foot soldiers for the establishment. Only demolition of the Cathedral will suffice to return society to a state of peaceful discourse. The resulting end of linguistic warfare would bring about a renewed focus on the advancement of knowledge and technology, paving the way for a proper restoration of Western civilization.

References:

  1. de Condillac, Étienne Bonnot (1776). Le Commerce et le gouvernement considérés relativement l’un à l’autre. p. 93.
  2. Schmitt, Carl (1996). The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition. The University of Chicago Press. p. 61.

Book Review: Reactionary Liberty

Reactionary Liberty is a book about libertarian philosophy by Robert Taylor that approaches this and related subjects from a reactionary perspective. The book is divided into fifteen chapters, with a short introduction preceding.

Taylor begins with a four-page introduction in which he explains his motivations for writing the book. Mostly, this involves the decisive leftward shift in American libertarianism since the Ron Paul presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012, including a notorious open letter to Paul read at the 2015 International Students for Liberty conference and Gary Johnson’s disastrous presentation in 2016. He briefly explains what is wrong with left-libertarianism and gives an outline of the structure of the book.

In the first chapter, Taylor begins with the non-aggression principle (NAP), self-ownership, and private property rights. Although Taylor notes the important distinction between just property and currently-held property, he fails to properly account for the role of conquest in determining property rights over the long term. Taylor goes on to explain the social and economic difficulties that arise without secure property rights. The failures of central planning are discussed, as are the differences between negative and positive rights. He lays out the history of natural law in Western philosophy, beginning with early Christian thinkers, continuing through Enlightenment philosophers, and culminating in Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. Taylor contrasts this with the state, which routinely violates natural law and rights. He details the many crimes of nation-states, war and debt slavery being chief among them. Taylor concludes by proposing an alternative to Marxist class theory which vilifies the state rather than the capitalist, and elevates the producer rather than the parasite.

The second chapter deals with the Austrian School perspective on the subject. Taylor takes the reader through praxeology, the action axiom, marginal utility, and the role of prices in efficiently allocating resources. Next, he explains why government and central bank interference with prices is so destructive. The section on money deals with the history of money according to the regression theorem, beginning with barter and commodity money, then progressing to precious metals and receipts for those metals. Taylor shows the reader that modern fiat currencies are a corruption of these receipts into instruments of inflation and debt slavery that facilitate unduly risky financial behavior, state largesse, and wars. In the Austrian view, these behaviors fuel the business cycle of booms and busts by distorting interest rates, which leads investors astray.

Spontaneous order and free markets are the subjects of the third chapter. Taylor begins with the economic calculation problem, the knowledge problem, and public choice theory, showing that central planning cannot succeed because it cannot calculate prices without the market and is further hampered by cynical concerns. He then covers the concept of spontaneous order, making the important and oft-overlooked observation that “there is no such thing as an unregulated market; the issue is, rather, who is doing the regulating.” These regulations take the form of trust, reputation, and freedom to dissociate, unless the state interferes by imposing its coercive regulations. Taylor frames the difference between state and market in terms of who gets profits and who suffers losses. The state privatizes profits and socializes losses, while the market does the opposite. Next, Taylor proposes the term marketization to describe the proper procedures for converting state monopolies into free-market entities, as privatization has acquired the meaning of turning over state monopolies to politically-connected oligarchs, as happened in Russia when the Soviet Union collapsed. He concludes the chapter by providing an outline of how businesses may function in a purely libertarian market while noting that the particulars can only be observed in the future, not precisely predicted in the present.

The fourth chapter offers a much-needed treatment of Cultural Marxism, a concept often (and incorrectly) dismissed by leftists as a conspiracy theory. Taylor traces its roots to the failure of political and economic Marxism in Europe after World War I, at which time Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukacs resolved to apply Marxism to culture and use it to destroy traditional Western culture, which they faulted for the failure of communism to take root in most of the West. Taylor traces the ‘long march through the institutions’ from its beginnings in the 1930s all the way to its modern manifestations of identity politics and campus craziness. He calls on libertarians to refute Marxism’s cultural application, just as they defeated its economic application. The next section begins to do this by making the case against egalitarianism, showing it to be both impossible and self-defeating in practice. The second half of the chapter traverses more dubious ground in the form of r/K selection theory. This is an interesting analogy for attempting to understand political dynamics, but it places too much emphasis on nature instead of nurture and encourages dichotomous thinking in complex problems. That being said, it correctly suggests that some authoritarian leftists are beyond reason. The chapter ends with an explanation of the necessity of traditional social and sexual norms, as well as how and why Cultural Marxists have attacked them.

Decentralization is the focus of the fifth chapter. Taylor gives the reader a history lesson in the creation of Western traditions and common law through decentralized institutions after the fall of the Roman Empire. He blames centralization elsewhere in the world for preventing those peoples from enjoying the liberty and prosperity of Europeans. Turning to America, these two descriptions show the difference between what the United States was supposed to be and what it has become. As a remedy, Taylor proposes breaking up the US into at least 100 smaller territories. He concludes the chapter by praising those who have taken a strong stand for decentralization in the face of oppressive state power.

The sixth chapter attacks state power as a concept. Taylor explains how people are ruled indirectly through propaganda and mythology rather than directly by force, as the masses are sufficiently numerous and armed to defeat such an effort. He discusses the role of government schooling in indoctrinating the masses to accept such an arrangement, as well as the insufficient efforts to resist the imposition of compulsory indoctrination in the 19th century. The concept of situational Leninism comes next, followed by an overview of famous psychological experiments that demonstrate the willingness of people to obey authority toward reprehensible ends. After this, the role of language control and thought policing in maintaining authoritarian leftist control is examined. Taylor finishes the chapter with Ludwig von Mises’ concept of statolatry, in which statism becomes a sort of secular religion.

The attack continues in the next chapter, as Taylor turns to the flawed ideas of minarchism. He returns to the American example to show how limited government does not stay limited. He explains that the Constitution was not actually written to limit government, contrary to popular belief. It gave the federal government more power than it had under the Articles of Confederation, which Taylor praises in relative terms. He shows how Americans of the time were deceived, taking the reader through the tax rebellions of the 1780s-90s and the Alien and Sedition Acts. In the next section, he contrasts traditional monarchies with modern democracies, finding the former to be far less limited and more destructive due to inherent incentive structures. The chapter concludes with a strong explanation of why democracy grows the state and harms the cause of liberty.

In the eighth chapter, Taylor addresses police statism and what Samuel Francis termed ‘anarcho-tyranny’, a situation in which real crime goes unpunished while those who try to defend themselves are attacked by the state. He begins by noting the difference between a peace officer and an agent of the state. His description of several US Supreme Court cases is accurate, but misses the larger point that a coercive monopoly has no enforceable obligations because no one can enforce obligations against them, regardless of any court rulings. Taylor reviews Cultural Marxism through the lens of anarcho-tyranny, then explains some of the more obnoxious leftist behaviors in terms of Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals. The successes of the alt-right are explained in terms of their willingness to use the left’s tactics against them, unlike conventional conservatives. Next, he covers the origin of modern policing in the UK and the US, then proposes a private alternative to state police forces. The last section contemplates violent resistance against the state, though not with nearly the length and depth that the topic deserves.

While the eighth chapter considers the enforcers, Chapter 9 is concerned with what they enforce. Taylor begins by illustrating just how much poorer everyone is today as a result of lost economic growth due to regulations. Next, he refutes the progressive narrative about the antebellum South and the industrial captains of the 19th century, showing the negative aspects of both to be the result of government intervention rather than its absence. He then profiles James J. Hill, a largely forgotten hero of free-market capitalism in the late 19th century. Hill’s good deeds are contrasted with those who used the state to get undue favors and suppress competition. Taylor also corrects the record on John D. Rockefeller. The following section covers the history of expanding regulations after the Civil War, through the Progressive Era, and on to the present. He accuses those who point to regulations as the cause of improvements in safety and reductions in pollution of committing the broken window fallacy and ignoring the fact that some regulations have made people less healthy. The chapter concludes with many examples of faulty regulations that do more harm than good.

The transition from voluntary mutual aid to coercive welfare statism is the subject of the tenth chapter. Taylor introduces the subject with the age-old statist question, “Without government, who would take care of the poor?” Of course, one must begin by pointing out that government does no such thing, as Taylor does. He spends the first part of the chapter educating the reader about mutual aid societies, which were common before the Progressive Era but were destroyed by government intervention into the healthcare and insurance industries. Taylor shows how the state has reduced the supply of medical care, thus increasing its cost and decreasing its availability. Unfortunately, Taylor’s approach ignores the Social Darwinist perspective that natural selection should be allowed to remove the least successful humans from the gene pool. The second half of the chapter debunks at length the myth of Scandinavian socialism.

The eleventh chapter deals with civil disobedience. Here, Taylor stumbles in the way that most libertarians do, in that he fails to understand raw power, celebrates small victories that will not occur on a large scale, and confuses the downfall of a particular regime with ending the state itself. He does this even while reciting the history of preparedness for the use of force among civil rights leaders and noting what the state has done to leaders of nonviolent resistance efforts. Taylor also manages to celebrate the effects of Western degeneracy among Middle Eastern youth. His encouragement of government agents to refuse unjust orders, leak information detailing abuses to the public, and otherwise engage in whistleblowing is more on point, though he notes the powerful incentive structure against doing so. The second half of the chapter details a plethora of private alternatives to services which have long been monopolized and/or heavily regulated by the state.

The growth of cryptocurrency and other peer-to-peer technologies is the focus of Chapter 12. Taylor provides a decent layperson’s overview of Bitcoin, then moves on to practical applications of cryptocurrency, such as funding dissidents suppressed by legacy financial networks, evading capital controls, and engaging in commercial activities forbidden by the state. Next, he covers the P2P revolution, which has greatly expanded liberty and privacy online and in the physical world. The remainder of the chapter runs through various examples of how P2P and blockchain technologies have solved problems and exposed corruption.

In the thirteenth chapter, Taylor addresses the open-borders dogma held by many libertarians. He demonstrates that open borders and forced integration are a form of the aforementioned anarcho-tyranny, with closed state borders being sub-optimal but less evil. The role of forced diversity in creating internal conflicts that lead to less liberty is considered, as is the biological phenomenon of kin selection in creating cohesive groups. Taylor makes the case that open borders are contrary to private property rights because in order to have open borders, the state must override the wishes of property owners who do not want migrants to enter. He then examines the history of US immigration policy from 1790 to the present, noting the shift in demographics admitted after 1965. The contention that the real problem is the welfare state rather than demographic shifts is rebutted both on the practical grounds of American politics and with the counterexample of European nations surviving socialism but falling into turmoil due to migrants.

The fourteenth chapter furthers the themes from Chapter 11 by discussing secession, nullification, and political migration. Taylor notes the myriad benefits of secession, but only briefly mentions the history of larger states violently suppressing such movements. Next, he covers the history of both legislative and jury nullification in opposing unjust laws. Taylor’s exploration of political migration is rather America-centric, but it can be adapted to other situations. His praise for the Free State Project comes off as overzealous, given the thoroughly leftist nature of that organization. He finishes the chapter with a concept called the Benedict Option, in which those who wish to preserve a tradition and begin a restoration retreat from the public and urban life of a degenerate culture.

The final chapter of the book is an argument against democratic government. This reads much like Hoppe’s Democracy: The God That Failed, quoting and borrowing from it extensively as Taylor explains the perverse incentive structures inherent in democracy and makes the case that monarchy has a superior incentive structure. But unlike Hoppe, Taylor contemplates physical removal as a means of achieving a libertarian social order in addition to a means of maintenance. As Taylor writes on page 283, “Economics teaches us that there is no such thing as a free lunch. But in order to achieve and maintain a libertarian social order, there will be free helicopter rides.” His defense of Augusto Pinochet’s actions in Chile and Lee Kuan Yew’s rule in Singapore as better than the alternatives is common in right-libertarian circles, but his defense of Francisco Franco goes a bit too far. Taylor ends with an exhortation to and description of a libertarian revolution, but this is, as before, too brief.

Overall, the book is good, but not great. For a book called Reactionary Liberty, it could have used more reaction in the form of lengthy explanations of traditional norms and power dynamics. Taylor seemed to lack an editor and proofreader, as some typos survived in very unfortunate places that render a few sentences absurd. A few chapters can become tedious when Taylor features a laundry list of examples. That being said, it is a strong presentation of right-libertarianism that is impeccably sourced.

Rating: 4/5

Bill Wirtz’s Helicopter Skydive

On December 25, 2017, Freedom Today Journal published an article by Bill Wirtz in which he denounces Hans-Hermann Hoppe and his supporters, claiming that they have made improper and incompatible allies, done great damage to the libertarian movement, and should leave. In this rebuttal, I will show on a point-by-point basis that he is wrong on all counts.

False History

Wirtz begins by mentioning a recent case of a member of Students for Liberty being kicked out for his support of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, though he does not cite a source. He then delves into an erroneous history of right- and left-libertarianism. The truth is that the term was originally used by classical anarchists such as Pierre Proudhon, whose beliefs were quite different from contemporary American libertarians. The word was appropriated from them by American classical liberals in the early 20th century[1] because progressives had altered the meaning of the word liberal, although it continues to have a far-left connotation outside of American politics. He is correct to say that “left-libertarianism is merely another socialist viewpoint on the collective ownership of resources, that is inherently anti-capitalist.” But considering “leftists who described themselves as libertarians, as being very confused about what the philosophy means” only makes sense in an American context.

According to Wirtz, the American debate between right- and left-libertarianism is as follows: “the right believes in a strict application of property rights and the left has sucked up to ‘cultural Marxism’.” This is inaccurate; it is instead a description of the debate between thin- and thick-libertarianism. The thick libertarians believe that there is more to libertarianism than self-ownership, non-aggression, and private property—that these imply something more about the values that one should hold. Thin libertarians will have none of this, although most understand that libertarianism is not and was never intended to be a complete worldview and must have questions beyond what constitutes appropriate use of force answered by a complimentary philosophy, such as reactionary thought. Wirtz begins a pattern of applying scare quotes liberally with the term “cultural Marxism,” which he never bothers to define.

Wirtz then complains about Hoppe’s supporters, “who constantly nag the liberty movement about the importance of culture and the feeling of national identity,” being sure to place scare quotes around the word libertarian, as though they are somehow not libertarians. Let us note Wirtz’s focus on the liberty movement, a collective identification which will undermine the rest of his case. Denying the importance of culture and identity is a sign of political autism, as the philosophy of liberty was developed in a specific cultural context and those who do not form a group identity are at a disadvantage against those who do.

False Understanding

Wirtz refers to Hoppeans as “pretend right-libertarians,” but as we will see, Hoppe is more libertarian than Wirtz. His claim that Hoppeans invented this dichotomy is false; the thick-libertarians did this as a tactic of leftist entryism to disrupt and co-opt the liberty movement. Wirtz claims to understand Hoppe’s arguments, but he only does so in a superficial, politically correct manner. Wirtz writes,

“Private property tenants should be allowed to remove trespassers from their property, which particularly includes people who hold wildly anti-freedom believes [sic].”

But as Hoppe explains,

“With respect to some pieces of land, the property title may be unrestricted; that is, the owner is permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property owned by others. With respect to other territories, the property title may be more or less severely restricted. As is currently the case in some housing developments, the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property (voluntary zoning), which might include residential versus commercial use, no buildings more than four stories high, no sale or rent to Jews, Germans, Catholics, homosexuals, Haitians, families with or without children, or smokers, for example.”[2] (emphasis added)

In truth, libertarianism says that private property owners should be allowed to exclude people on any basis whatsoever, and the extent to which they are unable to do so is the extent to which the state or some other force is infringing upon their liberty. Wirtz notes the prevalence of memes about physical removal among the alt-right, but this is partly because alt-rightists tend to misunderstand the concept. He then claims that Hoppe “could have denounced white nationalists and national socialists as a group of collectivists who use his positions for their dangerous rhetoric” and has not done so. The facts are that Hoppe has denounced national socialists on multiple occasions, and that certain forms of white nationalism can be compatible with libertarianism. As long as a particular group of white nationalists acquire property in a legitimate manner, use their property rights to exclude non-whites, and refrain from aggression against non-whites, libertarians should speak out in favor of their property rights and freedom of association. In fact, because there is a short and slippery slope from interference with politically incorrect uses of private property to all manner of interference with private property rights, those who use their property rights in a controversial and/or reprehensible manner (as long as no force is initiated in the process) should be the first people that libertarians defend. This should be done regardless of one’s feelings about racial discrimination or white nationalism, for if their rights are infringed, ours are weakened as well.

Autistic Gatekeeping

Wirtz laments that Hoppe “seems all too keen to welcome the alt-right as his supporters, gives interviews to far-right papers and only occasionally calls the welfare-state ideals of people like Richard Spencer unfortunate.” Every part of this sentiment is fallacious. First, there is no reason why libertarians should not perform outreach to the alt-right. There is significant overlap and compatibility between the two, the alt-right are more willing than anyone else to do battle with authoritarian leftists, and many alt-rightists are former libertarians who left the liberty movement due to the latter’s perennial ineptitude. Should such outreach be successful, the result would be racists who no longer initiate the use of force in their advancement of racism or advocate for politicians to do so on their behalf. This should be regarded as a positive development by any sane person. The presence of such people in the liberty movement would also help to counter the worrying development of entryism by social justice warriors and other leftists into libertarian circles by triggering them into leaving, though as we will soon see, Wirtz may be fully aware of this and perceive it as a negative.

Second, Wirtz implies that it is wrong to even have a conversation with or use a platform provided by people with certain political views. The truth is that speaking with someone does not mean that one agrees with that person. Wirtz shows his establishment colors here, as this gatekeeper fallacy is the same tactic used by the legacy media against alternative content creators. The absence of dialogue with people who have different ideas also prevents both the improvement of libertarian philosophy and any outreach or conversion efforts toward those people. This makes little sense in light of the obsession that mainstream libertarians have with bringing as many people as possible into the liberty movement, regardless of quality.

Third, Wirtz seems to expect Hoppe to continually denounce the welfare statism of parts of the alt-right. While a libertarian should oppose the alt-right on this point, the implication here is that clearly stating one’s position is insufficient; rather, one must continually virtue signal in order to maintain one’s social status. This is a leftist, social justice warrior standard that should have no place in a healthy libertarian organization.

Wirtz continues,

“One thing should be very clear: grouping people in categories in order to attribute certain behavioural characteristics to them, is inherently collectivist.

Ron Paul, now often claimed by these right-libertarians, has been equally clear on the topic:

‘Racism is simply an ugly form of collectivism, the mindset that views humans strictly as members of groups rather than individuals. Racists believe that all individuals who share superficial physical characteristics are alike: as collectivists, racists think only in terms of groups.’”

This is a straw man; the purpose of grouping people into categories is not to attribute certain behavioral characteristics to them, but to notice useful patterns that may serve as a heuristic for taking decisions in situations which disallow a consideration of each person on an individual basis. A refusal to do this results in a politically autistic hyper-individualism that is incapable of perceiving demographic trends and other group dynamics. This kind of thinking leaves libertarians vulnerable against opponents who do perceive such dynamics and weaponize them against us. Interestingly, this hyper-individualism tends to come full circle into a globalist hyper-collectivism. This occurs because a rejection of group differences combined with the blank-slate egalitarianism of classical liberalism causes one to see humans as interchangeable cogs in a grand machine called the global economy. The end result is a belief that all of humanity is one large collective with universally preferred values, which is inconsistent with all empirical results.

Paul’s description of racism is also misguided, as few racists think only in terms of groups or believe that all individuals who share superficial physical characteristics are alike. Many simply believe that there are significant differences between population groups and that because superficial physical characteristics are produced from the same genetic codes that influence a person’s intelligence, athleticism, behavior, and other important attributes, there is good reason to believe that there is some correlation between superficial physical characteristics and more meaningful traits.

The Worst

Wirtz accuses Hoppe of “aligning with the worst parts of the political sphere,” by which he means the far-right. But what does it mean to be the worst part of the political sphere? By libertarian standards, this means initiating the use of force to cause the most deaths of people and destruction of property, regardless of rhetoric. Since Wirtz claims to be a libertarian and says earlier in his article that “there is every importance in the world between what we say and what we end up doing,” we may assume his agreement with this methodology. In such an accounting, it becomes clear that communists and other Marxists are the worst part of the political sphere, not fascists or racists. Though neo-Nazis are by no means a benevolent force, they can be a useful ally of convenience against communists, to be disposed of once the communist threat is eliminated. Contrary to Wirtz, this is not an “’end justifies the means’ sort of approach,” but a calculated political strategy. An unwillingness to deal with the context at hand by making alliances with unsavory characters in order to defeat even worse political forces is yet another sign of political autism.

Conclusion

Wirtz ends his article where it began, with a confused and ignorant view of left and right. He writes,

“Adopting the paranoia that everyone who disagrees with you must be leftist, a cultural marxist[sic] or what have not, is utterly ludicrous.”

This is a straw man, as no right-libertarian or alt-righter does this. There are significant internal disagreements in both camps, and there are discussions of these disagreements in which people do not sink into such ad hominem fallacies. That said, it would not be paranoid for a person who is completely right-wing to adopt such a view, as disagreement with such a person would necessarily require leftism of some variety.

Wirtz continues,

“Libertarianism was about not being fooled by the left/right spectrum which only supports the narrative of big government. Either you believe in the ideas of liberty or not. And yes, this means means that there is a big tent from objectivists[sic] to classical liberals, but it surely doesn’t include the proponents of racial politics.”

Libertarianism is a philosophical position on what constitutes the proper use of force. It says that initiating the use of force is never acceptable, and using force to defend against an initiator of force (commonly called an aggressor) is always acceptable. It has nothing else to say about the left/right spectrum apart from the aforementioned. While it is true at face value that one either believes in the ideas of liberty or not, Wirtz seems pathologically incapable of considering not only the potential role of racial politics in preventing demographic shifts which will be hostile to liberty, but any indirect strategy whatsoever. Furthermore, he ignores the possibility of any sort of reactionary thought being under the big tent, when a synthesis of libertarianism and reaction makes more sense than any other such synthesis.

Wirtz concludes,

“Dear Hoppeans: you left the liberty-movement and expected us to follow you, yet nobody outside of a few losers with toy helicopters did. As you are the champions of freedom of association, here’s a little association freedom for you: get out.”

Hoppeans did not leave the liberty movement; it left us. As predicted by Robert Conquest, any organization which is not hostile to the left will eventually be taken over by the left. This is exactly what has happened to most mainstream libertarian organizations. The end result is no better than it was when Murray Rothbard tried to work with the left in the late 1960s and learned that they were insane. However, as misguided as Wirtz and his ilk are, perhaps there is a bootlegger’s cause to agree with his final suggestion. It may be easier to form a new libertarian movement that is complemented by reactionary thought in order to prevent entryism, denounce libertinism, and seek a stable libertarian social order than to attempt to fix the mess that has been made of the current liberty movement. Though it would be unfortunate to cede control of anything to people like Wirtz, perhaps the best right-libertarian minds could accomplish more without the burdens that left-libertarians bring.

References:

  1. Burns, Jennifer (2009). Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 309.
  2. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (2001). Democracy: The God That Failed. Transaction Publishers. p. 139.

Nepal Has Fallen

Among Asian nations, Nepal is not high on Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The mountainous nation, which is consumed by the massive Himalayas, is mostly known for its Buddhism and its Gurkhas—a warrior people who still provide mercenary services for the British, Indian, and Singaporean armies. Overall, Nepal produces very little that Americans consume. Nepal is also not the home to a large American military contingent, nor is it seen as an important ally in America’s never-ending quest to be the major hegemony in West and East Asia. Nepal, to put it bluntly, is not important to American interests.

This view will almost certainly change, however. The reason for this is that a powerful Communist party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) recently acquired the levers of power in Kathmandu after a democratic election. According to all international observers, the Communists in Nepal have close connections to the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. This all but guarantees that rustic and rural Nepal will become a Chinese satellite on the border with India, a close American ally and a long-time opponent of China owing to a border dispute that once erupted in violence.

Democracy, Civil War, and Insurgency

In order to appreciate the importance of this victory, one must understand the history of communism in Nepal. Himalayan Communists are not the typical neckbeard professors that one encounters in the West; they are experienced guerrilla fighters who waged a war against the central government for almost two decades.

The Communist Party of Nepal is led by two former prime ministers, K.P. Sharma Old and Pushpa Kamal Dahal (both of whom fought against the center-left government during the 2000s). These two men managed to unify two competing factions of the far-left party in order to sweep the country’s Parliament and Provincial Assembly. With this mandate, Nepalese Communists are expected to both follow a harder line against India and be more cooperative to Chinese business interests in the country. It is predicted that one of the first orders of business for the new government is to pass through the Chinese hydropower project that the former prime minister, Kamal Thapa, cancelled less than a month before the election.

In 1994, the government of prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala, the first democratically elected leader of Nepal and a member of the center-left Nepali Congress Party, suffered a vote of no confidence. That same year, new elections brought the Communists into power. Communist leader Man Mohan Adhikari became the prime minister and briefly led a minority government. That same government dissolved less than a year later. After that, Nepalese Communists, especially the Maoists among then, began their long insurgency.

A brief paper written by Yurendra Basnett in 2009 laid out the reasons underlying the vicious civil war that rocked Nepal between 1996 and 2006. Basnett writes that Western scholars were baffled by the far-left insurgency given that “Nepal enjoyed [an] unprecedented level of economic and political freedom” at the start of the rebellion.[1] The Maoists themselves argued that their war began because of economic inequality, rural poverty, and chronic landlessness in the country. Basnett argues that these invocations of economic disparities do not amount to much given that they have been “omnipresent” since the formation of modern Nepal.[2]

What Basnett’s critique of the Maoist movement misses is that Communist movements rarely come from times of economic disparity. Except for the rise of far-left movements during the Great Depression of the 1930s, most of the seminal Communist movements have sought to obtain power just at the time when their respective nations have achieved some form of unprecedented growth or stability. When the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 erupted, the Russian Empire that they overthrew was far more liberal, progressive, and economically advanced than Western liberals and socialists realized. According to UNZ Review writer Anatoly Karlin, the Russian Empire of Tsar Nicholas II was even more “progressive” than such typically modernist bastions as London, Paris, and Berlin:

“Access to higher education was actually more meritocratic in the late Empire than in contemporary Germany or France by a factor of 2-3x. Women constituted about a third of Russia’s total numbers of university students, a far larger percentage than in any other European country—and Russia by 1913 had the largest number of university students in Europe (127,000 to 80,000 in Germany, around 40,000 in France and Austria each). Likewise, they constituted an absolute majority in grammar schools, many decades ahead of most of the rest of Europe. In 1915, restrictions on co-education were dropped across a range of Russian universities by decision of the Tsar and his Council of Ministers.”[3]

Tragically, this liberal attitude allowed a radical student body to fester and become many of the same Bolsheviks who oversaw the genocidal regime that would rule Russia until 1991. Such a scenario played out in China as well, for when the Chinese Communist Party began life in the aftermath of World War I, China was modernizing at a rapid pace. Thanks to World War I, which did not damage China, Chinese exports rose and the nation’s trade deficit dropped by an astounding 80 percent. While this success proved temporary, China before Mao was politically unstable but considered one of the world’s greatest jewels. Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s was a cosmopolitan city beloved by Asians and Westerners alike.

Maoism in Nepal follows a discernible pattern—as prosperity increases or stabilizes, discontent grows as well. Like Marx, the social leech who had servants and never worried about earning a dollar, many of today’s Communists are full of the same greed that they constantly accuse capitalists of harboring deep in their benighted chests.

In Nepal, Maoist violence reached a terrifying apex in November 2001, when more than one hundred people were killed in violent confrontations between rebels and government forces. As a result, the central government declared a state of emergency. An absolute monarchy returned to power amidst the chaos. All told, almost 20,000 people were killed and another 2,000 remain missing.

From Monarchy to Democracy to Communism

A reactionary analysis would find that Nepal’s troubles began with the decline and fall of its monarchy. When this stabilizing force fell, chaos came in its wake.

Nepal was unified into a central state ruled by a hereditary monarchy in 1768. The kingdom first began to falter due to military incursions by the British East India Company, which already had a sizable foothold in India by the late 18th century. Between 1814 and 1816, Nepalese forces lost the Anglo-Nepalese War to the soldiers of the East India Company and their Indian allies. Although the Kingdom of Nepal retained its independence, one third of the country would be a protectorate of British India until Indian independence in 1947.

When King Birendra came to the throne in 1972, political parties were banned in the country. However, this did not mean that the king could rule by fiat or whim; a system of regional councils called panchayats helped to disperse and decentralize authority. Because he ruled during an age of interventionist democratic liberalism, King Birendra often told the international press that he was a democrat rather than an autocrat. Still, the king wisely told his critics that due to Nepal’s “backwardness,” mass democracy would be a recipe for disaster. The political violence that often accompanies the rise of political parties would ruin the country, the king argued.

King Birendra would rule Nepal in this way for decades. Despite the relative peace and harmony, there were pro-democratic movements designed to bring down the monarchy. In 1980, King Birendra had the leaders of the center-left Nepali Congress Party arrested in order to keep the panchayat system in place. The king then called a referendum in order to see if Nepalese citizens would prefer a non-party government or one that allowed political parties to exist. Nepalese voters favored non-party politics by a score of 55 to 45 percent.

Ten years later, the People’s Movement used strikes to disrupt the monarchical state. This movement proved harder to suppress than one political party, as it was composed of several political parties, including the Nepali Congress Party and a unified group of Communist parties called the United Left Front. In February 1990, the government began arresting the leaders of the People’s Movement and shut down most of their media organs. A series of deadly confrontations between the Nepalese state and People’s Movement protesters followed this. For example, in the city of Bhaktapur, police killed 12 protesters in late February. Out of anger and frustration, approximately two million protesters descended on the capital of Kathmandu. On April 8, King Birendra removed the ban on political parties. A few months later, in November 1990, a constitution written by the People’s Movement forced King Birendra to remove the panchayat system and to democratize the government. Marxists were soon elected to office.

Although 1990 is often seen as the year when democracy came to Nepal, the continued existence of the royal family helped to maintain fears that an absolute monarchy could return at any time. These fears gained substance thanks to Crown Prince Dipendra, the king’s eldest son and heir. Unfortunately, he proved to be a murderous psychopath. On June 1, 2001, Dipendra consumed large amounts of alcohol and hashish at a dinner on the grounds of the Narayanhity Royal Palace. After misbehaving with a guest, the King told him to leave. He returned an hour later with a Franchi SPAS-12 shotgun, an H&K MP5 submachine gun, a Colt M16A2 rifle, and a Glock 19 9mm pistol, which he used to kill nine members of the royal family: the King and Queen, his sister, his brother, the King’s brother, two of the King’s sisters, the husband of one of the King’s sisters, and the King’s cousin. Dipendra then turned a gun on himself, dying after spending three days in a coma during which he was King. While many Nepalese citizens continue to question the official story of the massacre, there is no doubt that the future of the Nepalese monarchy ended on that late spring night in 2001.

The throne passed to Gyanendra, another brother of Birendra who briefly re-established the absolute monarchy due to political violence in the country. King Gyanendra blamed Nepal’s political parties for failing to form a government after the dissolution of the parliament. After taking direct control of the state, Gyanendra dismissed three prime ministers for failing to call for new elections. Interestingly for an autocrat, King Gyanendra demanded that Nepal acquire some form of democracy or parliamentarianism in order to legitimize the state in the eyes of foreign critics. King Gyanendra’s promises of “peace and effective democracy” were undermined by the Maoist rebels who continued to carry out their bloody war against the Nepalese monarchy. Like Bavarian minister Gustav von Kahr, King Gyanendra all but admitted that a “cell of order” must exist before democracy can take hold. Personal liberty is nothing if public safety cannot be guaranteed.

By 2006, King Gyanendra announced that he would give executive authority to a new prime minister. Interim prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala took power in 2006 while Nepalese politicians argued about the role the monarchy would play in the future democracy. That April, Gyanendra reinstated the country’s parliament.

The fall of the monarchy occurred under the watchful eye of the Indian government. Along with Prime Minister Koirala, who supposedly suspected that the monarchy would always threaten democratic governance, Indian officials weakened the King’s power to the point where the royal palace became just the head of the parliament. On May 27, 2008, King Gyanendra was ordered by the parliament to vacate the royal palace within fifteen days. The ruling came as part of peace talks between the transitional democratic government and the Maoists. This is how the Nepalese monarchy fell—as an olive branch given to ultra-left radicals who despise Nepalese traditions.

Lessons

There are several lessons to be learned from these events. First, in the words of Hans-Hermann Hoppe,

“One may say innumerable things and promote almost any idea under the sun, but naturally no one is permitted to advocate ideas contrary to the very purpose of the covenant of preserving and protecting private property, such as democracy and communism. There can be no tolerance toward democrats and communists in a libertarian social order. They will have to be physically separated and expelled from society.”[4]

If democrats and communists are permitted to wield political power and advance their goals, they will eventually destroy the traditions and values that make civilization possible. It sometimes begins with something that seems innocuous—the Magna Carta in England, the Constitution in America, or the People’s Movement in Nepal—but the end is always some form of communist takeover, whether overt or covert. Monarchs (or private property owners in a libertarian society) must be willing to use the necessary amount of force to crush democratic and communist uprisings, however unpleasant the resulting bloodshed may be.

Second, it is no measure of health to kowtow to a sick global community, especially when the disease in question is such a virulent one as liberal democracy. Had King Birendra argued a passionate defense of traditional unelected governance, offered an ideological offensive against democratic thought, and called upon foreigners to respect Nepal’s sovereignty, the progress of the Maoists might have been forestalled. King Gyanendra was no better in this regard, and it cost him his crown. Unlike other countries that have had democratic experiments inflicted upon them by Western intervention, Nepal harbors no conceivable threat and has little that imperialist powers could want, so war propaganda would be more difficult to manufacture against them.

Finally, the greatest enemy is always the enemy within. A stable family, let alone governance structure for a nation, must have a means of detecting and removing threats like Dipendra. This could take many forms, from mental health evaluations to keeping inebriated people and deadly weapons away from the King.

What Lies Ahead

For India, the end of official hostilities in Nepal have been of little comfort. After all, India itself is still battling an internal Maoist insurgency that has ties to Nepal’s Communists. India’s war with Communist forces have been going on since 1967, and today, the “red corridor” of the country has claimed almost 18,000 lives. Violence is trending downwards, but there is no end in sight to the insurgency. A Communist victory in Nepal is likely to bolster the spirits of Maoists across the border in India.

For China, a pliant government in Nepal means that they move one step closer to realizing their “One Belt, One Road” dream. This plan, which has already seen China dump billions of dollars in investments in Asian and European ports, as well as investing heavily in the economies of sub-Saharan Africa, is the great issue facing the West. Contrary to starry-eyed Cathedral elites, the Chinese Communist Party is not reformed and has not embraced capitalism. Instead, the CCP is bent on pursuing a predatory economic policy that will make Asia and Africa into colonies of China’s limitless and cheap produce.

In order to achieve “One Belt, One Road,” do not be surprised if China dusts off an old gem from Communism’s history. During the 1930s, when fascism posed a grave threat to Soviet Communism, Joseph Stalin encouraged the Popular Front strategy, which saw Communist parties collaborate with liberal and socialist parties in France, Spain, the United States, and other nations. The elections of May 1936 brought the Front Populaire to power in Paris, and Leon Blum pursued a radically republican, anti-clerical, and socialistic platform thanks to support from Communist-backed labor unions. Across the Pyrenees in Spain, the Frente Popular installed the a rabidly anti-Catholic and anti-capitalist government headed by Manuel Azana. This was the last government of the Second Spanish Republic, for a right-wing coup led by the Spanish Army triggered what would become the Spanish Civil War in 1936. China, in pursuing their economic goals, may begin promoting Communist parties all across Asia. While Nepal is small potatoes in the grand scheme of things, its fall to a far-left rabble does not bode well for liberty in Asia.

References:

  1. Basset, Yurendra (2009). From Politicization of Grievances to Political Violence: An Analysis of the Maoist Movement in Nepal. Development DESTIN Studies Institute, Working Papers Series. p. 4.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Karlin, Anatoly (2017). The Russian Empire: Too Nice For Its Own Good. http://www.unz.com/akarlin/progressive-russian-empire/
  4. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (2001). Democracy: The God That Failed. Transaction Publishers. p. 218.

The Not-So-Current Year: 2017 In Review

Though the specific demarcation of the passage from one year into another is a rather arbitrary social construct, it does provide a useful annual period for self-examination and remembrance. Now that 2017 has entered the history books, let us take a look back at a year’s worth of essays and review the not-so-current year.

We begin, of course, with last year’s article of the same kind. Some articles in this list are sequels to articles in that list. Aside from that, we may move on.

I began 2017 by addressing a recurring story throughout the 2016 election campaign; that of Russia hacking the DNC and phishing Hillary Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta’s email system. I argued that Russia would have been justified in doing not only this, but in actually altering the election to cause Donald Trump to win. I would later use this piece as an example in a guide on how to argue more sharply in order to throw opponents out of their comfort zones. The story lingered on, so I published a sequel detailing the benefits of a Trump-Russia conspiracy. The left’s activities after the election became ridiculous, so I decided to give them some free advice.

My first list of 25 statist propaganda phrases and some concise rebuttals was a major hit, so I started planning a sequel. I had no intention of taking almost two years to compile 25 more statist propaganda phrases to refute, but better late than never, I suppose.

Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States, which of course meant that Gary Johnson did not. I explored in detail what was wrong with Johnson’s campaign that made him not only lose, but fail to earn 5 percent of the vote against two of the least popular major-party candidates ever to seek the Presidency. Once Trump was in office, the responses to his trade policies among mainstream analysts led me to explain why many of them are politically autistic.

Book reviews have long been a part of my intellectual output, but I decided to start doing more of them in late 2016. This trend continued throughout 2017, as I read and reviewed The Invention of Russia, The Age of Jihad, In Our Own Image, Come And Take It, Against Empathy, Level Up Your Life, Islamic Exceptionalism, The Science of Selling, Closing The Courthouse Door, Open To Debate, Calculating the Cosmos, The Art of Invisibility, Libertarian Reaction, and The Euro.

Antifa grew from a nuisance that rarely affected anyone other than neo-Nazis into a serious threat to anyone who is politically right of center and/or libertarian who wishes to speak in a public venue. A comprehensive strategy to defeat them was necessary, and I was happy to provide one. Kyle Chapman grew weary of Antifa’s antics and led the effort to take up arms against them, becoming known as Based Stickman. I praised him in song. After the events of February, April, and May Day, I revised the strategy.

The Walking Dead comic series and the television show based on it contain many themes which are of interest to the student of libertarian philosophy. I explored the many ways in which Negan’s group resembles a state apparatus. The first part covers the sixth season of the show, and the second part covers the first half of the seventh season. At least three more parts will come next year.

‘No Particular Order-ism’, or the belief that libertarians should take whatever reduction in the size and scope of government they can get, has become common among the more radical members of the Libertarian Party. I explained why this approach is misguided.

White nationalist and alt-right leader Richard Spencer was present in the bar of the Marriott hotel that hosted the International Students For Liberty conference. This did not go over well with Jeffrey Tucker, who loudly denounced Spencer, after which security removed everyone from the bar. I wrote about the incident and the philosophical underpinnings of it.

Sometimes, the lens of examination is best turned inward to correct one’s own missteps. Such was the case for an article I wrote in 2014 about the nature of fake libertarianism, so I published a revision.

Theories concerning the creation, acquisition, trade, inheritance, and defense of private property form much of libertarian philosophy. The role of conquest in the determination of property rights had gone largely unexplored, so I decided to remedy the situation.

Terrorism struck in London on the anniversary of the Brussels attacks. I wrote a list of observations on the event.

I argued against more amendments to the United States Constitution, namely the Second and the Eleventh.

A chemical weapon attack occurred in Syria, which led to US intervention via a cruise missile strike. I wrote a list of observations on the event.

Keynesians and others who support fiat currency and central banking frequently claim that there is not enough gold in the world to back the quantity of currency in existence, and thus returning to gold would set off a deflationary spiral while destroying several industries that depend on gold. I debunked that claim.

On the anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, I applied ethical theories to the event to gain a deeper perspective of what happened and the aftermath of the event.

The primary aim of politically active libertarians is to limit and reduce the size and scope of government, as well as to eliminate as much state power as possible. I made the case that in order to do this, it may be necessary to temporarily do the opposite.

On May 8, Fritz Pendleton published an article at Social Matter in which he argued that liberty is best preserved by authority rather than anarchy. He then proceeded to launch a misguided attack against libertarianism, all while misunderstanding authority, anarchy, liberty, and the nature of a libertarian social order. I rebutted Pendleton’s case on a point-by-point basis.

Fashion trends can be a useful barometer of the health of a society. I explained how the trend of clothing that is designed to mimic the appearance of wear and work for those who think themselves above the sorts of activities that would produce these effects naturally indicates that a revolution may come soon.

Memorial Day provides an opportunity to promote statist propaganda concerning the nature of service and the provision of defense. I decided to do the opposite.

The immediate danger standard says that using force against someone who is not presenting a physical threat at the exact moment that force is used constitutes aggression, and it has become far too commonly advocated in libertarian circles. I explained why it is wrong and why it has gained prevalence.

On June 14, James Hodgkinson opened fire on several Republican members of Congress and their staffers while they were practicing for the annual Congressional Baseball Game for Charity. I wrote a list of observations on the event.

The Supreme Court ruled against the stays on Trump’s travel ban, but he missed a greater opportunity by letting them decide rather than ignoring the courts. I explained how and why.

Political rhetoric has grown increasingly heated, with violence erupting as a result. I showed how democracy is the root of this problem and how abolishing democracy is the solution.

The meme of throwing one’s political rivals out of helicopters has become popular among certain right-wing and libertarian groups in recent years. Unfortunately, people from all over the political spectrum tend to misunderstand the historical context of the meme, and thus interpret it incorrectly. I wrote an overview of this context and explained why helicopter rides may not be the best option.

I welcomed Insula Qui, the first additional writer for Zeroth Position, in July. He provided two articles to keep the site going while I was preparing for, participating in, and recovering from the Corax conference in Malta. A piece describing the problems that led to the call for net neutrality and recommending against more state inteference in the Internet came first, followed by a critique of common libertarian strategies to date. Speaking of the Corax conference, a revised version of my talk may be found here, as they own the rights to the original. A topic that came up in the talk that needed further comment is that in the discussion of proper behavior beyond the basics of libertarian theory, right-libertarians in general and libertarian reactionaries in particular will use the term ‘degeneracy,’ but they do not always properly define the term. I attempted to do so.

In the August 2 episode of the Tom Woods Show, he asserted that libertarians and fascists are completely contradictory political perspectives and could never be combined, and that when one embraces fascism, one must have relinquished one’s libertarianism, as there is no other solution that would make sense. Qui countered these assertions and delved deeper into the relationship between libertarianism and fascism than I had previously, which is not as inimical as one might think.

An alt-right rally in Charlottesville, Va. on August 11-12 turned violent, with three deaths and about 20 injuries. I wrote a list of observations on the events. In response, the large technology companies of Silicon Valley, which have become increasingly hostile to right-wing and libertarian content creators over the past decade, ramped up their censorship efforts. I proposed a novel and radical plan to deal with this problem so as to avoid public utility regulation.

I welcomed Benjamin Welton, our second additional writer, in September. I had meant to write an article about using the historical concept of outlawry to deal with violent illegal aliens myself, but time constraints led me to outsource the project. He then explored several historical examples of private military defense, finding that something novel must be created in order to defeat the state and maintain a libertarian social order.

In the wake of two major hurricanes, the usual complaints about price gouging were made yet again. I explained why price gouging is actually beneficial.

Qui wrote a piece about the limits of the applicability of libertarian philosophy, explaining that humans can fall into the categories of personhood or savagery, and that it is important to deal with each accordingly.

Catalonia held a referendum to secede from Spain and become an independent nation on October 1. This was met with force, and much hostility ensued. I wrote a list of observations on the events.

Qui examined the role of the modern concept of citizenship in advancing a particularly insidious form of totalitarianism.

On October 5, the New York Times published an opinion column by Michael Shermer in which he argued that the rule of law is a bulwark against tyranny, but guns are not. I thoroughly rebutted his arguments.

Welton explored the history of judicial corporal punishment, then made a case for restoring its use as a replacement for imprisoning lesser criminals.

The debt ceiling became a political issue again. As it incites financial panic for no good reason and hides important truths from common view, I advocated for its elimination on formalist grounds.

Capitalism and consumerism are distinct phenomena, with the latter caused by high time preference, which in turn is caused by the flaws inherent in modernity. Qui explained this at length.

I welcomed Nathan Dempsey, our third additional writer, in November. He runs a project called Liberty Minecraft, and wrote an introduction to the project.

The relationship between libertarianism and racial politics has become a controversial issue in recent years. Views on the issue run the gamut from complete opposition to imperative alliance, with nearly every conceivable position between being advocated by someone noteworthy. Many libertarians either provide the wrong answer or are afraid to address the question, so I decided to address libertarianism and support for ethnic nationalism.

Black Friday is revered by most libertarians as a celebration of free-market capitalism. I updated my explanation of why this reverence is misplaced. I weighed in on holiday shopping again due to some misguided criticism of computer programs designed to scalp popular gifts. Finally, I detailed the problems with Santa Claus.

Qui offered a message of hope in dark times by demonstrating how the socialists and anti-capitalists of today are not usually as fanatical as those that the early libertarians opposed, then offered advice on how to argue against them. He quickly followed this with an explanation of his concept of autostatism, which closely echoed one of the other presentations from the Corax conference. He then dealt with traditional views on degenerate behavior, and how a compassionate, non-enabling approach is necessary.

Due to surging exchange rates, the opening of Bitcoin futures, and the likelihood of Bitcoin exchange-traded funds in the near future, there is renewed mainstream interest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. There are benefits of cryptocurrencies which will be cheered by political outsiders to the chagrin of the establishment, and I listed eight of them.

Qui finished out the year by explaining why individualism and nationalism are not as incompatible as many people believe.

All in all, it was an interesting year full of occasions to make sharp libertarian and reactionary arguments. May 2018 bring more and better. Happy New Year!

On Individualism and Nationalism

One of the most common sentiments expressed by both individualists and nationalists is that these two perspectives are incompatible. It is supposedly impossible to both prioritize the well-being of the singular individual and the well-being of the nation. No matter if the charge is being an anti-social, politically autistic individualist or a collectivist nationalist, there is a tremendous amount of hostility between the adherents of these ideas. If one wants theoretical reasons for why individualism and nationalism are supposedly incompatible, one must analyze the objections from both sides and consider what it means to be an individualist and a nationalist, respectively.

The Individualists

The doctrine of individualism rests on a fundamental assumption that in both theoretical and practical matters, an appropriate guideline is the primacy of the individual. Collectives are not immoral or illogical, but all collectives are ultimately reducible to the actions of individuals. Since societies are determined by individuals and not vice versa, it must also be the case that individuals are responsible for the health of societies. By this standard, there can never be any attempt to increase the health of a society by suppressing the individual. Individualism also implies that each individual ought to be judged by one’s own actions. This means that an entire society should not be glorified for the actions of a heroic individual within that society, and an individual should not be held accountable for deeds done by others in the society who claim to act on behalf of all.

This supposedly creates a fundamental incompatibility between individualism and nationalism, as nationalism judges individuals by their collective affiliations. Nationalism discriminates according to national origin, even though a person does not choose one’s heritage. Individuals become tied to a collective and are discriminated either for or against by collective preference, regardless of their individual goals and deeds. This is contrary to individualism because it subordinates individuals to the national collective. Individuals have their opportunities reduced or expanded, and their persons degraded or elevated due to being considered part of a nation. Furthermore, some forms of nationalism aim to practically reduce the role of individual choices and increase the role of national choices. Even worse, a significant amount of nationalist philosophies are thoroughly anti-individualist, so nationalism as a political force can be contrary to individualism as a political force.

The Nationalists

At its core, nationalism is a focus on the advancement of the nation, either in relation to other nations, the history of the nation, or some goal set by the ruling class. Nationalism can manifest as imperialist expansionism, progressive isolationism, or anything between. This contrasts with internationalism, which does not aim to advance nations on their own but rather a collaboration of nations. Internationalism holds that the advancement of individual nations is irrelevant when contrasted with the advancement of supranational aims. These may be ending global poverty, establishing a worldwide economy, or simply putting in place a pan-European superstate. Nationalism and internationalism are not ideologies, but rather manifestations of special interests by different groups. Many ideological positions inherently incorporate internationalism or nationalism, but neither position becomes defined by the ideologies with which they are associated.

Due to the diversity of nationalist ideology, it is difficult to define the opposition that nationalism as a whole has to individualism. One can easily critique individualism from fascist, national communist, or communitarian perspectives, but there is no singular nationalist critique of individualism. There is not even a cohesive nationalist critique of anything (is imperialism nationalist or internationalist?). If individualism advances the nation more than any other form of social organization, then any good nationalist ought to favor individualism. For this reason, a nationalist cannot properly judge individualism to be completely incompatible with nationalism. The most coherent argument against individualism from a nationalist standpoint is that the focus on individual desires and aims will always create a society in which the organization of the nation can never advance. The sort of non-conformity and disorder that individualism can bring will never form a national identity that can be on par with more collectivist societies. But this is not a cogent or complete critique for the reasons elaborated on below.

A Synthesis

To prove that an integration of nationalism and individualism is possible, one must prove that individualism advances the nation and that nationalism is not necessarily based on individual submission. This can effectively defeat the criticisms of nationalism advanced by individualists and the criticisms of individualism advanced by nationalists. Although this cannot explain why individualists should support nationalism, it can demonstrate that individualists could support nationalism.

First, one must demonstrate how internationalism is held up by a fundamentally collectivist attitude, and how true internationalism can never be replicated under individualist conditions. The ideology of internationalism is derived from the egalitarian notion that all individuals, no matter their culture, genetics, history, or language, are equally valuable and united by their common humanity. But this is the worst form of collectivism, a collectivism that spans the entirety of the globe. The extent of this collectivism is so vast that many even confuse it with individualism. This collectivism completely ignores subjective valuations and assumes that the value of all persons is some objective matter.

Many classical liberals and libertarians fail to understand that internationalism is collectivist. Universalism, humanitarianism, and globalization are so deeply ingrained into the liberal tradition that they cannot bring themselves to question these values. In this view, all people are the same, are subject to judgment under the same higher law, and ought to cooperate for the maximum benefit of each individual. Additionally, with less institutional discrimination based on national collectives, it could only be true that internationalism is advanced when there is more individualism. But if people acknowledge that there is no common humanity, what attachments would anyone have to people with whom they have no recognizable contact? At best, internationalism can only be a pragmatic policy for individualists and not an ideological position.

If the collectivism of all peoples is the worst form of collectivism, would it not also be true that the collectivism of a single genetic and historical group is similarly undesirable? This is the second question in need of an answer: why is nationalism not the same sort of collectivism that internationalism is? The answer to this is fairly simple. The definition of a nation has two important conditions which must hold true. First, positive externalities must accumulate easily. Since people within a nation share physical, economic, and cultural connections, the people within that nation all benefit when single people benefit. When there are more rich people in China, very few people benefit in Oregon. The profits from trade and commerce from China only make up a small part of the goods to which the people in Oregon have access. However, if there is more economic advancement in Oregon and if more wealth accumulates to individuals in Oregon, then many Oregonians can expect to benefit. Likewise, advancements of the culture in Tibet do not necessarily mean that those living in Hong Kong benefit from a better culture. All of these groups have more and stronger internal connections compared to their external connections with other groups. Each individual is incentivized to look after their own group or groups rather than concern themselves with the welfare of out-groups. This is especially true whenever there is a democratic state, as all groups will aim to gain access to the powers of the state for their own benefit.

Internationalism requires collectivism based on a fictitious idea of humanity. This is not to dismiss the notion of biological incentives shared across all human groups or a natural law that should apply to all. Rather, this is a recognition that in the real world, there are natural incentives for cooperation between nations but none for global unity. One could also say that the smallest possible group is the individual and as such, independence is best for the advancement of an individual. But interpersonal and economic relations are vital to sustain a society, and these are most effective within a small community no larger than a historical city-state. Decentralized nationalism is tremendously beneficial to individuals, and it is perfectly individualist to support voluntary nationalism of this kind. Furthermore, this creates a spontaneous national order in which voluntary individual actions advance the nation as they advance the goals of the individuals. This means that there is no need to force people to be nationalists.

The second important aspect of a nation ties together with the first. Within each nation, the transaction costs are reduced as language barriers, geographical barriers, cultural incompatibility, and a lack of trust are all lesser problems. When all else is equal, it is always preferable to work inside one’s own nation. Thus, free trade should be understood in the context of cooperation between nations and not as something that supersedes nations. The incentive structure in a free market system favors local exchanges and high-trust networks. Therefore, it must be true that individualism advances nationalism and that individuals do not need to submit to their nation and give up their own self-interest to be nationalists.

The Case for Individualist Nationalism

It has been demonstrated that individualism will lead to nationalist ends, and that nationalism does not require individuals to be secondary. However, this does not mean that nationalism is necessarily good. It may still true that individuals without national connections are better off than individuals who are within a connected nation. There are some ways to demonstrate how individuals can benefit from not having an institutionalized nation. However, if one is to claim that individuals are better off without national bonds, one must ignore the entire purpose for which anyone would become an individualist in the first place. Individualism supports making one’s own choices and having those choices respected. Most people will make choices that strengthen their relationships to other people in their nation. This is because the majority of people value their own nation and want to be a part of it. The vast majority of the human population has a preference for their in-group and has connections to their heritage and history. Thus, if one is to be an individualist, one must account for the fact that to most people, this means nationalism within the individualistic framework.

Although some individualists support nationalism, it does not follow that this is necessarily correct. There is no reason why an individualist ought to support nationalism in the modern sense unless one is choosing it as a lesser evil than internationalism. Furthermore, it is contradictory for individualists to support anything other than what they themselves as free individuals wish to support. Individualism, however flawed it may be, allows for each individual to choose one’s own priorities. Nationalism may be antagonistic to some and favorable to others, but the beauty of the individualist mindset is the possibility of personal choice. There is no need for a monolithic individualism; the notion that individualists all ought to think the same way and adhere to some strict principle is self-contradictory. All individualists need to respect the power of persuasion and debate while accepting that some people will make mistakes, such as a rejection of even localist forms of nationalism.

The Problems With Santa Claus

Every year on Christmas Eve, children throughout Christendom eagerly await a visit from Santa Claus. Most children are told that he visits the homes of children to place gifts under Christmas trees for good children and bring coal or sticks for bad children. While many parents may believe that this is a harmless “white lie,” there is a case to be made that the myth of Santa Claus is actually very harmful to children. Let us examine the origins of these customs and consider their ill effects.

Santa’s Origin

The original form of Santa Claus was nothing like his common appearance today, which is largely a product of Thomas Nast’s cartoons (shown above), the poetry of Clement Clark Moore, and Coca-Cola advertisements. The custom of a mythical figure placing presents under a tree dates back to the mother/child cult of Semiramis and Nimrod in ancient Babylon. The mythology says that Nimrod married his mother, setting her up as the “queen of heaven” and himself up as the “divine son of heaven.” The two of them had a son named Tammuz, a god of food and vegetation worshiped in Sumer, Akkad, Assyria, and Babylonia. Upon Nimrod’s death, Semiramis claimed to see an evergreen tree spring up to full size overnight, symbolizing the “new life of Nimrod.” She then taught Tammuz to go into forests and make offerings to his father on the day that is December 25 in the Gregorian calendar (the origin of the date of Christmas), who was now worshiped as the sun god Ba’al, the false god mentioned numerous times in the Old Testament of the Bible. The custom was known to the authors of the book of Jeremiah, which includes the following:

“Do not learn the way of the Gentiles; do not be dismayed at the signs of heaven, for the Gentiles are dismayed at them. For the customs of the peoples are futile; for one cuts a tree from the forest, the work of the hands of the workman, with the ax. They decorate it with silver and gold; they fasten it with nails and hammers so that it will not topple. They are upright, like a palm tree, and they cannot speak; they must be carried, because they cannot go by themselves. Do not be afraid of them, for they cannot do evil, nor can they do any good.”[1]

The book of Jeremiah is believed to have been written between 627 and 586 BC—six centuries before the time of Jesus—disproving any assertions that the customs surrounding Christmas were an invention of Christians. Nimrod was also known as Santa throughout Asia Minor.[2] Another name for Nimrod used in Greece was Nikolaos. This name is a combination of the Greek words nikos and laos, which together mean “victory over the laity” or “conqueror of common people.” These customs inform certain practices within Christianity, such as the focus on Mary and Jesus together. Thus, the gift-bearing portion of the Santa Claus or Saint Nicholas story is ultimately a manifestation of the ancient cults of Babylon.

Krampus Confluence

With Santa’s gifts explained, let us turn to the coal and sticks. These come from a pre-Christian tradition in Eastern Europe involving a figure named Krampus. This being, whose portrayal resembles that of Satan, is said to come on December 5 (Krampusnacht) to punish bad children. He may leave coal or sticks, beat children with sticks, kidnap and throw them into water, or take them directly to Hell in the worst cases. In places where Krampusnacht is observed, children get presents on December 6. Families with unruly children hang gold-painted bundles of birch sticks in their homes throughout the year as a functional décor to remind the children of the threat that Krampus may beat or abduct them.

Krampusnacht celebrations involve parades of people wearing Krampus costumes, running through the streets and beating people. The masks involved can be valuable items of folk art, especially if they are antiques. Though Krampus was of Norse origin—said to be the son of Hel, the god of death and the underworld who lends her name to the Hell of Christianity—he has been linked to Santa since the 17th century. Though Krampus was banned under fascist rule in the 1930s, the custom resumed once those governments fell.

Ill Effects

To adults, all of this may seem like a harmless bit of fun. But when children are taught to believe in such beings as Santa Claus and Krampus, several detrimental effects may occur. First, parents who lie about Santa and/or Krampus are weakening their trust and credibility. Children will someday realize that their parents have lied to them, and this will lead them to question other statements that their parents have made. This can lead to trust issues that persist even into adult life, as well as damage a fundamental and irreplaceable relationship in a young person’s life.

Second, the Krampus story encourages violent parenting. A multitude of studies show that physically abusing and verbally threatening children is counterproductive to their development. The idea that a demon may take a child away from home forever into a place of punishment can inflict lasting feelings of trauma and insecurity on a young mind, and being hit with sticks is not much better for a child’s physical health. If children are capable of understanding reason, then it is better to use reason. If children are incapable of understanding reason, then they cannot understand the reasons why their elders are striking or threatening them. Moreover, the desire to escape punishment is the lowest of Kohlberg’s six stages of ethical development[3], and the desire to obtain rewards is the next lowest. Myths like those about Santa and Krampus can keep people from progressing past these lower stages of ethical thinking.

Third, these myths teach children to believe in entities whose existence and efficacy are not supported by credible evidence. A scientific analysis of what Santa Claus and his flying reindeer would have to do to fulfill the conditions set for him shows that he would have to endure G-forces more than 1,000 times beyond what is lethal. The idea of gifts and punishments coming seemingly out of nowhere, deus or diabolus ex machina style, to those who deserve them, requires a supernatural violation of physics as well as economics. If a child can be taught to believe in Santa or Krampus in the absence of credible evidence, then it will be easier for them to fall prey to religious cults or confidence schemes later on. On a related note, such traditions undermine the religious teachings that parents may wish to pass on to their children. Once children reason their way to the conclusion that Santa Claus is not real, they may apply similar thinking to the Christian God and become atheists, which a Christian parent would presumably not wish to see.

Fourth, the focus on gifts that is encouraged by belief in Santa Claus contributes to a culture of degenerate consumerism. This leads many people to spend money they do not have on items they do not need, then take the rest of the year to pay off the debts they incur during the holiday season. This runs counter to Christian teaching, which encourages both economic frugality and an emphasis on long-term planning over immediate gratification.

But perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Santa Claus myth relates to the similarities between the Santa/Krampus duo and the institution of the state. The lyrics to a popular Christmas song say,

“He sees you when you’re sleeping,
He knows when you’re awake,
He knows if you’ve been bad or good,
So be good for goodness sake!”[4]

The idea of a benevolent gift-giver who regularly violates everyone’s privacy and will bring punishment to those whom he deems to be bad people is a close approximation of the ideals of the current political establishment. The story of Santa makes the citizenry easier to control by making people comfortable with a state apparatus that frequently violates their rights and threatens them with punishment from a young age.

Conclusion

All things considered, the stories of Santa Claus and Krampus have the effects of destroying trust in the family, healthy personal development, acceptance of reason and science, maintenance of other traditions, and the desire for liberty in the mind of a child. For these reasons, it is fair to say that lying to children about Santa Claus and/or Krampus does far more harm than good. It is best to be honest about such customs and tell children that these are merely stories rather than real entities so that they will not develop resentment, irrationality, and statist tendencies.

References:

  1. Jeremiah 10:2-5 (NKJV)
  2. Langer, William L. (1940); Stearns, Peter N. (ed. 2001). The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, chronologically arranged. Houghton Mifflin. p. 37.
  3. Kohlberg, Lawrence (1976). “Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach”. In Lickona, T. Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. Holt, NY: Rinehart and Winston.
  4. Coots, John Frederick and Gillespie, Haven (1934). Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town.

Book Review: The Euro

The Euro is a book about the shortcomings of the eurozone currency project by American economist Joseph Stiglitz. The book makes a case against many of the policies pursued by European leaders thus far and recommends several alternatives, including further integration, a flexible euro, and the exit of one or more members. The book is divided into twelve chapters which explore different aspects of the problem and possible solutions.

A short preface details Stiglitz’s view of the economic problems of Europe as being largely attributable to the creation of a single currency zone without the creation of other institutions that are found in other such places elsewhere in the world. He compares the euro to the gold standard, repeating the flawed mainstream view that deflation is bad. His Keynesian approach to economics and thoroughly statist worldview is apparent from the beginning. That being said, Stiglitz appears to want to solve problems and correctly identifies some people and institutions as being uninterested in doing so.

The opening section begins with a chapter that expands upon the preface and outlines the rest of the book. There is little here that is not covered in greater detail later, so let us move on. In Chapter 2, Stiglitz argues that the poor results of the euro should have been expected because economic integration of this sort cannot come before political integration. Here, he contends that military might no longer shapes outcomes as it once did, but this is dubious because nothing short of a nuclear exchange that no one wants could have stopped the United States from conquering and colonizing Iraq if that had been the intention and American leadership had used its full power. So too for Russia in Ukraine and Crimea. His responses to other arguments for a single currency make more sense. He states the fallacious mainstream position on public goods, claiming without logic or evidence that it is impossible for markets to provide basic research and common utilities. This amounts to a confusion of collective action with state action. Even so, Stiglitz does recognize that localization is better than central planning from afar, though his disdain for German policies makes him inconsistent on this point. He then turns to economic integration, discussing the importance of German history with hyperinflation and its prominent role in modern Europe for understanding the European Central Bank. Next, Stiglitz writes about effect that a shared currency has on economic integration, which is mixed. Like many Keynesians, he accuses the market of failure when this is actually impossible; such events are actually failures of government, resources, or individual people. He also regards economics as scientific, even though the scientific method cannot be applied to subjects in which counterfactuals are so important but also unobservable. As usual, the word ‘neoliberal’ says more about the person using it than anything else. He concludes by arguing that there is a democratic deficit in Europe, even though he argues elsewhere in the book against incentive structures which are necessarily part of any democracy.

Europe’s lackluster economic performance since the 2008 crisis is the subject of the third chapter. Stiglitz begins by claiming that Keynesianism is a success because it has lengthened business cycles and shortened downturns, but it has also made the downturns that do occur so much worse that markets were better off before such interventionism. Much of the chapter consists of empirical data for Europe since 2007. When discussing unemployment, he seems not to recognize that unemployment benefits subsidize a negative behavior and will thus produce more of that behavior. Stiglitz relies upon the Gini coefficient when discussing inequality, which is a faulty metric because it measures pre-tax income rather than after-tax consumption. This causes it to exaggerate the amount of income inequality. His detailing of the long-term adverse effects of recession in terms of destroyed human capital is largely correct, but he again recommends interventionism that tends to worsen such problems. He also takes the position that the state should protect those at the economic bottom, though almost every economist would avoid social Darwinism on this front. Stiglitz then commits a fixed pie fallacy by arguing that trade surpluses necessarily cause trade deficits elsewhere, when the reality is quite different. He concludes by correctly noting that the counterfactuals help critics of the euro, and that there is no better explanation for many of Europe’s troubles than sharing a common currency across uncommon societies and economies.

The second section argues that the euro suffers from a flawed initial design. In Chapter 4, the requirements for a single currency region to be successful are considered. Here, Stiglitz uplifts full employment and market stability as goals while denouncing those who favor economic freedom as a “lunatic fringe.” This leads him to contemplate a false dilemma between national control of money and supranational control. He blames market fundamentalism (which he calls neoliberalism) for the crisis of 2008, despite the fact that markets were altered by central bankers in such a way as to cause the crash, which he all but says elsewhere. In explaining the differences between the United States and the eurozone, Stiglitz highlights the freer movement of Americans, the identity of Americans at the national level rather than the state level (at least in modern times), and the federal nature of monetary and fiscal stimulus. He is correct to say that there must either be “more Europe” or “less Europe,” but sides with the former. He describes the Keynesian theory of business cycles, but makes no mention of the Austrian theory. Stiglitz then repeats the tired fallacy that austerity caused the Great Depression and the current malaise, rather than central bank shenanigans and tariff policies. His blame for the gold standard is similarly misguided. He somewhat fixes an error from the previous chapter by clarifying that trade imbalances are not a problem if currency exchange rates can change to compensate for them. He straw-mans the laissez-faire position on unemployment by saying that it views unemployment due to market adjustments as good rather than as simply necessary. Stiglitz then gets a few points correct: low wages undermine worker morale and productivity, falling wages may not amount to falling prices if firms are worried about their solvency, and monetary stimulus has a breaking point at which interest rates cannot be lowered further. But he again blames the private sector for being excessive when it is only reacting to perverse incentives created by governments and central banks. There is little to fault in Stiglitz’s explanation of why currency areas are prone to crisis except for the preceding error, but it never occurs to him to simply not have such an area. The chapter ends by repeating many of the fallacious arguments from the previous chapter concerning trade surpluses and deficits.

The fifth chapter considers the economic divergence of the eurozone countries. Stiglitz argues in favor of institutional frameworks to prevent the need for bailouts, as well as funds to make depositors whole and provide bailouts. This ignores the moral hazard created by such a regime that causes bankers to take excessive risks, as well as the powerful incentives that an absence of protection would have on depositors to act responsibly and hold bankers accountable. His view of regulation is starry-eyed, missing the entire concept of regulatory capture. This is especially striking, given his focus on institutional capture in the following chapter. Stiglitz rightly complains of capitalized gains and socialized losses among bankers. In his consideration of other sources of divergence, he again fails to consider the possibility of turning over infrastructure to private development, instead proposing expansion of the European Investment Bank, which is certain to become another statist boondoggle. His view of knowledge markets is flawed in the same manner as his view of economies; it fails to account for the distortions that statism necessarily causes which lead to various types of failure. He concludes the chapter by showing how policies in the eurozone have caused greater instability, but cannot seem to avoid blaming the private sector for responding to the incentives imposed upon it.

In Chapter 6, Stiglitz examines the European Central Bank. He begins by saying that open markets and free competition can efficiently allocate resources only in the presence of adequate government regulation. This is a contradiction because an absence of government regulation defines an open market with free competition. His arguments concerning the inflation-only mandate of the ECB and the problems it causes would be much stronger if the Austrian business cycle theory were anywhere to be found in the book. His description of events in Chile under Pinochet does not agree with the long-term result of economic prosperity relative to the rest of South America and neglects how much worse conditions would have been under Salvador Allende. His claim that markets are supposed to be efficient and stable are a straw man; instability in the form of creative destruction and inefficiency by some metrics rather than others are inherent in a market economy. Stiglitz correctly writes that monetary policy is always a political question, pitting creditors against debtors for control of the central bank. But he leaves unclear how democracy is supposed to hold central bankers accountable. He also must not know any libertarians, or he would know that some people have proposed taking away spending power from governments to ensure that they do not misbehave. The chapter ends with a history of fashionable central bank policies over time and what was wrong with them from a Keynesian perspective.

The next two chapters delve into the Greek situation in particular, as Greece has suffered a more severe economic crisis than any other eurozone country. The seventh chapter explores the effect that the Troika’s policies had on countries in crisis. Stiglitz accuses some European leaders of acting in bad faith by purposefully attempting to punish governments with different political views from their own, which may be accurate. He continues his misguided attack on austerity, though it has more merit against what Europeans have actually done than against real austerity. He correctly explains the problem with primary surpluses, but then commits the broken window fallacy by embracing Keynesian multipliers. Stiglitz accurately diagnoses the problems of increasing taxes, but seeks to aid governments in collecting them rather than encourage economic freedom and stronger property rights. He describes his ideal system of property taxation in the same tone that a proud and unrepentant thief might use to boast of his crimes. Although he is correct to say that particular moves toward privatization and economic freedom may produce adverse results in particular contexts, this is a justification not for state intervention, but for undoing even more statism so as to remove the problematic context. Stiglitz notes that the hegemony of American military power has put Europe into a Pax Romana problem in which it cannot fend for itself against a real threat, but advises that this problem be worsened in the name of fiscal restraint. He compares reductions in pensions to wage theft when the two are clearly different. It is the responsibility of workers to figure out that they are being offered terms which may be impossible for the employer to meet in the future and practice caveat emptor. As for bank bailouts and debt restructuring, Stiglitz describes the situation well except for his faulty view of austerity.

Chapter 8 delves into structural reforms in Greece that made matters worse. Again, Stiglitz’s views of austerity and democracy corrupt an otherwise sound analysis of trivial and counterproductive actions taken by the Troika. He claims without proof that industrial policies are required to advance countries that are lagging behind in technological development, neglecting that markets are not doing this because they are either disallowed from doing so or are assuming that the state will do this for them. He criticizes intergenerational transmission of advantage and seeks to use the state against it, when it should be championed as both eugenic and important for maintaining a natural aristocracy. Stiglitz argues for a price on carbon emissions and claims that the private sector will not address climate change, when again the state has kept this from happening. He finishes by discussing counterfactuals, which is interesting given his empiricist thinking on economics.

The final four chapters deal with various proposals going forward. In the ninth chapter, Stiglitz offers his advice for fixing the eurozone. As before, he embraces what Henry Hazlitt called “the fetish of full employment” as the goal of his policy proposals. Much of the content of the chapter rehashes proposals from previous chapters. He seeks to create common deposit insurance and common resolution while abolishing place-based debt within the EU. This will create moral hazards and work against people who wish to escape debt slavery inflicted upon them by their ancestors. He calls for wages to be raised in countries with surpluses, which will lead to unemployment in those countries as workers whose labor is not worth higher wages are laid off. He fundamentally misunderstands precious metals, failing to understand their role as a store of value and medium of exchange, even if no longer officially used in such capacities. Stiglitz seeks to make the financial sector and other corporations serve society, but fails to recognize that the organs of a statist social order inherently and irrevocably serve themselves at the expense of the society. The shortsightedness of markets of which he complains is actually caused by the institutions that he seeks to use to solve the problem. One of the few sound recommendations made in this chapter is the creation of a super-Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure to quickly restructure debt. He goes on to propose that EU taxes be based on citizenship, and that some of the proceeds be used for foreign aid or resettlement of migrants, further impoverishing and culturally endangering Europeans.

Chapter 10 examines the possibility of what Stiglitz calls “an amicable divorce,” in which countries exit the eurozone. He considers the example of Grexit, or Greece returning to its own currency that he calls the Greek-euro but would probably be called the drachma, as it was before the euro. He proposes that Greece create a new electronic currency to ease concerns over producing coins and banknotes, stop tax avoidance, bring everyone into the financial system, and facilitate the ability of central banks to create credit. Stiglitz fails to consider that people are likely to reject such a system in favor of cryptocurrencies, which have all of the benefits of such a system without most of the drawbacks, and that such a system could offer states tyrannical control over their citizens. His view of credit indicates magical thinking, although this is quite common in modern financial circles. He again blames the private sector for problems caused by politicians and central bankers, while ignoring peer-to-peer lending as a substitute for modern credit systems. Stiglitz describes a potential system of credit auctions which could be abused with much the same ease as the current system. He admits and supports what should be abhorrent to any decent person: that fiat currencies are ultimately given value by extortion in the form of taxation. Stiglitz correctly says that a new Greek currency would enable them to devalue it to correct trade imbalances, but his proposed system of trade tokens for the same purpose would be redundant. He equates deflation with a deficiency of aggregate demand, neglecting the possibilities of an abundance of supply or improvements in efficiency and/or quality. His description of currency change as a debt restructuring is insightful. To end the chapter, Stiglitz considers the alternative of Germany leaving the eurozone, though it is unlikely that they would give up their current position of power so willingly. This segues into the topic of the next chapter, which is a flexible euro consisting of several subdivisions.

Stiglitz uses Finland as a counterexample against those who claim that profligacy in southern Europe is to blame, rather than the structure of the eurozone. Most of his argument here is correct, except for his view of austerity. His proposal in this chapter is to have several eurozones with fluctuating exchange rates, which could be brought closer together over time as political integration occurs, eventually resulting in economic integration. The details are borrowed from the previous two chapters. Though more likely to succeed than the proposals in those chapters, it is also the least likely to be adopted. Stiglitz correctly recognizes that having a single currency area is an interference in the market in and of itself, monopolizing exchange and interest rates in the area, but cannot seem to fathom that his flexible euro proposal also does this on a smaller scale. He claims that it can be better not to simply rely on prices for the allocation of resources, but does not explain how to solve the local knowledge problem or the economic calculation problem in a superior manner. He also says that history shows free banking to be a disaster, when the truth is quite the opposite.

The final chapter sees Stiglitz review many themes from previous chapters, but he also covers topics which are barely mentioned elsewhere. He denounces anti-immigrant groups in Europe, which are only trying to resist demographic replacement by a ruling class that they did not ask to replace them. So much for the “democratic accountability” that Stiglitz extols in the same breath. He blames right-wing economic ideology for rising inequality in the United States beginning with the Reagan administration, but incomes really began to diverge ten years earlier, when Nixon ended the gold standard. Stiglitz expresses a desire to preserve the Enlightenment values of Europe, but cannot comprehend how letting in migrants with distinctly anti-Enlightenment values will jeopardize that mission. On the issue of trade policy, he understands that free trade is not always best for all parties involved, as it can destroy important societal arrangements that prevent conflict. But then Stiglitz incredulously asks how one could have expected that Europe’s leaders would create such economic dysfunction, with massive unemployment and lack of economic security. The answer is that a proper amount of cynicism would require such an expectation.

Overall, the best thing that can be said for the book is that it is not an effort made in bad faith. Stiglitz correctly identifies many of the problems with the current state of affairs in Europe and seems to want to help, but his proposed solutions are thoroughly misguided. Despite his palpable disdain for Milton Friedman and other Chicago School monetarists, he suffers from one of the worst of their faults: a desire to solve the immediate problems set before him combined with a lack of broader perspective. This leads him to propose a banking system which could be used to terrible effect against political dissidents, tax collection schemes that would indicate criminal intent in any non-statist context, and forced political integration by means of stealth and subterfuge. He also seems to believe that everything would be fine if only state power were used by the right people to implement the right policies. It never occurs to him that the power itself might be the problem. The Euro is an interesting case study in leftist economic thought, but those looking for real solutions to Europe’s economic woes should keep looking.

Rating: 2.5/5

The Case for Autostatism

Author’s note: The reader can find everything else I have written about the concept of autostatism here.

Introduction

Libertarians have always had ambitions that are both universalist and purist. Most libertarians are willing to admit that their vision will not be realizable in their own lifetimes and rather hope that future generations are wiser than they themselves have been. These libertarians take an approach that could only be considered rational when one takes into account the very nature of libertarianism. The search for liberty means always fighting against tremendous odds, as many people care more about increasing their personal power than about liberty. Power is a great direct gain, while liberty is a diffused social gain. This insight, combined with the logic of public choice, tells us that when people seek power, they are more likely to attain it than those who want to destroy power are to destroy it. These people seek power for themselves by being parasites on others, which is generally incompatible with achieving liberty.

The achievement of a libertarian social order requires collective motivation on a scale that is only present when the state has become so oppressive as to be intolerable. The state has adapted to this and tries very hard to avoid any loss of power by being as tolerable as possible and making its operations as covert as possible while openly integrating themselves into the lives of everyone. This helps the state remain an unambiguous sovereign and appear to be a fundamental condition of life from which it is hard to deviate psychologically and intellectually. The modern state makes itself into a leviathan not by lording over people, but rather by integrating itself into the population. This process is neither peaceful nor painless; the methods by which the state integrates itself into a society must be fundamentally based on indoctrination and coercion. But once sufficiently advanced, the state becomes a fact of life that is almost incontestable by any rational person, and support for the abolition of the state will be extremely sparse. Thus it is possible to say that up to a point, the more oppressive a state is, the more it can be expected to have popular support.

Collective Separation

The main premise from which the strategy of autostatism is derived from is that separating ourselves into multiple autonomous governments or stateless localities is a necessary precondition for abolishing the central state. In modern democracies, all sides of all conflicts are under immense pressure and are thus very hostile towards everyone with whom they are in conflict. Since all issues are to be decided by all people in a democracy, the people who have their lives questioned will be the people who resist those who challenge their ability to live their own lives as they please. Note that in a healthy social order, the challengers themselves would be the imperiled group. From this comes a desire to separate from the hostile factors that are directly antagonistic to the individual’s lifestyle and property. There is no reconciliation or common ground within the framework of democracy because democracy intentionally creates unresolvable antagonisms. The common decision-making process is irreconcilable with personal liberty. Having the masses govern the masses thus becomes a self-reinforcing structure of creeping totalitarianism.

This does not necessarily mean that the correct answer to the problems of democracy is statist fascism or monarchism, as the conflicts are still present but heavily suppressed, although a case could still be made for these kinds of states. Even though autocracy has a better incentive structure than democracy in most cases, the state is not the answer to all problems within democracy. Neither is a lack of state; when libertarians think that full rights in property will properly resolve all conflicts, they assume that all people desire to have full rights in their own property. The problem is then a conflict of whether or not there should be complete property rights or whether property rights ought to be limited for the sake of the common good. This is the question of whether property creates society or vice versa.

The answer to this fundamental conflict is the autostate. This is the practical, but largely forgotten notion of governance based on actual consent. The word “autostate” means a government by the self. It can also be explained as a state formed from autonomy. The fundamental difference between a state and an autostate is that the foundational principle of the autostate is that the system of governance ought to require the consent of everyone who is governed. If no such consent is acquired, the government must be invalid and must fall into internal conflict. The notions of tacit or implicit consent that play a prominent role in social contract theory only serve to elevate the conflict inherent in any system of compulsion and suppression.

Since an autostate has the unanimous consent of everyone governed by it, it functions as any other entity on the market. However, instead of a consumer good or a conventional service, the autostate provides governance, which is to say a legal framework and a means of enforcement. Many libertarians are caught up in a fantasy in which all governance is evil. Most people do not agree with that assessment and want to put together a semblance of a social and political order so they can realize their vision for what virtue and political organization should be.

Powerless Politics

The fundamental tenet of autostatism is that the government ought to be completely powerless and can only enact those edicts which people find to be tolerable or benevolent. If this is no longer the case, the autostate could be overthrown without any risk or violence. It is necessary to distinguish between a government and a state. A government is the manager of a land area while a state holds a monopoly of compulsion and coercion. Thus, the autostate is a government, but not a conventional state. The autostate fundamentally requires consent, and consent can be revoked when the autostate stops diligently fulfilling the duties that it has taken upon itself. The autostate can be fascist, socialist, or anarchist in nature and it does not need to have any formal structure at all. What matters is that this structure or lack thereof is first agreed upon. Many anarchists and libertarians see this as conflicting with spontaneous order, but the natural condition of society is deliberate action building upon spontaneous order. It does no good to assume that one system or another is objectively part of human existence.

Furthermore, the prevailing law system in any area is more powerful and consistent if all people within that area follow the same system. This does not mean that autostates need to be dependent on physical area, but autostates are composed of the individuals who subscribe to the legal structure of the autostate. The autostate is simply the reduction of governance to a market entity and the elimination of coercion within governance. However, the autostate can retain the political and personal values that people want to have enacted. The autostatist order can thus be acceptable to everyone who is not wholly influenced by their desire for power or domination. Autostatism can let everyone accomplish their utopian political structure unless it involves the direct subjugation of others. It allows for people to have their own ideals realized in a manner that does not impose costs on those who do not share these ideals.

In essence, autostatism calls for an abolition of competitive politics for the implementation of cooperative politics. Politics should not be a matter of majority consensus but rather the implementation of mutually agreed upon social goals. The politics right now are imposed upon an unwilling population; the politics of autostatism are collaborative and voluntaristic. This can be called either an abolition of politics or a revolution within the nature of politics. Politics should not imply coercive governance, but cooperation for the achievement of mutual goals. It may be true that these mutual goals are reprehensible to others, or that some people will not want to participate in seeking these goals, but the goals themselves are not a threat within the autostatist order because they are strictly confined within consensual relations. These consensual relations mimic governance in the traditional sense, yet they require no authority insofar as that authority is derived from force and compulsion. The autostate as a concept itself allows for a reconciliation between anarchists, libertarians, socialists, conservatives, and every other group that is able to be so intellectually honest as to admit that they are better off when they have their own ideal structures implemented.

Stateless Governance

Stateless governance may seem like an ultimate nonsensical contradiction. When there is no state, the government supposedly lacks the power to do what it needs to do. And within libertarian circles, the government is seen as an inherently coercive and violent entity. Thus, stateless governance seems impossible. But we must realize that without a state, the government is nothing other than a manager of a certain society or community. If a government is a voluntarily funded managerial entity which only ensures that the social order is kept functional, there is nothing inherently unethical about that government. A critique of the state cannot be a critique of governance, as the governance is derivative of the state only in modern society.

The distinctly libertarian view that all governance and control over an individual are inherently evil, and we should all be free and not tied to any obligation, is naive and unrealizable. Most people do not want to fully determine the path of their lives and do not want others to do so either. People have values that go beyond individual liberty and they want to exercise those values. The reality is that most people want society and themselves to be controlled, appealing to liberty as an ultimate end is only convincing when appealing to people who would inevitably become libertarians themselves if given enough time to reflect on their beliefs. We must acknowledge that government is not something that is inherently evil, but rather a tool that can be used for the accomplishment of certain goals. However, when the government is tied to a state, it will be fundamentally exploitative, as the incentive structures allow for such exploitation and cater to those who would engage in such behavior. The problem is statism and not governance.

Fourth-Wave Libertarianism

Libertarianism is currently in a serious identity crisis. To explain this, let us begin by sorting the development of libertarianism into four different periods. The first period was the classical liberal era, in which the primary conflict was between the liberals and the mercantilist-feudalist tendencies within the social order. Between the high point of the first period and the high point of the second period, there were the Anglophone anarchists. People such as Lysander Spooner and Benjamin Tucker developed a theory of natural law and individualist anarchism which would later be adopted in part by Rothbard. Although integral for the development of the third wave in libertarianism, they were not influences on the later or earlier thinkers. The second period was the most desperate period, in which Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, and Ayn Rand were the most active and the period in which the groundwork was laid for the modern libertarian movement. This was the active defense against communism and socialism as they were becoming the dominant forces in the world. This was followed with the wave of libertarianism that had Rothbard at the forefront. This was a drastic attack against the state itself that went beyond the anti-socialism of the previous wave. The third wave accumulated thinkers such as Hans-Hermann Hoppe and Walter Block, and reached a somber crescendo with the campaigns of Ron Paul. The neoliberal movement was also created at this time, although this movement does not follow the particular development of libertarianism and as such is excluded.

Each of these waves has a distinct attitude, and all of them shared the consistent strategy of trying to reach libertarianism by being the most reasonable and intellectual people. But this only works when libertarians are attacking something dangerous and imminent; the success was not due to rationality, but due to how threatening the opposition was. However, there is an emergent fourth wave, and although Hoppe falls solidly in the third wave of thinkers, he is either the eminent inspiration or the primary intra-movement antagonist for most of the fourth wave. These fourth-wave thinkers do not stick to political or economic issues, but rather involve social issues at the core of libertarianism and do not allow for libertarianism to be nihilistic without properly defined morality and values. The classical liberalism of the previous waves is also under scrutiny, with some calling for a more positive outlook on reactionary thought.

Since libertarians are split into the left, right, and neither camps when it comes to social and cultural values, the fourth wave is in a disorganized and dysfunctional crisis. If we wish to preserve the libertarian tradition, we need thinkers who can unite the libertarians who want to preserve the social orders that they value alongside the purist notion of liberty. Fourth-wave libertarianism must make a drastic change and must use different tactics than the last three waves. Libertarians have always been best when they face significant issues and behemoths that seem to be immortal, and there is no larger challenge today than forced integration and coercive democracy. Autostatism offers an answer to these issues that neither the status quo nor more conventionally purist libertarians can.

How To Argue Against Modern Anti-Capitalism

Socialism is dead. This can be contended and debated, but I would assert that socialism as a pure doctrine has been defeated. The original form of socialism is barely, if at all, relevant to modern politics or economics. Almost no one goes against markets, money, property, or economic liberty on principle in the 21st century. Socialist policy has thus become a matter of pragmatism and not philosophy. One may argue that any degree of statism is socialism, but socialism as it was in the 19th and 20th centuries is no longer a threat in the Western world. Almost no person wants a command economy and no one says that the price system should be completely replaced by central planning. Only the most fringe radicals say that there should be no property and that the proletariat should have free access to capital and consumer goods.

The socialism that Mises described and the socialism that the early libertarian movement viciously attacked has long since disappeared from the common political sphere. There are still radicals who are true socialists, but even most self-described socialists have adopted positions that are in opposition to state socialism and planned command economies. The usefulness of the market in deciding the allocation of goods is almost universally recognized and economics no longer has a large current of pure socialism running through it. The closest school of thought in mainstream economics to actual socialism is post-Keynesianism, which is still quasi-capitalist. Although there are still a few socialist experiments, only Cuba and North Korea manage to remain truly and properly communist. One could argue that North Korea is just as fascist as communist, and that some other small states like Laos still retain communism. But when one looks at official state ideologies and their practice, these are the two most communist states. The Western world has fully embraced economic liberalism, although liberalism now has an inherent focus on welfarism alongside economic freedom.

By using welfare, workplace democracy, or other methods that preserve the market system, the modern anti-capitalist tries to create what they call a mixed economy. This mixed economy is supposed to be a combination of socialism and capitalism, but in reality it is trying to achieve the moral goals of socialism while still retaining the benefits of a capitalist economy. Trying to create this balance between socialism and capitalism results in a system that is still fundamentally capitalist. However, this capitalist system is restricted and encumbered by various reforms and privileges granted to favored groups. Modern anti-capitalism is no longer anti-capitalist, but simply capitalism with additional fetters. The Nordic countries are the only Western countries that socialists can point to, and they have relatively laissez-faire principles outside of the welfare state. And even the Nordic welfare states were previously balanced by the relatively high trust and high quality populations. This may be related to eugenics or other factors that make these countries different. The success of these countries is certainly despite the massive social democracies that they have in place. The only arguments that are being had concern the degree to which capitalism ought to be allowed to operate before it is restricted. The conflict is really about how capitalism ought to be improved and not whether to transform the economy into a socialist one. People who continue to call themselves socialists are far removed from what socialists used to be.

Cause for Optimism

Even traditional Keynesianism is nowhere in sight; the Keynesian assumptions still underline mainstream economic theory and some Keynesians are extremely prominent, but no one outside the Cathedral really argues for Keynesianism. There are new Keynesianism and neo-Keynesianism, which distance themselves from original Keynesianism and take a slightly more market-oriented approach. Even though Keynesianism was somewhat resurrected by the economic crash, it died again soon after. The far-left and the far-right are attempting to resurrect the theory again, but thus far they have had little luck in actually doing so.

Traditional Keynesianism is no longer a dominant paradigm, but rather confined to the spheres of radical Internet politics and extremely well-connected and state-sponsored academics. This does not mean that everyone is suddenly a libertarian; far from it. However, if a time traveler were to go back to the 1950s and tell Mises and Hayek that 60 years later, labor unions would be in decline, mainstream economics would not be hostile to the market economy, planned economies would be out of fashion, the government would not be seen as a god, and that the greatest current enemy to capitalism is universal healthcare, they would be extremely relieved.

Current Threats Against Capitalism

Since there is no organized and consistent opposition to capitalism as a whole in eminent positions or the common conscience, the threats against capitalism have become those parties which aim to limit capitalism rather than those that aim to entirely smash the capitalist system. Libertarians tend to be incredibly pessimistic and assume that the success of socialist propaganda with young people is indicative of a return to the old Communist Party, but it is actually just a desire for a more prominent central regulatory system and an increase in welfarism. There is no concentrated desire to end the market system as a whole. This is because it has been demonstrated that ending capitalism ends in ruin no matter what. The establishment media may try to downplay this as much as possible, but the common person knows that any system that is anti-capitalist ends in death and starvation. The foremost threat to capitalism is not that the state will exist or that some people seriously favor syndicalism, but that the state will gain an increasing mandate to restrict capitalism to the point that we are back to full socialism without realizing it.

Defending Capitalism

Libertarians tend to spend a lot of time in intellectual circles and on the Internet, the two places in which there still are dedicated socialists. The existence of socialists on the Internet and in intellectual circles does not demonstrate that anyone actually values old-style socialism in the real world. The word ‘socialism’ is still anathema for many of the older generation. Even worse, the continuous protest against socialism only serves as to make the modern form of socialism, which consists of taxing the rich so the rest of society can receive welfare handouts, more radical and rebellious. This is not an actual threat against the capitalist system itself, but rather a threat to the free and unrestrained capitalism that libertarians favor. But libertarians are still overly focused on the 20th-century phenomena of intellectually pure socialism and Keynesianism, and thus associate the relatively market-friendly social democrats and new Keynesians with the original socialist and Keynesian platforms. Libertarians need to acknowledge that the modern opponents of capitalism do not think like their predecessors.

Since free marketeers have won the ideological debate, it is better to focus on the debate over restrictions imposed upon capitalism. One often hears that capitalism is good up to a point but needs to be restricted. Most people have their own preconceived boundaries, past which they cannot see how capitalism can work. Modern anti-capitalism will not be defeated by talking about lower tax rates or less regulation. It will also not be defeated by defending capitalism on principle. Instead, it is necessary to demonstrate how capitalism can solve problems and how the state fails to do so. Appealing to regulation or taxes will always come across as deliberately reducing the burden on those who are privileged in society and not caring about the poorest and the weakest. This feeds into the moral sentiment from which anti-capitalism arises. Libertarians must make sure that people do not automatically assume that capitalism should be subordinated to the state at the certain occasions in which they think that it does not work. Empirical demonstration will be more convincing than arguing based on principles and abstractions. It is vital to demonstrate how capitalism can solve the problems people think it creates. We should not work on what is irrelevant to average people, but rather focus on the reasons they oppose capitalism. People rightly do not want to be oppressed and exploited by their bosses, health insurance providers, or Internet service providers. This means that we need to ensure that people do not associate pure capitalism with being oppressed and exploited by those with economic pre-eminence.

Many people currently favor free healthcare, central banking, extensive welfare, workplace safety regulations, and other conveniences. The goal should not be to tell these people about how the wondrous forces of the free market will fix all their problems, but rather demonstrate how the state is not effective at providing these services and how unrestrained capitalism is theoretically capable of doing so. An appeal to the invisible hand setting a rational economic order is not poignant when these people already acknowledge that the capitalist market system is the best system for accomplishing most goals. They accept that the capitalist premises are correct but simply refuse to follow through in certain areas. People are completely aware of why capitalism benefits them, as Westerners live in overwhelmingly capitalist societies.

There are countries in which there is an increasing opposition to capitalism, but these are isolated places and do not reflect the paradigm across most of the West. It is unnecessary to prove how capitalism can function; we need to prove what capitalism can do. Modern anti-capitalism is a very weak form of anti-capitalism, clinging onto the emotional appeal that it still has and nothing more. If we are able to defeat this aspect of anti-capitalism, we will be the closest we have been to a full acceptance of capitalism since the 19th century.

Conclusion

Education is not sufficient for creating a libertarian society, but it is necessary. Libertarian language and arguments are still tailored to those who oppose capitalism on principle and not anti-capitalists who think capitalism is a mostly decent system. This is improving somewhat, but there are very few systematic works that show how capitalism can properly solve issues and how the state is not a virtuous or effective mechanism. The people who promote capitalism as a definitive solution and not an ideal are few and far between. We do not need to show how capitalism can cause a general increase in the quality of living, as this is already known. Our current ideological opponents are the people who believe in the new neo-classical synthesis, the people who ask about how libertarians think roads would work and the people who think that healthcare gets expensive in a free market. These are not people who hate capitalism and the free market; they are not dedicated socialists or Keynesians; they are people who know how capitalism increases their quality of living.

To protect capitalism, we need to focus on furthering it because restriction is the only way in which capitalism is actually threatened. Fighting socialism is not completely useless, but the purpose of doing so should be to demonstrate how the socialist dogma is wrong to those who could be swayed by socialist moralism. We also need to talk to people in person; we cannot contain our arguments to fringe radicals on the Internet. Convincing someone is almost always impossible if there is no real conversation with that person. We should make sure that the line people draw of what capitalism is capable of is the closest it can be to the full and pure form of capitalism.