On Individualism and Nationalism

One of the most common sentiments expressed by both individualists and nationalists is that these two perspectives are incompatible. It is supposedly impossible to both prioritize the well-being of the singular individual and the well-being of the nation. No matter if the charge is being an anti-social, politically autistic individualist or a collectivist nationalist, there is a tremendous amount of hostility between the adherents of these ideas. If one wants theoretical reasons for why individualism and nationalism are supposedly incompatible, one must analyze the objections from both sides and consider what it means to be an individualist and a nationalist, respectively.

The Individualists

The doctrine of individualism rests on a fundamental assumption that in both theoretical and practical matters, an appropriate guideline is the primacy of the individual. Collectives are not immoral or illogical, but all collectives are ultimately reducible to the actions of individuals. Since societies are determined by individuals and not vice versa, it must also be the case that individuals are responsible for the health of societies. By this standard, there can never be any attempt to increase the health of a society by suppressing the individual. Individualism also implies that each individual ought to be judged by one’s own actions. This means that an entire society should not be glorified for the actions of a heroic individual within that society, and an individual should not be held accountable for deeds done by others in the society who claim to act on behalf of all.

This supposedly creates a fundamental incompatibility between individualism and nationalism, as nationalism judges individuals by their collective affiliations. Nationalism discriminates according to national origin, even though a person does not choose one’s heritage. Individuals become tied to a collective and are discriminated either for or against by collective preference, regardless of their individual goals and deeds. This is contrary to individualism because it subordinates individuals to the national collective. Individuals have their opportunities reduced or expanded, and their persons degraded or elevated due to being considered part of a nation. Furthermore, some forms of nationalism aim to practically reduce the role of individual choices and increase the role of national choices. Even worse, a significant amount of nationalist philosophies are thoroughly anti-individualist, so nationalism as a political force can be contrary to individualism as a political force.

The Nationalists

At its core, nationalism is a focus on the advancement of the nation, either in relation to other nations, the history of the nation, or some goal set by the ruling class. Nationalism can manifest as imperialist expansionism, progressive isolationism, or anything between. This contrasts with internationalism, which does not aim to advance nations on their own but rather a collaboration of nations. Internationalism holds that the advancement of individual nations is irrelevant when contrasted with the advancement of supranational aims. These may be ending global poverty, establishing a worldwide economy, or simply putting in place a pan-European superstate. Nationalism and internationalism are not ideologies, but rather manifestations of special interests by different groups. Many ideological positions inherently incorporate internationalism or nationalism, but neither position becomes defined by the ideologies with which they are associated.

Due to the diversity of nationalist ideology, it is difficult to define the opposition that nationalism as a whole has to individualism. One can easily critique individualism from fascist, national communist, or communitarian perspectives, but there is no singular nationalist critique of individualism. There is not even a cohesive nationalist critique of anything (is imperialism nationalist or internationalist?). If individualism advances the nation more than any other form of social organization, then any good nationalist ought to favor individualism. For this reason, a nationalist cannot properly judge individualism to be completely incompatible with nationalism. The most coherent argument against individualism from a nationalist standpoint is that the focus on individual desires and aims will always create a society in which the organization of the nation can never advance. The sort of non-conformity and disorder that individualism can bring will never form a national identity that can be on par with more collectivist societies. But this is not a cogent or complete critique for the reasons elaborated on below.

A Synthesis

To prove that an integration of nationalism and individualism is possible, one must prove that individualism advances the nation and that nationalism is not necessarily based on individual submission. This can effectively defeat the criticisms of nationalism advanced by individualists and the criticisms of individualism advanced by nationalists. Although this cannot explain why individualists should support nationalism, it can demonstrate that individualists could support nationalism.

First, one must demonstrate how internationalism is held up by a fundamentally collectivist attitude, and how true internationalism can never be replicated under individualist conditions. The ideology of internationalism is derived from the egalitarian notion that all individuals, no matter their culture, genetics, history, or language, are equally valuable and united by their common humanity. But this is the worst form of collectivism, a collectivism that spans the entirety of the globe. The extent of this collectivism is so vast that many even confuse it with individualism. This collectivism completely ignores subjective valuations and assumes that the value of all persons is some objective matter.

Many classical liberals and libertarians fail to understand that internationalism is collectivist. Universalism, humanitarianism, and globalization are so deeply ingrained into the liberal tradition that they cannot bring themselves to question these values. In this view, all people are the same, are subject to judgment under the same higher law, and ought to cooperate for the maximum benefit of each individual. Additionally, with less institutional discrimination based on national collectives, it could only be true that internationalism is advanced when there is more individualism. But if people acknowledge that there is no common humanity, what attachments would anyone have to people with whom they have no recognizable contact? At best, internationalism can only be a pragmatic policy for individualists and not an ideological position.

If the collectivism of all peoples is the worst form of collectivism, would it not also be true that the collectivism of a single genetic and historical group is similarly undesirable? This is the second question in need of an answer: why is nationalism not the same sort of collectivism that internationalism is? The answer to this is fairly simple. The definition of a nation has two important conditions which must hold true. First, positive externalities must accumulate easily. Since people within a nation share physical, economic, and cultural connections, the people within that nation all benefit when single people benefit. When there are more rich people in China, very few people benefit in Oregon. The profits from trade and commerce from China only make up a small part of the goods to which the people in Oregon have access. However, if there is more economic advancement in Oregon and if more wealth accumulates to individuals in Oregon, then many Oregonians can expect to benefit. Likewise, advancements of the culture in Tibet do not necessarily mean that those living in Hong Kong benefit from a better culture. All of these groups have more and stronger internal connections compared to their external connections with other groups. Each individual is incentivized to look after their own group or groups rather than concern themselves with the welfare of out-groups. This is especially true whenever there is a democratic state, as all groups will aim to gain access to the powers of the state for their own benefit.

Internationalism requires collectivism based on a fictitious idea of humanity. This is not to dismiss the notion of biological incentives shared across all human groups or a natural law that should apply to all. Rather, this is a recognition that in the real world, there are natural incentives for cooperation between nations but none for global unity. One could also say that the smallest possible group is the individual and as such, independence is best for the advancement of an individual. But interpersonal and economic relations are vital to sustain a society, and these are most effective within a small community no larger than a historical city-state. Decentralized nationalism is tremendously beneficial to individuals, and it is perfectly individualist to support voluntary nationalism of this kind. Furthermore, this creates a spontaneous national order in which voluntary individual actions advance the nation as they advance the goals of the individuals. This means that there is no need to force people to be nationalists.

The second important aspect of a nation ties together with the first. Within each nation, the transaction costs are reduced as language barriers, geographical barriers, cultural incompatibility, and a lack of trust are all lesser problems. When all else is equal, it is always preferable to work inside one’s own nation. Thus, free trade should be understood in the context of cooperation between nations and not as something that supersedes nations. The incentive structure in a free market system favors local exchanges and high-trust networks. Therefore, it must be true that individualism advances nationalism and that individuals do not need to submit to their nation and give up their own self-interest to be nationalists.

The Case for Individualist Nationalism

It has been demonstrated that individualism will lead to nationalist ends, and that nationalism does not require individuals to be secondary. However, this does not mean that nationalism is necessarily good. It may still true that individuals without national connections are better off than individuals who are within a connected nation. There are some ways to demonstrate how individuals can benefit from not having an institutionalized nation. However, if one is to claim that individuals are better off without national bonds, one must ignore the entire purpose for which anyone would become an individualist in the first place. Individualism supports making one’s own choices and having those choices respected. Most people will make choices that strengthen their relationships to other people in their nation. This is because the majority of people value their own nation and want to be a part of it. The vast majority of the human population has a preference for their in-group and has connections to their heritage and history. Thus, if one is to be an individualist, one must account for the fact that to most people, this means nationalism within the individualistic framework.

Although some individualists support nationalism, it does not follow that this is necessarily correct. There is no reason why an individualist ought to support nationalism in the modern sense unless one is choosing it as a lesser evil than internationalism. Furthermore, it is contradictory for individualists to support anything other than what they themselves as free individuals wish to support. Individualism, however flawed it may be, allows for each individual to choose one’s own priorities. Nationalism may be antagonistic to some and favorable to others, but the beauty of the individualist mindset is the possibility of personal choice. There is no need for a monolithic individualism; the notion that individualists all ought to think the same way and adhere to some strict principle is self-contradictory. All individualists need to respect the power of persuasion and debate while accepting that some people will make mistakes, such as a rejection of even localist forms of nationalism.

The Problems With Santa Claus

Every year on Christmas Eve, children throughout Christendom eagerly await a visit from Santa Claus. Most children are told that he visits the homes of children to place gifts under Christmas trees for good children and bring coal or sticks for bad children. While many parents may believe that this is a harmless “white lie,” there is a case to be made that the myth of Santa Claus is actually very harmful to children. Let us examine the origins of these customs and consider their ill effects.

Santa’s Origin

The original form of Santa Claus was nothing like his common appearance today, which is largely a product of Thomas Nast’s cartoons (shown above), the poetry of Clement Clark Moore, and Coca-Cola advertisements. The custom of a mythical figure placing presents under a tree dates back to the mother/child cult of Semiramis and Nimrod in ancient Babylon. The mythology says that Nimrod married his mother, setting her up as the “queen of heaven” and himself up as the “divine son of heaven.” The two of them had a son named Tammuz, a god of food and vegetation worshiped in Sumer, Akkad, Assyria, and Babylonia. Upon Nimrod’s death, Semiramis claimed to see an evergreen tree spring up to full size overnight, symbolizing the “new life of Nimrod.” She then taught Tammuz to go into forests and make offerings to his father on the day that is December 25 in the Gregorian calendar (the origin of the date of Christmas), who was now worshiped as the sun god Ba’al, the false god mentioned numerous times in the Old Testament of the Bible. The custom was known to the authors of the book of Jeremiah, which includes the following:

“Do not learn the way of the Gentiles; do not be dismayed at the signs of heaven, for the Gentiles are dismayed at them. For the customs of the peoples are futile; for one cuts a tree from the forest, the work of the hands of the workman, with the ax. They decorate it with silver and gold; they fasten it with nails and hammers so that it will not topple. They are upright, like a palm tree, and they cannot speak; they must be carried, because they cannot go by themselves. Do not be afraid of them, for they cannot do evil, nor can they do any good.”[1]

The book of Jeremiah is believed to have been written between 627 and 586 BC—six centuries before the time of Jesus—disproving any assertions that the customs surrounding Christmas were an invention of Christians. Nimrod was also known as Santa throughout Asia Minor.[2] Another name for Nimrod used in Greece was Nikolaos. This name is a combination of the Greek words nikos and laos, which together mean “victory over the laity” or “conqueror of common people.” These customs inform certain practices within Christianity, such as the focus on Mary and Jesus together. Thus, the gift-bearing portion of the Santa Claus or Saint Nicholas story is ultimately a manifestation of the ancient cults of Babylon.

Krampus Confluence

With Santa’s gifts explained, let us turn to the coal and sticks. These come from a pre-Christian tradition in Eastern Europe involving a figure named Krampus. This being, whose portrayal resembles that of Satan, is said to come on December 5 (Krampusnacht) to punish bad children. He may leave coal or sticks, beat children with sticks, kidnap and throw them into water, or take them directly to Hell in the worst cases. In places where Krampusnacht is observed, children get presents on December 6. Families with unruly children hang gold-painted bundles of birch sticks in their homes throughout the year as a functional décor to remind the children of the threat that Krampus may beat or abduct them.

Krampusnacht celebrations involve parades of people wearing Krampus costumes, running through the streets and beating people. The masks involved can be valuable items of folk art, especially if they are antiques. Though Krampus was of Norse origin—said to be the son of Hel, the god of death and the underworld who lends her name to the Hell of Christianity—he has been linked to Santa since the 17th century. Though Krampus was banned under fascist rule in the 1930s, the custom resumed once those governments fell.

Ill Effects

To adults, all of this may seem like a harmless bit of fun. But when children are taught to believe in such beings as Santa Claus and Krampus, several detrimental effects may occur. First, parents who lie about Santa and/or Krampus are weakening their trust and credibility. Children will someday realize that their parents have lied to them, and this will lead them to question other statements that their parents have made. This can lead to trust issues that persist even into adult life, as well as damage a fundamental and irreplaceable relationship in a young person’s life.

Second, the Krampus story encourages violent parenting. A multitude of studies show that physically abusing and verbally threatening children is counterproductive to their development. The idea that a demon may take a child away from home forever into a place of punishment can inflict lasting feelings of trauma and insecurity on a young mind, and being hit with sticks is not much better for a child’s physical health. If children are capable of understanding reason, then it is better to use reason. If children are incapable of understanding reason, then they cannot understand the reasons why their elders are striking or threatening them. Moreover, the desire to escape punishment is the lowest of Kohlberg’s six stages of ethical development[3], and the desire to obtain rewards is the next lowest. Myths like those about Santa and Krampus can keep people from progressing past these lower stages of ethical thinking.

Third, these myths teach children to believe in entities whose existence and efficacy are not supported by credible evidence. A scientific analysis of what Santa Claus and his flying reindeer would have to do to fulfill the conditions set for him shows that he would have to endure G-forces more than 1,000 times beyond what is lethal. The idea of gifts and punishments coming seemingly out of nowhere, deus or diabolus ex machina style, to those who deserve them, requires a supernatural violation of physics as well as economics. If a child can be taught to believe in Santa or Krampus in the absence of credible evidence, then it will be easier for them to fall prey to religious cults or confidence schemes later on. On a related note, such traditions undermine the religious teachings that parents may wish to pass on to their children. Once children reason their way to the conclusion that Santa Claus is not real, they may apply similar thinking to the Christian God and become atheists, which a Christian parent would presumably not wish to see.

Fourth, the focus on gifts that is encouraged by belief in Santa Claus contributes to a culture of degenerate consumerism. This leads many people to spend money they do not have on items they do not need, then take the rest of the year to pay off the debts they incur during the holiday season. This runs counter to Christian teaching, which encourages both economic frugality and an emphasis on long-term planning over immediate gratification.

But perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Santa Claus myth relates to the similarities between the Santa/Krampus duo and the institution of the state. The lyrics to a popular Christmas song say,

“He sees you when you’re sleeping,
He knows when you’re awake,
He knows if you’ve been bad or good,
So be good for goodness sake!”[4]

The idea of a benevolent gift-giver who regularly violates everyone’s privacy and will bring punishment to those whom he deems to be bad people is a close approximation of the ideals of the current political establishment. The story of Santa makes the citizenry easier to control by making people comfortable with a state apparatus that frequently violates their rights and threatens them with punishment from a young age.

Conclusion

All things considered, the stories of Santa Claus and Krampus have the effects of destroying trust in the family, healthy personal development, acceptance of reason and science, maintenance of other traditions, and the desire for liberty in the mind of a child. For these reasons, it is fair to say that lying to children about Santa Claus and/or Krampus does far more harm than good. It is best to be honest about such customs and tell children that these are merely stories rather than real entities so that they will not develop resentment, irrationality, and statist tendencies.

References:

  1. Jeremiah 10:2-5 (NKJV)
  2. Langer, William L. (1940); Stearns, Peter N. (ed. 2001). The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, chronologically arranged. Houghton Mifflin. p. 37.
  3. Kohlberg, Lawrence (1976). “Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach”. In Lickona, T. Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. Holt, NY: Rinehart and Winston.
  4. Coots, John Frederick and Gillespie, Haven (1934). Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town.

Eight Politically Incorrect Benefits of Cryptocurrency

Due to surging exchange rates in the past few months, the opening of Bitcoin futures, and the likelihood of Bitcoin exchange-traded funds in the near future, there is renewed mainstream interest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Mainstream investors tend to be attracted to the profit potential, portfolio diversification, and technological curiosities of cryptocurrency. But there are other benefits of cryptocurrencies which may scare away the average investor. Let us consider eight activities which can be performed with or aided by Bitcoin and its alternatives that will be cheered by political outsiders to the chagrin of the establishment.

1. Tax Evasion

Charles Stross famously complained that Bitcoin

“looks like it was designed as a weapon intended to damage central banking and money issuing banks, with a Libertarian political agenda in mind—to damage states ability to collect tax and monitor their citizens’ financial transactions.”

The problem is that he views this as a negative. From a moral standpoint, taxation is armed robbery, slavery, racketeering, trespassing, communicating threats, receiving stolen money, and conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes. If anyone dared to challenge the state’s monopoly on tax collection, they could face any of these criminal charges. By doing business in cryptocurrencies and taking additional steps to protect one’s identity (Bitcoin is pseudonymous rather than anonymous, though other cryptocurrencies are fully anonymous), one can keep part or all of one’s income and stored wealth away from Leviathan’s watchful eye. Establishment politicians and pundits will decry tax evasion as immoral. But as Murray Rothbard writes,

“Just as no one is morally required to answer a robber truthfully when he asks if there are any valuables in one’s house, so no one can be morally required to answer truthfully similar questions asked by the State, e.g., when filling out income tax returns.”[1]

The weapon of cryptocurrency is thus more of a shield than a sword, though it may be employed in an offensive posture (see #8).

2. Agorism

One way to reduce the size and scope of the state is to starve it of funds. Agorism is a strategy introduced by Samuel Konkin for reducing and eventually eliminating state power by expanding the size and scope of gray and black markets. As more people rely on the informal economy to a greater extent, they will develop a culture of resistance against state power while depriving governments of revenue by keeping their taxable income out of official records. This will incense people who believe that the state is necessary for the provision of essential services such as military defense and legal systems, but those services could be performed by private entities if they were not forcibly stopped from doing so by state monopolies. It will also worry those who believe that governments must take care of the poor and down-trodden, but private charity is quite capable of solving the problem, especially with tax burdens removed.

3. Undermining Prohibition

From the beginning of the original Silk Road, cryptocurrency has played a role in helping people to obtain goods and services that are prohibited by state laws. Though that site was shuttered by government intervention, this had more to do with the incompetence of Ross Ulbricht than with any inherent flaw in Silk Road or Bitcoin. Since then, many other sites have been created to serve the same purpose. This is a terrifying prospect for drug warriors and gun control advocates, who believe that strict laws against the sale of such goods are necessary to keep communities safe. But the available evidence suggests that state bans only raise the prices of banned goods while increasing the violence involved in their trade. Thankfully, online black markets will continue to undermine prohibitionist policies while reducing the amount of violence involved in both law enforcement and black market disputes.

4. Circumventing Child Labor Laws

Most developed countries prohibit children under a certain age from working. Proponents of child labor legislation believe that it is necessary to protect children from exploitation and lack of education. However, in most places where child labor is still prevalent, it is better than the alternatives of lackluster schooling, child prostitution, or starvation. In more developed countries, child labor laws prevent children from earning income, learning useful trade skills, building a work ethic, and avoiding indoctrination by the state. Cryptocurrencies provide a framework to allow people to hire and pay children outside of official channels (see #2), while smart contracts on a cryptocurrency blockchain can prevent wage theft and other exploitation.

5. Circumventing Capital Controls

In many countries, there are laws that forbid carrying more than a certain amount of money or goods out of the country. Such laws are easy to enforce when currencies are centralized in a specific country, and when money and goods must take physical form, as precious metals and cash do. But cryptocurrencies are not particular to any physical location and do not require a physical form. This allows a person to trade one’s fiat currency or precious metal in one country for cryptocurrency, travel to another country, and either sell the cryptocurrency for fiat currency or precious metal in the other country or use the cryptocurrency directly. Economic protectionists may argue that this weakens the economy of the nation that experiences capital flight, but capital flight would not be occurring if the nation experiencing it had a more responsible government that was not creating adverse economic conditions.

6. Financing Disapproved Activism

Political dissidents and the causes they support are frequently rejected by the legacy financial system. Banks, credit cards, Paypal, and other money handlers have a long history of closing accounts and denying service to people and groups that oppose the current power structure with sufficient ardency and effectiveness. This occurs partly because these companies tend to be controlled by virtue-signaling members of the establishment, and partly because government regulators can make business difficult or impossible for companies that refuse to crack down on dissidents. If there were no other options, then the establishment would be able to effectively eliminate its opposition by starving them out. But ever since Wikileaks came to depend on Bitcoin donations for funding, cryptocurrencies have provided an alternative financial system that allows activists to make a living, engage in commerce, and perform their activism despite the disapproval of ruling elites.

7. Thwarting Monetary Policy

Ever since Keynesian economics became prevalent among policymakers, central bankers have sought to manipulate interest rates and the money supply to stimulate the economy. But in practice, this only distorts the economy further, encouraging those with capital to make malinvestments. True to the Austrian business cycle theory, this forms yet another economic bubble that then breaks, after which misguided commentators blame markets and call for yet more intervention. Over the long term, central banks also destroy the purchasing power of a currency, with the US dollar losing 96 percent of its value since the Federal Reserve was formed in 1913. In order to continue to function, central banks must have a critical mass of economic transactions occur in the currency that they manipulate. Should enough people make the switch away from state-backed fiat currencies, monetary policy will lose its effectiveness. Cryptocurrencies threaten this critical mass by offering an alternative to people who wish to opt out of the scam of central banking and own an asset that appreciates over time.

8. Assassination Markets

Perhaps the most controversial application for cryptocurrencies is known as a death pool or an assassination market. First theorized by Tim May and fleshed out by Jim Bell in the 1990s, assassination markets predict the date on which a particular person will die and provide payment to those who guess correctly. This incentivizes an assassin to bet on a certain date and kill the person on that date. The original proposal was made long before cryptocurrencies were invented, and thus called for the use of anonymous remailers. Cryptocurrencies render remailers obsolete, as they better serve the purpose of compensating the assassin without leaving evidence that law enforcement can use to discover the identity of the assassin and/or the crowdfunders. The goal is to increase the level of occupational hazard for being a politician or minion thereof to such an extent that the benefits of wielding state power are no longer worth the cost. The theoretical result is that if politicians, central bankers, enforcers, and other such people suddenly become frequent targets of assassination, then these occupations will cease to exist due to a lack of interest in assuming such roles. Although the establishment will only ever view such an approach as murderous, and cryptocurrency enthusiasts are deeply divided over the concept, there will almost certainly be many attempts to create assassination markets in the coming years.

References:

  1. Rothbard, Murray (1982). The Ethics of Liberty. Humanities Press. p. 183

On Traditionalism, Degeneracy, and Compassion

Reaction and Traditionalism

In recent years, there has been a resurgence in traditionalist and reactionary thought. However, as far-right circles still retain a tint of modernity, some anomalous developments have occurred. Parts of this new reaction engage in a contest against modernity without seeking any actual return to traditional norms. This creates a situation in which the framework of modernity is tacitly accepted while modernity itself is rejected. Since the people who appreciate modernity tend to oppose pre-modern wisdom and accomplishment, reactionaries have a tendency to oppose everything modern without the necessary consideration. This is an example of a phenomenon that neoreactionaries call “Error Push,” in which people signal agreement with positions that are factually inaccurate because an ideological opponent holds those positions.

Thus far, there has not been a coherent grounding for this traditionalism. The attempts to lay an alternative groundwork have thus far been arbitrary and capricious. Whether the current fad is traditional Christianity, white separatism, or worshiping Chilean dictators, none have provided an analytic or cohesive framework for what is supposed to come after modernity in lieu of postmodernism. As there has not been a good and proper moral standard for the new reactionaries, there are people who claim to be reactionaries who are openly participating in modernity. These include proud and open homosexuals who cite the ancient Greeks, a degree of intersectionality of men’s rights activism and traditionalism, and supposed conservatives who promote pornography, to name a few. To make sense of this and to provide an alternative, there needs to be an establishment of coherent norms of morality and what is expected of those who hold traditional values. The ultimate answer to this is found in early libertarian theory.

The Typology of Degeneracy

The traditional libertarian notion of tolerance is fundamentally antithetical to the modern notion of tolerance. What has now become a tacit acceptance of every sort of perversion and lifestyle under the sun grew out of a reluctance to use force against non-violent people. This, coupled with the ideas of free will and individual responsibility, was the libertarian view until libertarianism became tied together with cosmopolitanism. In a cohesive framework utilizing these ideas, the question of degeneracy becomes simplified. First, it is unjust to force individuals to cease being degenerates as long as the individuals in question are not initiating the use of force. This should be obvious to every libertarian and acceptable to most people who believe that a traditional society is necessary. However, it is completely justified to exclude undesirable degeneracy from a society. The method for fighting against degeneracy is thus to have a set of moral standards agreed upon by private property owners in a community, with physical removal as the punishment for non-compliance.

This splits degeneracy into two types: personal and communal. Personal degeneracy is that which has absolutely no effect on the community; in economic terms, it imposes no externalities. An example is the notion advanced by homosexuals that what they do in their own bedrooms is not the business of the state. Despite the dubious nature of this example in the real world (if they were really only concerned with what occurs behind closed doors, there would be little need for public agitation), it is true that insofar as their activities are confined to their own bedrooms, it does not affect the larger society. In fact, the rest of society will not even know that they are homosexuals and will function under the assumption that they are not. The people who choose to engage in acts that are only harmful to themselves are the responsibility of themselves and no one else. That being said, the typology of degeneracy is not a simple binary. Not all personal perversion that has effects on the community becomes communal perversion, and there is always some degree of externality in every action, however minuscule. Thus the typology becomes a matter of degree; degeneracy can be more communal or more personal, but is never entirely one to the exclusion of the other.

There is another important aspect which both libertarianism and theology can provide. There is a difference between choosing to engage in degenerate behavior and having an abnormal nature. For example, a drug addict who is clean and has no interest in furthering drug abuse or engaging in depraved behavior is very different from a drug addict who actively promotes and regularly engages in the use of dangerous substances. In this case, a drug addict is likely to have genetic and environmental factors that make drug addiction more likely. A broken person is much more likely to turn to heroin in an effort to fill an emotional void than out of a desire to do heroin, but there is still a choice involved to some lesser degree. As before, this is a matter of degree and not a simple dichotomy. The more one personally embraces a degenerate behavior, the more likely it is to become public, as degenerate behaviors necessarily cause a loss of the self-control needed to keep the behavior private.

These factors lead to a correlation between voluntary degeneracy and communal practice, as well as a correlation between involuntary degeneracy and personal practice. There is variance outside these two cases, but they are the two broad categories of depravity. Voluntary communal degeneracy can be reduced by the proper raising of children, but can only be defeated by forming communities that exclude those who promote degeneracy. Reactionaries tend to understand this, but often lack understanding of involuntary personal degeneracy. Due to radicalization and having no effective definition of counter-modernity, the first impulse is often to shun and attack those who are effected by this sort of decay. The other impulse that is often prevalent is to simply accept degeneracy as long as it is kept within personal boundaries. This creates a massive amount of confusion within the radicals who have no moral background and leaves potential problems to grow and fester. Furthermore, both of these approaches are fundamentally modern, in that they attempt to hide and ignore that which is undesirable rather than confront and defeat it.

The Role of Compassion

There is only one internally consistent way to deal with involuntary personal degeneracy. This is not through tolerance or acceptance but through compassion. This is the libertarian-Christian ideal forgotten by the new wave of reactionaries, the notion of loving the sinner but hating the sin, of disagreeing with a person’s behavior but still wanting to help them improve with non-coercive discussion and empathy. This is the most rational and effective way to change behaviors in a productive manner. If one cares about people who have succumbed to destructive behaviors without subjecting others to what they are doing, one needs to provide them with constructive support that does not enable their degeneracy. If one is guided by a vague sense of moralism, it may be repulsive to approach such people with an open mind. It may seem natural to shun everyone who has problems which they are unable to solve. But everyone has some degree of behavioral tendencies which could be harmful to oneself and others. What matters is knowing how to properly manage these tendencies and that one can live the most balanced life by facilitating a compromise between higher ideals and personal desires. The goal should not be to rid oneself of personal desires completely or to eliminate people who have desires which go contrary to morality, as this would ultimately cause human extinction.

The only way in which it is possible to change the minds of people who are in a state of decay through no fault of their own is to show how their state can be improved by living a better and more moral life. A drug addict cannot instantaneously stop being a drug addict; however, he can stop actively desiring to participate in voluntary and communal perversion. The same is true for homosexuals, excessive gamblers, the sexually promiscuous, and every other type of participant in degenerate behavior. In essence, the goal should be to increase the degree to which unnatural urges are involuntary and personal. If we are to stop degeneracy, it must be done by compassion or forced exclusion. The former requires actively caring about the people in our personal lives who have some degree of degeneracy and are willing to be helped.

Book Review: The Euro

The Euro is a book about the shortcomings of the eurozone currency project by American economist Joseph Stiglitz. The book makes a case against many of the policies pursued by European leaders thus far and recommends several alternatives, including further integration, a flexible euro, and the exit of one or more members. The book is divided into twelve chapters which explore different aspects of the problem and possible solutions.

A short preface details Stiglitz’s view of the economic problems of Europe as being largely attributable to the creation of a single currency zone without the creation of other institutions that are found in other such places elsewhere in the world. He compares the euro to the gold standard, repeating the flawed mainstream view that deflation is bad. His Keynesian approach to economics and thoroughly statist worldview is apparent from the beginning. That being said, Stiglitz appears to want to solve problems and correctly identifies some people and institutions as being uninterested in doing so.

The opening section begins with a chapter that expands upon the preface and outlines the rest of the book. There is little here that is not covered in greater detail later, so let us move on. In Chapter 2, Stiglitz argues that the poor results of the euro should have been expected because economic integration of this sort cannot come before political integration. Here, he contends that military might no longer shapes outcomes as it once did, but this is dubious because nothing short of a nuclear exchange that no one wants could have stopped the United States from conquering and colonizing Iraq if that had been the intention and American leadership had used its full power. So too for Russia in Ukraine and Crimea. His responses to other arguments for a single currency make more sense. He states the fallacious mainstream position on public goods, claiming without logic or evidence that it is impossible for markets to provide basic research and common utilities. This amounts to a confusion of collective action with state action. Even so, Stiglitz does recognize that localization is better than central planning from afar, though his disdain for German policies makes him inconsistent on this point. He then turns to economic integration, discussing the importance of German history with hyperinflation and its prominent role in modern Europe for understanding the European Central Bank. Next, Stiglitz writes about effect that a shared currency has on economic integration, which is mixed. Like many Keynesians, he accuses the market of failure when this is actually impossible; such events are actually failures of government, resources, or individual people. He also regards economics as scientific, even though the scientific method cannot be applied to subjects in which counterfactuals are so important but also unobservable. As usual, the word ‘neoliberal’ says more about the person using it than anything else. He concludes by arguing that there is a democratic deficit in Europe, even though he argues elsewhere in the book against incentive structures which are necessarily part of any democracy.

Europe’s lackluster economic performance since the 2008 crisis is the subject of the third chapter. Stiglitz begins by claiming that Keynesianism is a success because it has lengthened business cycles and shortened downturns, but it has also made the downturns that do occur so much worse that markets were better off before such interventionism. Much of the chapter consists of empirical data for Europe since 2007. When discussing unemployment, he seems not to recognize that unemployment benefits subsidize a negative behavior and will thus produce more of that behavior. Stiglitz relies upon the Gini coefficient when discussing inequality, which is a faulty metric because it measures pre-tax income rather than after-tax consumption. This causes it to exaggerate the amount of income inequality. His detailing of the long-term adverse effects of recession in terms of destroyed human capital is largely correct, but he again recommends interventionism that tends to worsen such problems. He also takes the position that the state should protect those at the economic bottom, though almost every economist would avoid social Darwinism on this front. Stiglitz then commits a fixed pie fallacy by arguing that trade surpluses necessarily cause trade deficits elsewhere, when the reality is quite different. He concludes by correctly noting that the counterfactuals help critics of the euro, and that there is no better explanation for many of Europe’s troubles than sharing a common currency across uncommon societies and economies.

The second section argues that the euro suffers from a flawed initial design. In Chapter 4, the requirements for a single currency region to be successful are considered. Here, Stiglitz uplifts full employment and market stability as goals while denouncing those who favor economic freedom as a “lunatic fringe.” This leads him to contemplate a false dilemma between national control of money and supranational control. He blames market fundamentalism (which he calls neoliberalism) for the crisis of 2008, despite the fact that markets were altered by central bankers in such a way as to cause the crash, which he all but says elsewhere. In explaining the differences between the United States and the eurozone, Stiglitz highlights the freer movement of Americans, the identity of Americans at the national level rather than the state level (at least in modern times), and the federal nature of monetary and fiscal stimulus. He is correct to say that there must either be “more Europe” or “less Europe,” but sides with the former. He describes the Keynesian theory of business cycles, but makes no mention of the Austrian theory. Stiglitz then repeats the tired fallacy that austerity caused the Great Depression and the current malaise, rather than central bank shenanigans and tariff policies. His blame for the gold standard is similarly misguided. He somewhat fixes an error from the previous chapter by clarifying that trade imbalances are not a problem if currency exchange rates can change to compensate for them. He straw-mans the laissez-faire position on unemployment by saying that it views unemployment due to market adjustments as good rather than as simply necessary. Stiglitz then gets a few points correct: low wages undermine worker morale and productivity, falling wages may not amount to falling prices if firms are worried about their solvency, and monetary stimulus has a breaking point at which interest rates cannot be lowered further. But he again blames the private sector for being excessive when it is only reacting to perverse incentives created by governments and central banks. There is little to fault in Stiglitz’s explanation of why currency areas are prone to crisis except for the preceding error, but it never occurs to him to simply not have such an area. The chapter ends by repeating many of the fallacious arguments from the previous chapter concerning trade surpluses and deficits.

The fifth chapter considers the economic divergence of the eurozone countries. Stiglitz argues in favor of institutional frameworks to prevent the need for bailouts, as well as funds to make depositors whole and provide bailouts. This ignores the moral hazard created by such a regime that causes bankers to take excessive risks, as well as the powerful incentives that an absence of protection would have on depositors to act responsibly and hold bankers accountable. His view of regulation is starry-eyed, missing the entire concept of regulatory capture. This is especially striking, given his focus on institutional capture in the following chapter. Stiglitz rightly complains of capitalized gains and socialized losses among bankers. In his consideration of other sources of divergence, he again fails to consider the possibility of turning over infrastructure to private development, instead proposing expansion of the European Investment Bank, which is certain to become another statist boondoggle. His view of knowledge markets is flawed in the same manner as his view of economies; it fails to account for the distortions that statism necessarily causes which lead to various types of failure. He concludes the chapter by showing how policies in the eurozone have caused greater instability, but cannot seem to avoid blaming the private sector for responding to the incentives imposed upon it.

In Chapter 6, Stiglitz examines the European Central Bank. He begins by saying that open markets and free competition can efficiently allocate resources only in the presence of adequate government regulation. This is a contradiction because an absence of government regulation defines an open market with free competition. His arguments concerning the inflation-only mandate of the ECB and the problems it causes would be much stronger if the Austrian business cycle theory were anywhere to be found in the book. His description of events in Chile under Pinochet does not agree with the long-term result of economic prosperity relative to the rest of South America and neglects how much worse conditions would have been under Salvador Allende. His claim that markets are supposed to be efficient and stable are a straw man; instability in the form of creative destruction and inefficiency by some metrics rather than others are inherent in a market economy. Stiglitz correctly writes that monetary policy is always a political question, pitting creditors against debtors for control of the central bank. But he leaves unclear how democracy is supposed to hold central bankers accountable. He also must not know any libertarians, or he would know that some people have proposed taking away spending power from governments to ensure that they do not misbehave. The chapter ends with a history of fashionable central bank policies over time and what was wrong with them from a Keynesian perspective.

The next two chapters delve into the Greek situation in particular, as Greece has suffered a more severe economic crisis than any other eurozone country. The seventh chapter explores the effect that the Troika’s policies had on countries in crisis. Stiglitz accuses some European leaders of acting in bad faith by purposefully attempting to punish governments with different political views from their own, which may be accurate. He continues his misguided attack on austerity, though it has more merit against what Europeans have actually done than against real austerity. He correctly explains the problem with primary surpluses, but then commits the broken window fallacy by embracing Keynesian multipliers. Stiglitz accurately diagnoses the problems of increasing taxes, but seeks to aid governments in collecting them rather than encourage economic freedom and stronger property rights. He describes his ideal system of property taxation in the same tone that a proud and unrepentant thief might use to boast of his crimes. Although he is correct to say that particular moves toward privatization and economic freedom may produce adverse results in particular contexts, this is a justification not for state intervention, but for undoing even more statism so as to remove the problematic context. Stiglitz notes that the hegemony of American military power has put Europe into a Pax Romana problem in which it cannot fend for itself against a real threat, but advises that this problem be worsened in the name of fiscal restraint. He compares reductions in pensions to wage theft when the two are clearly different. It is the responsibility of workers to figure out that they are being offered terms which may be impossible for the employer to meet in the future and practice caveat emptor. As for bank bailouts and debt restructuring, Stiglitz describes the situation well except for his faulty view of austerity.

Chapter 8 delves into structural reforms in Greece that made matters worse. Again, Stiglitz’s views of austerity and democracy corrupt an otherwise sound analysis of trivial and counterproductive actions taken by the Troika. He claims without proof that industrial policies are required to advance countries that are lagging behind in technological development, neglecting that markets are not doing this because they are either disallowed from doing so or are assuming that the state will do this for them. He criticizes intergenerational transmission of advantage and seeks to use the state against it, when it should be championed as both eugenic and important for maintaining a natural aristocracy. Stiglitz argues for a price on carbon emissions and claims that the private sector will not address climate change, when again the state has kept this from happening. He finishes by discussing counterfactuals, which is interesting given his empiricist thinking on economics.

The final four chapters deal with various proposals going forward. In the ninth chapter, Stiglitz offers his advice for fixing the eurozone. As before, he embraces what Henry Hazlitt called “the fetish of full employment” as the goal of his policy proposals. Much of the content of the chapter rehashes proposals from previous chapters. He seeks to create common deposit insurance and common resolution while abolishing place-based debt within the EU. This will create moral hazards and work against people who wish to escape debt slavery inflicted upon them by their ancestors. He calls for wages to be raised in countries with surpluses, which will lead to unemployment in those countries as workers whose labor is not worth higher wages are laid off. He fundamentally misunderstands precious metals, failing to understand their role as a store of value and medium of exchange, even if no longer officially used in such capacities. Stiglitz seeks to make the financial sector and other corporations serve society, but fails to recognize that the organs of a statist social order inherently and irrevocably serve themselves at the expense of the society. The shortsightedness of markets of which he complains is actually caused by the institutions that he seeks to use to solve the problem. One of the few sound recommendations made in this chapter is the creation of a super-Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure to quickly restructure debt. He goes on to propose that EU taxes be based on citizenship, and that some of the proceeds be used for foreign aid or resettlement of migrants, further impoverishing and culturally endangering Europeans.

Chapter 10 examines the possibility of what Stiglitz calls “an amicable divorce,” in which countries exit the eurozone. He considers the example of Grexit, or Greece returning to its own currency that he calls the Greek-euro but would probably be called the drachma, as it was before the euro. He proposes that Greece create a new electronic currency to ease concerns over producing coins and banknotes, stop tax avoidance, bring everyone into the financial system, and facilitate the ability of central banks to create credit. Stiglitz fails to consider that people are likely to reject such a system in favor of cryptocurrencies, which have all of the benefits of such a system without most of the drawbacks, and that such a system could offer states tyrannical control over their citizens. His view of credit indicates magical thinking, although this is quite common in modern financial circles. He again blames the private sector for problems caused by politicians and central bankers, while ignoring peer-to-peer lending as a substitute for modern credit systems. Stiglitz describes a potential system of credit auctions which could be abused with much the same ease as the current system. He admits and supports what should be abhorrent to any decent person: that fiat currencies are ultimately given value by extortion in the form of taxation. Stiglitz correctly says that a new Greek currency would enable them to devalue it to correct trade imbalances, but his proposed system of trade tokens for the same purpose would be redundant. He equates deflation with a deficiency of aggregate demand, neglecting the possibilities of an abundance of supply or improvements in efficiency and/or quality. His description of currency change as a debt restructuring is insightful. To end the chapter, Stiglitz considers the alternative of Germany leaving the eurozone, though it is unlikely that they would give up their current position of power so willingly. This segues into the topic of the next chapter, which is a flexible euro consisting of several subdivisions.

Stiglitz uses Finland as a counterexample against those who claim that profligacy in southern Europe is to blame, rather than the structure of the eurozone. Most of his argument here is correct, except for his view of austerity. His proposal in this chapter is to have several eurozones with fluctuating exchange rates, which could be brought closer together over time as political integration occurs, eventually resulting in economic integration. The details are borrowed from the previous two chapters. Though more likely to succeed than the proposals in those chapters, it is also the least likely to be adopted. Stiglitz correctly recognizes that having a single currency area is an interference in the market in and of itself, monopolizing exchange and interest rates in the area, but cannot seem to fathom that his flexible euro proposal also does this on a smaller scale. He claims that it can be better not to simply rely on prices for the allocation of resources, but does not explain how to solve the local knowledge problem or the economic calculation problem in a superior manner. He also says that history shows free banking to be a disaster, when the truth is quite the opposite.

The final chapter sees Stiglitz review many themes from previous chapters, but he also covers topics which are barely mentioned elsewhere. He denounces anti-immigrant groups in Europe, which are only trying to resist demographic replacement by a ruling class that they did not ask to replace them. So much for the “democratic accountability” that Stiglitz extols in the same breath. He blames right-wing economic ideology for rising inequality in the United States beginning with the Reagan administration, but incomes really began to diverge ten years earlier, when Nixon ended the gold standard. Stiglitz expresses a desire to preserve the Enlightenment values of Europe, but cannot comprehend how letting in migrants with distinctly anti-Enlightenment values will jeopardize that mission. On the issue of trade policy, he understands that free trade is not always best for all parties involved, as it can destroy important societal arrangements that prevent conflict. But then Stiglitz incredulously asks how one could have expected that Europe’s leaders would create such economic dysfunction, with massive unemployment and lack of economic security. The answer is that a proper amount of cynicism would require such an expectation.

Overall, the best thing that can be said for the book is that it is not an effort made in bad faith. Stiglitz correctly identifies many of the problems with the current state of affairs in Europe and seems to want to help, but his proposed solutions are thoroughly misguided. Despite his palpable disdain for Milton Friedman and other Chicago School monetarists, he suffers from one of the worst of their faults: a desire to solve the immediate problems set before him combined with a lack of broader perspective. This leads him to propose a banking system which could be used to terrible effect against political dissidents, tax collection schemes that would indicate criminal intent in any non-statist context, and forced political integration by means of stealth and subterfuge. He also seems to believe that everything would be fine if only state power were used by the right people to implement the right policies. It never occurs to him that the power itself might be the problem. The Euro is an interesting case study in leftist economic thought, but those looking for real solutions to Europe’s economic woes should keep looking.

Rating: 2.5/5

Praise The Grinch Bots

This week, outlets across the spectrum of establishment media were outraged at so-called ‘grinch bots.’ These are automated programs that make bulk purchases online so that scalpers can resell the items at higher prices. This has caused the prices of some toys to increase several-fold. For instance, a Barbie Hello Dreamhouse retails for $299.99, but on eBay, one reseller is asking for more than $4,600. This phenomenon has caught the attention of Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), who said, “Grinch bots cannot be allowed to steal Christmas, or dollars, from the wallets of New Yorkers. …Parents have a real dilemma: either they can’t get the toy because the bots have scooped them up, or they have to pay an enormous price.” In a letter to the National Retail Federation and the Retail Industry Leaders Association, he wrote, “I am calling on your associations to immediately investigate how these dishonest software programs are being used on your members’ sites and take all available steps to thwart computer systems from cheating America’s consumers.”

Schumer’s comments illustrate an economic illiteracy that is all too common among politicians and pundits. Contrary to popular belief, scalpers perform an important function in an economy. In this case, they also provide other benefits that extend beyond economics and into culture. Let us examine these phenomena in order to see why grinch bots are good.

The Economic Role of Scalpers

When a manufacturer produces an item for sale, it is impossible to calculate the market clearing price in advance. The market clearing price is exactly what it appears to be: the maximum price at which the producer can sell all of the produced items. Any price above this level will result in unsold product, while any price below this level will invite people to buy up the items and resell them, also known as scalping. Whereas overproduction is the worst inefficiency in manufacturing, a producer would prefer to err on the low side of the market clearing price. This naturally produces excess demand, which in turn leads to higher prices. Part of this effect occurs naturally in retail businesses, but scalpers act as an additional market force to accelerate the price correction up to its proper level.

Scalpers also function as risk mitigators. If a scalper buys products and fails to resell them, then the scalper loses the entire cost of the item while the manufacturer, retailer, and everyone in between are reimbursed for their expenses. If the scalper does make sales, then he makes a profit and people find the products they want. The scalper is thus strongly incentivized to connect manufacturers and distributors with customers who want their goods. Note that the scalper is behaving like a retailer, in that he buys large amounts of finite, potentially scarce products and sells them for a profit to people who want them. Yet hatred of scalpers is common, while hatred of retailers is rare.

Some people will argue that scalpers are responsible for higher prices and lower availability, but this is merely a result of arithmetic, and would happen with or without dedicated scalpers speculating on Christmas toys. Suppose, for an example similar to the case at hand, that doll houses are selling for an average of about $300, there are 10,000 doll houses for sale every day, and 15,000 people want a doll house. To avoid distributing reservations without price rationing, which would result in reservations being made available in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, prices must rise to a level where only 10,000 people still want them. This level may be around $450 in this case. How this $150 per doll house increase is distributed is what will vary, depending on how much scalping versus internal revaluation in retail stores is occurring.

Schumer makes two more especially ignorant claims which are worthy only of a cursory rebuttal. First, he contends that scalping harms the poor. This ignores the fact that scalping is an excellent economic opportunity for the poor, as they can make large returns by engaging in scalping. Second, he says that grinch bots are engaging in acts of theft and cheating. The idea that voluntarily purchasing a product at the offered price could constitute theft and cheating is simply bizarre.

Cultural Benefits

When scalpers buy up Christmas toys and fail to resell them, there are additional benefits which extend beyond economics and into culture. There is an enormous opportunity cost involved with the holiday shopping season, as people spend money they do not have on items they do not need, then spend even more money on getting out of debt. One way of preventing this is for attempted scalpers to raise prices and thus reduce demand. This will cause people who are on the margin of shopping versus not shopping to reconsider in favor of the latter. Those who make one reconsideration are more likely to make other, related reconsiderations, so people who cease engaging in holiday consumerism may come to some deeper personal or spiritual understanding, or at least develop more concerns beyond immediate gratification. Although a few grinch bots may play a minmal role in the grand scheme, any lowering of time preference coupled with greater focus on the virtues embodied in Christmas traditions would be a cultural improvement.

Conclusion

The attacks on the grinch bots are understandable; they are an obvious target for the economically illiterate, and going after them makes excellent political hay for a senator looking to expand the state’s regulatory powers. Which of these best describes Schumer is debatable, but the above analysis clearly demonstrates that scalpers in general and these computer programs in particular should be praised rather than denounced.

The Case for Autostatism

Author’s note: The reader can find everything else I have written about the concept of autostatism here.

Introduction

Libertarians have always had ambitions that are both universalist and purist. Most libertarians are willing to admit that their vision will not be realizable in their own lifetimes and rather hope that future generations are wiser than they themselves have been. These libertarians take an approach that could only be considered rational when one takes into account the very nature of libertarianism. The search for liberty means always fighting against tremendous odds, as many people care more about increasing their personal power than about liberty. Power is a great direct gain, while liberty is a diffused social gain. This insight, combined with the logic of public choice, tells us that when people seek power, they are more likely to attain it than those who want to destroy power are to destroy it. These people seek power for themselves by being parasites on others, which is generally incompatible with achieving liberty.

The achievement of a libertarian social order requires collective motivation on a scale that is only present when the state has become so oppressive as to be intolerable. The state has adapted to this and tries very hard to avoid any loss of power by being as tolerable as possible and making its operations as covert as possible while openly integrating themselves into the lives of everyone. This helps the state remain an unambiguous sovereign and appear to be a fundamental condition of life from which it is hard to deviate psychologically and intellectually. The modern state makes itself into a leviathan not by lording over people, but rather by integrating itself into the population. This process is neither peaceful nor painless; the methods by which the state integrates itself into a society must be fundamentally based on indoctrination and coercion. But once sufficiently advanced, the state becomes a fact of life that is almost incontestable by any rational person, and support for the abolition of the state will be extremely sparse. Thus it is possible to say that up to a point, the more oppressive a state is, the more it can be expected to have popular support.

Collective Separation

The main premise from which the strategy of autostatism is derived from is that separating ourselves into multiple autonomous governments or stateless localities is a necessary precondition for abolishing the central state. In modern democracies, all sides of all conflicts are under immense pressure and are thus very hostile towards everyone with whom they are in conflict. Since all issues are to be decided by all people in a democracy, the people who have their lives questioned will be the people who resist those who challenge their ability to live their own lives as they please. Note that in a healthy social order, the challengers themselves would be the imperiled group. From this comes a desire to separate from the hostile factors that are directly antagonistic to the individual’s lifestyle and property. There is no reconciliation or common ground within the framework of democracy because democracy intentionally creates unresolvable antagonisms. The common decision-making process is irreconcilable with personal liberty. Having the masses govern the masses thus becomes a self-reinforcing structure of creeping totalitarianism.

This does not necessarily mean that the correct answer to the problems of democracy is statist fascism or monarchism, as the conflicts are still present but heavily suppressed, although a case could still be made for these kinds of states. Even though autocracy has a better incentive structure than democracy in most cases, the state is not the answer to all problems within democracy. Neither is a lack of state; when libertarians think that full rights in property will properly resolve all conflicts, they assume that all people desire to have full rights in their own property. The problem is then a conflict of whether or not there should be complete property rights or whether property rights ought to be limited for the sake of the common good. This is the question of whether property creates society or vice versa.

The answer to this fundamental conflict is the autostate. This is the practical, but largely forgotten notion of governance based on actual consent. The word “autostate” means a government by the self. It can also be explained as a state formed from autonomy. The fundamental difference between a state and an autostate is that the foundational principle of the autostate is that the system of governance ought to require the consent of everyone who is governed. If no such consent is acquired, the government must be invalid and must fall into internal conflict. The notions of tacit or implicit consent that play a prominent role in social contract theory only serve to elevate the conflict inherent in any system of compulsion and suppression.

Since an autostate has the unanimous consent of everyone governed by it, it functions as any other entity on the market. However, instead of a consumer good or a conventional service, the autostate provides governance, which is to say a legal framework and a means of enforcement. Many libertarians are caught up in a fantasy in which all governance is evil. Most people do not agree with that assessment and want to put together a semblance of a social and political order so they can realize their vision for what virtue and political organization should be.

Powerless Politics

The fundamental tenet of autostatism is that the government ought to be completely powerless and can only enact those edicts which people find to be tolerable or benevolent. If this is no longer the case, the autostate could be overthrown without any risk or violence. It is necessary to distinguish between a government and a state. A government is the manager of a land area while a state holds a monopoly of compulsion and coercion. Thus, the autostate is a government, but not a conventional state. The autostate fundamentally requires consent, and consent can be revoked when the autostate stops diligently fulfilling the duties that it has taken upon itself. The autostate can be fascist, socialist, or anarchist in nature and it does not need to have any formal structure at all. What matters is that this structure or lack thereof is first agreed upon. Many anarchists and libertarians see this as conflicting with spontaneous order, but the natural condition of society is deliberate action building upon spontaneous order. It does no good to assume that one system or another is objectively part of human existence.

Furthermore, the prevailing law system in any area is more powerful and consistent if all people within that area follow the same system. This does not mean that autostates need to be dependent on physical area, but autostates are composed of the individuals who subscribe to the legal structure of the autostate. The autostate is simply the reduction of governance to a market entity and the elimination of coercion within governance. However, the autostate can retain the political and personal values that people want to have enacted. The autostatist order can thus be acceptable to everyone who is not wholly influenced by their desire for power or domination. Autostatism can let everyone accomplish their utopian political structure unless it involves the direct subjugation of others. It allows for people to have their own ideals realized in a manner that does not impose costs on those who do not share these ideals.

In essence, autostatism calls for an abolition of competitive politics for the implementation of cooperative politics. Politics should not be a matter of majority consensus but rather the implementation of mutually agreed upon social goals. The politics right now are imposed upon an unwilling population; the politics of autostatism are collaborative and voluntaristic. This can be called either an abolition of politics or a revolution within the nature of politics. Politics should not imply coercive governance, but cooperation for the achievement of mutual goals. It may be true that these mutual goals are reprehensible to others, or that some people will not want to participate in seeking these goals, but the goals themselves are not a threat within the autostatist order because they are strictly confined within consensual relations. These consensual relations mimic governance in the traditional sense, yet they require no authority insofar as that authority is derived from force and compulsion. The autostate as a concept itself allows for a reconciliation between anarchists, libertarians, socialists, conservatives, and every other group that is able to be so intellectually honest as to admit that they are better off when they have their own ideal structures implemented.

Stateless Governance

Stateless governance may seem like an ultimate nonsensical contradiction. When there is no state, the government supposedly lacks the power to do what it needs to do. And within libertarian circles, the government is seen as an inherently coercive and violent entity. Thus, stateless governance seems impossible. But we must realize that without a state, the government is nothing other than a manager of a certain society or community. If a government is a voluntarily funded managerial entity which only ensures that the social order is kept functional, there is nothing inherently unethical about that government. A critique of the state cannot be a critique of governance, as the governance is derivative of the state only in modern society.

The distinctly libertarian view that all governance and control over an individual are inherently evil, and we should all be free and not tied to any obligation, is naive and unrealizable. Most people do not want to fully determine the path of their lives and do not want others to do so either. People have values that go beyond individual liberty and they want to exercise those values. The reality is that most people want society and themselves to be controlled, appealing to liberty as an ultimate end is only convincing when appealing to people who would inevitably become libertarians themselves if given enough time to reflect on their beliefs. We must acknowledge that government is not something that is inherently evil, but rather a tool that can be used for the accomplishment of certain goals. However, when the government is tied to a state, it will be fundamentally exploitative, as the incentive structures allow for such exploitation and cater to those who would engage in such behavior. The problem is statism and not governance.

Fourth-Wave Libertarianism

Libertarianism is currently in a serious identity crisis. To explain this, let us begin by sorting the development of libertarianism into four different periods. The first period was the classical liberal era, in which the primary conflict was between the liberals and the mercantilist-feudalist tendencies within the social order. Between the high point of the first period and the high point of the second period, there were the Anglophone anarchists. People such as Lysander Spooner and Benjamin Tucker developed a theory of natural law and individualist anarchism which would later be adopted in part by Rothbard. Although integral for the development of the third wave in libertarianism, they were not influences on the later or earlier thinkers. The second period was the most desperate period, in which Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, and Ayn Rand were the most active and the period in which the groundwork was laid for the modern libertarian movement. This was the active defense against communism and socialism as they were becoming the dominant forces in the world. This was followed with the wave of libertarianism that had Rothbard at the forefront. This was a drastic attack against the state itself that went beyond the anti-socialism of the previous wave. The third wave accumulated thinkers such as Hans-Hermann Hoppe and Walter Block, and reached a somber crescendo with the campaigns of Ron Paul. The neoliberal movement was also created at this time, although this movement does not follow the particular development of libertarianism and as such is excluded.

Each of these waves has a distinct attitude, and all of them shared the consistent strategy of trying to reach libertarianism by being the most reasonable and intellectual people. But this only works when libertarians are attacking something dangerous and imminent; the success was not due to rationality, but due to how threatening the opposition was. However, there is an emergent fourth wave, and although Hoppe falls solidly in the third wave of thinkers, he is either the eminent inspiration or the primary intra-movement antagonist for most of the fourth wave. These fourth-wave thinkers do not stick to political or economic issues, but rather involve social issues at the core of libertarianism and do not allow for libertarianism to be nihilistic without properly defined morality and values. The classical liberalism of the previous waves is also under scrutiny, with some calling for a more positive outlook on reactionary thought.

Since libertarians are split into the left, right, and neither camps when it comes to social and cultural values, the fourth wave is in a disorganized and dysfunctional crisis. If we wish to preserve the libertarian tradition, we need thinkers who can unite the libertarians who want to preserve the social orders that they value alongside the purist notion of liberty. Fourth-wave libertarianism must make a drastic change and must use different tactics than the last three waves. Libertarians have always been best when they face significant issues and behemoths that seem to be immortal, and there is no larger challenge today than forced integration and coercive democracy. Autostatism offers an answer to these issues that neither the status quo nor more conventionally purist libertarians can.